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PREFACE 
Ths paper is a set of background notes  on decision-making for the 
siting of a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal in the Netherlands, 
prepared for the IIASA risk research project on liquefied energy gases 
(1980-1982). 
The paper provides a detailed account of the major aspects of the 
decision process on LNG in the Netherlands, but it is in no way to be con- 
sidered as a finished research report. It was prepared as an internal 
working document to facilitate discussion withn the IIASA research team, 
and has provided the basis for the analysis of the Dutch LNG decision pro- 
cess as featured in the final IIASA research report on "Risk Analysis and 
Decision Processes: The Siting of LEG Facilities in Four Countries" (IIASA 
1982 and a forthcoming publication of Springer Verlag). 
The author wishes to acknowledge the many individuals and organiza- 
tions who have contributed to the collection and analysis of empirical 
data concerning the Dutch LNG decision process. In this respect, the 
author expresses his sincere thanks to colleagues at  IIASA and the many 
individuals in the Netherlands, without whom the detailed account of the 
complex decision processes concerned would not have been possible. 
Appendix A lists the major organizations and individuals which have been 
consulted during this research. Parts of this paper have been completed 
while the author was a t  the Department of Social and Economic Studies, 
Imperial College of Science and Technology (university of London). 
Finally, it is stressed again, that this paper is to be considered as a 
preliminary working document only, which was prepared while research 
was still in progress. Results of further analysis and conclusions as to the 
Dutch case study on LNG siting, are reported in the final IIASA study on 
decision processes and LEG siting (IIASA 1982). 
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DECISION-MAKING ON LNG TERMINAL SITING: 
THE NmHERLANDS 
Michel Schwarz 
SECTION I: 
DEClSION C m  STUDY 
CHAPTW 1: 
INTRODUCTION AND NATIONAL CONTEXT 
1.1. INTRODUCI'ION 
From the mid-1970s onwards, the Dutch semi-state company NV 
Nederlandse Gasunie has shown serious interest in importing large quan- 
tities of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) via its own terminal, to be built and 
sited in the Netherlands. The activities of the Gasunie concerning LNG-- 
which is the sole company responsible for the supply of national gas in 
the Netherlands and which was acting within the context of Dutch govern- 
mental policy of importing natural gas gradually set  into motion develop- 
ments at  national and local governmental level, leading towards decisions 
on the importation of LNG into the Netherlands and the siting of an LNG 
terminal. The decision process finally led to the approval, in late 1978, of 
a Dutch LNG terminal by the Dutch Cabinet. This background paper 
attempts to analyze and evaluate the major developments in the Nether- 
lands concerning the decision-making process as regards the approval 
and siting of this LNG terminal. This working paper* forms the basis for 
one of four country-specific case studies, which were carried out by the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), in Laxenburg, 
Austria, on liquefied energy gases facility siting and related decision- 
making. The final IIASA report analyzes comparative issues, whilst this 
*The IIASA research is supported by the Bundesrninisterium fiir Forschung und Technologie, 
F.R.G., contract no. 321/7591/RGB 8001. The final IIASA report is referred to as IIASA (1982) 
and is entitled "Risk Analysis and Decision Processes; The Siting of LEG Facilities in Four 
Countries," a forthcoming publication from Springer Verlag. 
paper is strictly limited to a descriptive analysis and evaluation of major 
aspects of the decision-making on LNG siting as it took place in the Neth- 
erlands. 
Section I sets out the major events of the decision process in the 
Netherlands and introduces the major parties involved in the political 
process--mainly between 1975 and 1978--leading up to the decision by the 
Dutch Cabinet to locate an LNG terminal a t  a site a t  Eemshaven, in the 
northwestern province of Groningen. Ths  section sets the context for the 
analysis of the decision process as attempted in subsequent sections of 
the case study. 
Section I1 discusses the major dimensions which seem to  have been 
a t  the center of the LNG decision problem in the Netherlands: energy 
policy, economics, safety, socio-economics and environmental impact. 
For each of the major parties it is assessed how and to what extent these 
dimensions were evaluated and which role they seem to have played in 
the particular policy perspectives of each of the parties involved (Chapter 
4) 
Section I11 analyzes the decision structure which was at the basis of 
the policy-making process in the Netherlands and the hierarchy of 
decision-makers. In this section the decision powers of the different par- 
ties are  assessed within the decision process--in particular in relation to 
what have been the major decision points in the event on LNG in the Neth- 
erlands. An attempt is made to  describe the complex interaction 
between the multitude of interested parties, and ultimately to  assess the 
"field of forces" which seems to have been instrumental in pushing the 
final outcome of the decision on LNG in the Netherlands in a particular 
direction. 
The emphasis of this paper has been placed upon providing a sys- 
tematic review of the major features of the decision process on LNG siting 
in the Netherlands. The largely descriptive approach, drawing heavily on 
published documents in Dutch, was partly adopted to facilitate involve- 
ment of other members of the IIASA risk research project team and to 
enable discussion on the basis of empirical data, rather than analysis 
(which would otherwise have been restricted to Dutch speaking research- 
ers). 
The nature of this paper--as a background document for discussion 
and subsequent analysis--has also meant that well developed conclusions 
as to the determinants of the Dutch LNG decision process, are not expli- 
citly formulated in the context of this internal document. For similar 
reasons, since various parts of this paper were prepared a t  different 
stages of the research, frequently for the purpose of specific research 
discussion meetings a t  IIASA, some degree of repetition in the descriptive 
elements of the paper has been inevitable. For a considered analysis of 
the major factors governing the Dutch LNG decision process, including 
the role of risk and safety issues, the reader is referred to the Dutch case 
study report, prepared for the main IIASA study on the project (IIASA 
1982). 
1.2. NATIONAL CONTEXT 
The discussion and analysis is strictly limited to the specific 
decision-making on LNG siting as it took place in the Netherlands, and 
therefore largely reflects particular national characteristics. It must be 
seen as a study of h t c h  national decision-making, and many of its con- 
clusions are limited in this respect. 
Dutch national decision-making is relatively centralized, with the 
national government coordinating major decisions, within national poli- 
cies for regional development, energy plann.ing, land use, etc. Specific 
siting approval for industrial development is, however, usually a matter of 
local authorities--thereby making many planning decisions of importance, 
including the LNG facilities here discussed, a combination of local and 
national decision structures. 
The Dutch decision-making on LNG reflects this "dual" structure of 
local and national authorities. Furthermore, and perhaps more signifi- 
cantly, the multi-disciplinary nature of the LNG siting decision (involving 
land use planning, energy policy, socio-economic factors, health and 
safety, etc.) and the inter-departmental decision-structures as a result, 
give rise to a complex set of "interested parties" and decision-making 
events and procedures. In this context, the study of LNG siting may be 
typical of governmental decision-making on large-scale technological pro- 
jects with a multi-disciplinary character. In terms of both support 
mechanisms and implications. In the case of LNG, the aspect of risk and 
safety, furthermore, deserves special attention. The analysis will give 
special emphasis to the health and safety dimension--which has been an 
important element of the IIASA comparative research carried out on 
liquefied energy gases facility siting. 
At  the level of the national government the character of the LNG 
decision problem is reflected in the large number of governmental 
departments and advisory bodies which were involved. As policy issues 
have become more complex governmental decision-making a t  the 
national level in the Netherlands has seen an increasing emphasis upon 
so-called "inter-departmental coordination." 
In many areas where responsibility of different governmental depart- 
ments intersect, interdepartmental coordinating committees have been 
set  up, with the aim of agreeing upon a common line among top civil ser- 
vants from different ministries in order to prepare governmental (and 
more often than not, Cabinet) policies. In the case of LNG decision- 
making, departmental policy coordination took place mainly within 
ICONA, the interdepartmental committee for North Sea affairs, under the 
responsibility of the Minister for Transport and Public Works. 
At the local as well as national level, public involvement in decision- 
making in the Netherlands takes place via elected councils of representa- 
tives, common to modern parliamentary democracy. Within this context 
Dutch political tradition has emphasized the importance of pluralism in 
government and society, and this is reflected in the large number of 
political parties in the Netherlands. A related phenomena is the relative 
weakness of extra-parliamentary public interest groups, although the last 
decade or so has signaled changes in this respect. The Dutch tradition of 
pluralism also forms the context for the fact that a large number of dif- 
ferent interested parties were consulted or involved themselves in the 
debate in the course of the decision-making process on LNG siting. The 
nature and length of this report reflects t h s  point. 
As far as the Dutch decision-making on the siting of a LNG terminal is 
concerned, the process started in the early seventies, in the context of 
overall energy and gas supply policies. Towards the end of the decision 
process, in 1977 and 1978, however, the decision-making on LNG siting 
increasingly centered around a LNG terminal site specifically to handle 
LNG which was contracted from Algeria, and due to arrive in the Nether- 
lands in 1983/1984. Although initial expectations of the imported LNG 
were higher, the actual quantity of Algerian LNG contracted for in 1977 
totaled 4 x loom3 LYG/year. Final discussions in the Netherlands con- 
cerned a LNG terminal which could eventually handle quantities of 10-15 x 
100m3 LNG per year. 
Although this case study on LNG siting decision-making does not 
analyze any events which took place after the national governmental deci- 
sion in October 1978 for the siting of a LNG terminal (at Eemshaven), it is 
noted that by 1882 (as t h s  report is being completed) the Algerian LNG 
contract has been called off by the Algerian supplier; and as a result of 
lack of alternative LNG suppliers, further planning and construction 
activities in the Netherlands for a LNG terminal has been stalled. 
CHAPTER 2: 
LNG DECISION-PROCESS 
In this chapter it is attempted to present some contextual factors to 
the Dutch LNG decision process and to consider the decision structures 
that were used in the process in the Netherlands. It introduces the vari- 
ous procedures for LNG decision-making and the major parties involved. 
This section also presents the major events in the decision-making pro- 
cess as it took place in the Netherlands. It furthermore attempts to iden- 
tify those developments which were of major importance in governing the 
s t m c t u r e  and o u t c o m e  of the decision problem and process, which are 
therefore of greatest relevance for the decision analysis. By way of intro- 
duction, Table 2.1 summarizes the major interested parties involved in 
the Dutch LNG decision making process. 
2.2. CONTEXT 
Like in other LNG siting decisions, t h s  case study on LNG in the 
Netherlands is concerned with two interrelated questions: 
(a) whether to site an LNG facility in the country, and 
(b) where to site such a facility (if the answer to the first question is 
"yes"), 
Table  2.1 .  Key P a r t i e s  Concerned i n  Dec i s ion  P r o c e s s .  
NV NEDERLANDSE GASUNIE "Gasunie": The sole national gas company 
s e t  up i n  1963 for the management, s a l e ,  and 
dis t r ibut ion of natural gas f ie lds  in  the 
Netherlands. The national government holds 
f i f t y  percent of the shares i n  Gasunie, par t i -  
cipates in its governing body, and must approve 
or veto many of i ts  proposed ac t i v i t i e s  
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
CABINET 
ICONA 
The Netherland's national executive body 
comprised of 16 Ministers, responsible 
for  making national policies 'and decisions 
( a l l  but two head government departments). 
The Interminis ter ial  Coordination Committee 
on North Sea Affairs (Interdepartmentale 
Cwrdinatie Commissie v w r  Noordzeeaange- 
legenheden: A policy advisory group t o  the 
Cabinet consisting of ( c i v i l  servants) repre- 
sentatives from a l l  but two of the sixteen 
ministers t ha t  comprise the Dutch cabinet. 
LOCAL ArnORITIES 
GRONINGEN LOCAL 
ArnORITIES 
CITY OF ROTTERDAM 
RIJNMOND PUBLIC 
AUTHORITY 
Include the a )  governors and council of the 
Province of Groningen, b)  the c i t y  council of 
the town of Uithuizermeeden, and c )  the 
Delfzi j l  harbour authority* 
The local authority y i t h  primary responsibili ty 
for  planning permission and building permits i n  
Rotterdam; represented by the major and aldermen; 
responsible for  harbour ac t i v i t i e s  via  the 
Rotterdam Harbour Authority 
A col lect ive of 16 municipalities i n  the 
Rotterdam area, including the City of 
Rotterdam, t ha t  performs cer tain leg is la t ive  
roles  regarding ac t i v i t i e s  such as environmental 
planning, housing policy, transportation, health 
and safety,  and pollution management 
PROVINCE OF ZUIE-HOLLAND The province i n  southern Netherlands t ha t  
encompasses the Rotterdam area and has legis- 
l a t i ve  responsibili ty for  certain pollution, 
planning, and housing regulations in  t h i s  
region 
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 
Dutch Shipowners Association 
Elec t r ic i ty  Corporation of Groningen and Drenthe Provinces 
Provincial Chamber of Commerce i n  Groningen 
Public i n t e r e s t  and environmental groups in  Rotterdam and Eemshaven areas 
Trade Union organizations i n  Groningen 
*All three local authori t ies  are  considered as  one i n  t h i s  report,  the 
Groningent Local Authorities, since they held nearly the  same point 
of view concerning the LNG s i t i n g  issue and co-ordinated t he i r  policy 
actions throughout the decision process. 
This implies that the decision-making process on LNG siting cannot be 
looked at  in isolation and decision structures and procedures for broader 
policy aspects will have to be taken into account, including LNG importa- 
tion and energy policies. In order to provide a historical perspective it 
will also be necessary to assess to what extent products of prior 
economic, social and political circumstances and dynamics. 
An important contextual aspect of the Dutch LNG decision-making 
process is provided by Dutch "energy policy" which was first formulated 
as such in a governmental policy paper on energy in 1974 (Tweede Kamer 
1974). Dutch energy policy emphasized, among other thngs,  the need for 
importation of foreign sources of natural gas, in order to conserve Dutch 
national gas fields and the need for establishing strategic natural gas 
reserves in the Netherlands. These policies provided the mandate for 
major decisions by the partly state-owned gas company NV Nederlandse 
Gasunie (hereafter referred to as Gasunie), as for the government itself, 
in connection with LNG. In particular in the early stages of the decision- 
making process on LNG, the gas industry (Gasunie) and the national 
government (being responsible for Dutch gas supplies) played an impor- 
tant, if not dominant role. 
Gasunie requested a first official view from the Cabinet in 1975, con- 
cerning the possibilities for Dutch LNG terminals, thereby intensifying 
government interest and involvement in the question of LNG imports and 
reception and storage facilities. 
This formal request is a major decision point in the Dutch LNG 
decision-making process, which was preceded by developments relating 
to LNG some years earlier, involving activities of the Gasunie, potential 
LNG suppliers and the Dutch government. Gasunie's involvement with 
LNG had started in 1972 when first discussions were held with Rotterdam 
harbor authorities, concerning the siting of a LNG peak shaving plant at 
Maasvlakte, in the greater Rotterdam area. This development led to 
direct involvement of the national government: amongst other activities 
the Ministry for Social Affairs (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken) (with respon- 
sibility for occupational hazards, etc.) requested a committee (Commissie 
Buschmann) to evaluate the safety aspects of a LNG peak shaving plant at  
Maasvlakte. Following early discussions by Gasunie with the Algerian 
company, Sonatrach, for the importation of LNG, and Gasunie's stated 
interest in a LNG terminal, next to its Maasvlakte peak shaving plant, 
governmental concern in LNG intensified. The Buschmann committee's 
brief was later extended to include the safety aspects of a LNG terminal, 
and partly as a result of these developments., TNO (the Dutch organization 
for applied scientific research) was asked (in March 1974) to carry out a 
study on the safety aspects of LNG importation, and other groups were 
initiated by the Dutch government to research the nautical feasibility and 
safety aspects of various potential Dutch LNG sites. 
Gasunie's request of 1975 concerning LNG importation, together with 
governmental involvement in various aspects of LNG (especially safety), 
were linked in government circles to existing interests (of industry and 
the Ministry for Transport and Public Works (Ministerie van Verkeer'en 
Waterstaat) in an artificial island in the North Sea off the Dutch coast. As 
a result the so-called STUNET "steering group for the study of North Sea 
islands and terminals" was set up. Its first major task: to study and to 
advise the Cabinet on the desirability and modalities of a Dutch LNG ter- 
minal to  be located off-shore on an artificial island in the North Sea, 
whereby a comparison between land-based and offshore LNG sites was 
also made. STUNET set up a working group specifically to look into a LNG 
terminal; the working group in turn set up five sub-groups to investigate 
different aspects. The sub-group on environment and safety incorporated 
the on-going activities of the Buschmann Committee (see above). 
STUNET's report was completed in 1977 and concluded that importa- 
tion of LNG should be welcomed as a part of securing Dutch gas supplies. 
As far as a LNG terminal was concerned, a site at  the Maasvlakte or off- 
shore should be considered, (LNG terminal in de Noordzee, STUNET, 1977, 
p.0-I/?). After initial consideration (involving especially nautical and 
safety aspects), other LNG sites were rejected at  this point. The STUNET 
report was submitted to a governmental advisory committee called ICONA 
(for Interdepartmental Coordinating-Committee for North Sea Affairs) 
which was established by the government in 1977 to coordinate among 
the different ministries, the decision-making process (including policy 
advice and implementation) on affairs concerning the North Sea, which 
included LNG siting. Renewed discussions on LNG imports between 
Gasunie and the Algerian LNG supplier Sonatrach were by then well 
underway. ICONA was given the task of studying the various issues 
involved in the upcoming decisions on LNG. This illustrates that there was 
no single established governmental organization in the Netherlands for 
dealing with the question of siting a terminal, involving not only regional 
and industrial planning, but also health and safety, economics, energy 
policy, and international affairs a t  a national level. It is of interest to 
note that despite the main context provided by Dutch energy policy, 
ICONA, continued the national governmental coordination, under respon- 
sibility of the Ministry of Transport and Public works and not the Ministry 
for Economic Affairs (Ministerie van Economische Zaken), which had 
responsibility for Energy policy. Within ICONA all relevant national minis- 
ters were represented and it continued to be the main interdepartmental 
forum dealing with the siting of a LNG terminal. 
ICONA's first policy report (ICONA 1977) had to be completed within 
several months, since it was to be the basis of the Cabinet's assessment of 
the need for LNG importation and a Dutch LNG terminal. The major con- 
straining factor in this context was the signing by Gasunie, in June 1977, 
of a contract with the Algerian company Sonatrach for the importation of 
LNG (4,000 million m3 a year over a period of twenty years--1985-2005). 
This contract required the official approval of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, by 31st October 1977. The Cabinet was hereby called into "active 
involvement" in the LNG decision-making process; it had become clear by 
that time, that a great number of ministerial departments would collec- 
tively be responsible for basic decisions and policies concerning LNG 
importation and storage in the Netherlands, whereby the formal responsi- 
bilities of local authorities for approving a LNG site was not affected. 
When the Ministry for Economic Affairs subsequently approved the 
LNG contract (20th October 1877) a main part of the context for the 
further decision process on LNG siting was set: a side letter attached to 
the contract specified that by the 31st October, 1978, Gasunie was obliged 
to inform Sonatrach of the location of the LNG importation site (if this 
proved impossible, the contract would have become void). The LNG siting 
debate was hereby officially opened and the machinery for national and 
local government decision-making procedures was set into motion-- 
against the background of a constraining time factor. 
ICONA continued its "advisory role" as an interdepartmental coordi- 
nating body and more parties were included in the decision process (such 
as the Council for Land Use Planning, RRO). As the LNG siting process had 
by then moved into a phase of actual assessment of LNG sites for LNG 
various ministerial departments set out to achieve increased involvement 
for their respective ministerial responsibilities. As a result the inter- 
departmental Committee for Environmental Hygiene (ICMH) with the 
Health and Environmental Protection Ministry (Ministerie van Volksgezon- 
dheid en Milieuhygiene) as the coordinating department, and the State 
Land Use Planning Committee (RPC) under the Ministry for Housing and 
Physical Planning (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting en Ruimtelijke Orden- 
ing) were also actively involved in the decision procedure. Local authori- 
ties were officially involved at  this point and were asked for their views, in 
the context of their respective responsibilities in connection with environ- 
mental and plannlng legislation. 
Except for nuclear facilities, no formal laws and regulations existed 
in the Netherlands to deal with complex policy decisions such as the sit- 
ing of a LNG terminal--involving questions of economics, environment, 
regional planning, public safety, shipping, etc.--at both regional and 
national level. A special decision procedure was drafted by the central 
government in late 1977, taking into account existing powers and respon- 
sibilities of state and local authorities in connection with planning and 
environmental legislations. 
Figure 2.1 depicts schematically the formal role played by the 
respective state provincial and municipal authorities with reference to 
existing Dutch legislation applicable to the LNG siting decision (The Rijn- 
mond Authority is a local body in the Province of Zuid-Holland, perform- 
ing certain legislative roles for a conglomerate of municipalities around- 
and including--Rotterdam). Laws concerning the following aspects are 
included: air pollution (Wet inzake de Luchtverontreinlguing), "Nuisance" 
(Hinderwet), land use planning (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening), land use 
(gronduitgifte), construction permission (bouwvergunning), and invest- 
ment (Wet Selective Investeringsregeling--SIR). 
In the case of LNG, however, decision procedures designed by the 
state government especially for the LNG siting decision, required the 
local authorities to make "in principle" decisions on the approval of each 
of the sites considered (in their respective areas of responsibility) at  a 
relatively early stage of the process. The positions hereby taken by the 
local authorities and notified to the national government would then be 
indicative for subsequent formal legislative procedures within the context 
of the above mentioned laws and regulations. The national government 
thus acquired "in advance" decisions on LNG siting approval by the vari- 
ous local authorities ("pre-selected by the national government), which 
could subsequently be incorporated in the national government's decision 
on LNG siting. (The eventual formal planning and approval procedures- 
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for construction permission--at the local authority level was still to be fol- 
lowed at a later stage.) 
The LNG decision process also included public hearings and informa- 
tion meetings organized at  the municipal and provincial level to enable 
the general public to air its views. These views were then to be incor- 
porated in the positions taken by the respective local authority, which 
subsequently was to notify the central government (by a specific date) 
officially of the "in principle" approval or disapproval of potential LNG 
developments in its area. 
Final decisions on LNG siting were thus taken by the Cabinet 
(prepared by the national government ministeries) on the basis of three 
major inputs: 
( 1) decisions from local authorities on future approval /disapproval 
of LNG sites, 
(2) advice from ICONA and other national advisory bodies, 
(3) advice from Gasunie and other interested parties. 
Local authorities were given complete authority as to  which procedures 
to use in order to reach their policy positions--enabling them to decide 
which dimensions to include, t o  seek external advice and to  have (risk) 
analyses perf ormed. 
ICONA was also given a broad mandate; its terms of reference, how- 
ever, and the selection of ."relevantM dimensions to be included in their 
advice was decided upon by the different ministerial departments, which 
were represented in the advisory committee. In late 1977 the govern- 
ment outlined a timetable for LNG decision procedures leading to a final 
siting decision by 31st October 1978--the final date by which the Dutch 
had to commit themselves t o  a LNG terminal site and to notify the Algeri- 
ans, in order to validate the import contract for LNG. 
2.3. LNG DECISION EYENTS 
Major events in this decision procedure as originally laid down by the 
national government are summarized in Table 2.2. It is of interest here to 
mention that a t  the time the national government drafted the timetable 
for the decision procedures, it was generally accepted that  only one 
group of local authorities would be inpolved: Rotterdam, Rijnmond Public 
Authority, and the Province of Zuid-Holland. I t  was not until February 
1978 that an alternative area for the LNG terminal was (re)introduced 
(Eemshaven in the Province of Groningen). 
The actual decision events on LNG took place broadly along the lines 
planned by the national government. The major exception was the 
(re)introduction of the Eemshaven area as a viable alternative for a LNG 
site. This took place early in 1978 following discussions between the Har- 
bour of Delfzijl (formally responsible for Eemshaven activities) and 
Gasunie, a t  the request of the latter. As a result, new actors and issues 
were introduced in the discussion on LNG and, in the decision-making 
process. 
Table 2.2. Governmental Decision Procedure for LNG Siting 1977/1978* 
(dates in brackets indicate actual events) 
18,1277 - 23.12.77 Cabinet approves decision schedule prepared by 1 
I 
i State Plann-irlg Committee (RPC) 
I 
I 3.12.77 - 15.01.78 Official notification to local authorities Zuid-Holland 
that their views will be required and preliminary 
Cabinei position concerning LNG, expected by 1 
April 1978. 1 i 1 12.77 - 01.03.78 Preparation of advice by ICONA. ICMH (Interdepart- / 
mental advisory committee for environmental 
hygiene) and RPC. 
1.03.78 - 01.04.78 Preliminary Cabinet position; request for local ( 
authorities' response. 
Publication of Cabinet preliminary position (13 
March 1978) 
Possible discussion on internal aspects. 
I 
01.04.78 - 01.07.78 Preparation of views a t  local authority level positions 
of local authorities decided upon (June) notification 
of local authorities' views to the Cabinet. 
01.07.78 - 31.10.78 Possible negotiations between state and local 
government 
Discussion and subsequent decision in Cabinet 
(council of ministers)(25 August 1978) 
Involvement Parliament (15 September 1978) 
Response t o  Algeria (31 October 1978) 
*based on official document from the RPC drafted in December. 1877. 
Source: Biljage 2, ICONA advice, 21 February 1878, Nader advies v a n  de ICONA inzake 
do aanvoer van  vtoeibaar aardgas i n  Nederland. " Inventarisatie besluitvol- 
mingsprocedure LNGterminal." 
Considering, in some more detail, the decision process on LNG as it 
took place in late 1977 and 1978, two major decision levels can be 
identified: 
1. National Government: decision events involving the Cabinet, 
ministries and parliament; 
2. Local Government: decision events involving local authorities: 
(a) Zuid-Holland (Maasvlakte site) 
(b) Groningen (Eemshaven site) 
Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 depict the major events concerning the LNG 
siting decision a t  the  various levels identified above. To a large extent the 
events shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 served as input to the decision events 
of the national government as illustrated in Figure 2.2 .  
A full set  of events provides a complex picture of the different 
interested parties and their formal actions in decision-making. However, 
analytical insight into the decision process can only be acquired when 
major and minor decision events can be distinguished. Major decision 
events may be defined as those events that relate to the most important 
and influential interested parties in the decision processes (whch include 
both the major parties' own actions and activities of others which seem to 
have had an important effect on their subsequent actions). 
The major parties involved in the Dutch LNG decision process are the 
Cabinet, National Ministries, ICONA, the local authorities a t  the two 
regions, and Gasunie, since discussions among these parties were 
predominantly responsible for deciding on the stTwcture of the decision 
process (defining the problem, setting the context, and determining the 
. boundary conditions, etc.).  Of the above, the f i s t  four (those within the  
national and local government) had furthermore the formal responsibility 
for (preparing and determining) the decision outcome of the process. 
Based on such a distinction of major interested parties, an aggre- 
gated picture of the major events in the development of the decision pro- 
cess can thus be constructed on the basis of the events illustrated in Fig- 
ure 2.5. Pre-supposing furthermore a sequential nature of the decision 
process an initial list of key events in the LNG decision process can be put 
forward: 
1. Gasunie requests governmental view on LNG imports (1975). 
2. Government/Cabinet requests official committee (STUNET) to 
study LNG terminal problem (1975); Ministry of Social Affairs ini- 
tiates risk analyses (performed by TNO). 
3. STUNET submits LNG terminal study to ICONA (partly based on 
TNO risk analysis); lCONA advises Cabinet on policies (1977, 
March and October). 

-TNO Risk Analysis 
+ Gesunie request to Rotterdam for extension of LNG peak-shaving for LNG tankers 
- STUNET LNG Terminal report completed 
--Rijnmond Council questions on LNG 
--Information document on LNG published by Rijnmond Authority 
- Study of Rotterdam Harbour published 
- Minister of Economic Affairs request Rijnmond to start decision proceedings 
- Local authorities recieve request from Cabinet for oflicial view on LNG 
- Local authorities publish joint information brochure 
Preliminary position by Rotterdam on LNG 
Provincial view on LNG published 
Rijnmond governors view on LNG published I I-' 
Ul 
I 
Rijnmond Council and City of Rotterdam debate LNG 
Cabinet notified of local euthorities' views 
* 
City of Rotterdam publishes a new brochure on LNG 
Nov. 
,1977 1978 1979 
Figure 2.3. Decision Events LNG 1977-78: Local Authorities/Maasvlakte. 
TNO Risk Analysis completed 
Gasunie talks wi th Delfzijl Harbour: nautical objections for  LNG activities 
Gasunie signs LNG contract 
Netherland Maritime institute: Eemshaven harbour has changed since 1976 - suitable for LNG, contrary to  earlier ICONA advice 
Delfzijl Harbour and Gasunie discuss LNG and start investigation into possibilities 
tinued discussions: Groningen-Gasunie 
Groningen letter to Cabinet to  include Eemshaven in  considerations 
Trades Union argue in  favor o f  Eemshaven LNG site 
Cabinet: Eemshaven LNG site not  ruled out 
ICONA reopens study into Eemshaven site 
Public Hearing Uithuizermeede - LNG siting 
Groningen governors publish policy statement 
ingen provincial council debates LNG 
ter t o  Cabinet f rom Groningen Province and other LNG proponents 
iscussion - Groningen Province with government 
Cabinet: "Eemshaven is potential LNG site" 
Further policy statement b y  Groningen t o  Cabinet 
Cabinet Ministers talk to  Province of Groningen 
Further policy statement b y  Groningen to Cabinet 
Cabinet decides t o  select Eernshaven 
Groningen Province talks t o  parliamentary committee 
I I I I I I I I I I I  1 1 \ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
' I March May July Sept. NOV. I March May July S e t .  Nor.  I 
1977 1978 1979 
' Figure 2.4. Decision Events LNG 1977-78: Local Authorities/Eemshaven. 
4. Gasunie signs contract with Sonatrach for LNG imports (1977 
June) 
5. Ministry for Economic Affairs approves Algerian LNG contract 
(1977 October). 
6. National government decides upon decision procedures (1977 
December). 
7. Gasunie opens discussions with Delfzijl Harbour about 
Eemshaven LNG terminal (1977 December) which ultimately 
results in consideration by the government of Eemshaven as 
viable alternative to a LNG site at Maasvlakte. 
0. TCONA submits further advice to the Cabinet, together with 
advice of RPC and ICMH (1977 October, 1978 February). 
9. Cabinet preliminary policy view: Maasvlakte sites possible; 
Eemshaven site not ruled out (1978 March). 
10. Local authorities of the provinces of Zuid-Holland and Groningen 
debate LNG siting and inform the Cabinet of their positions 
(1978 March-June). 
11. ICONA advises Cabinet about Eemshaven LNG terminal compared 
to  Maasvlakte (1978 June).. 
12. Government decides on LNG terminal site: Eemshaven (1978 
August) . 
13. Parliamentary debate: approval of government decision (1978 
October). 
I t  is possible to distinguish between activities of g o v e r n m e n t a l  bod ies  
such as Cabinet /Ministries ( ) and official advisory committees STUNET 
and ICONA (0) on the one hand, and a c t i v i t i e s  of o t h e r s  as an input t o  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  decisions/actions such as those of Gasunie ( 0 ) and local 
authorities ( A ). Using these denotations the twelve decision points may 
be pictured as in Figure 2.5. Such a division of parties and events is of 
limited use since the decision-mabng process involved a complex series 
of i n t e r a c t i v e  activities by different parties. It is therefore more useful-- 
for the sake of analysis-to identify the importance of events in a different 
way. Below are summarized what can be identified as the six m a j o r  deci- 
sion points which have distinctly influenced the event structure of the 
decision process (major interested parties italicized). 
(b) 1975 
The 
s hov 
land 
poss 
Dutc 
Nati 
and 
S T L  
Dutch gas company NV Nederlandse GaszLnie 
vs interest in importing LNG into the Nether- 
.s and requests a governmental view on the 
iibilities for a Dutch LNG terminal (either on 
:h soil or off-shore); 
onal g o v e r n m e n t  starts assessing possibilities 
need for LNG importation and terminal--via 
TNET and later ICONA, advisory committee; 

(c) June 1977 NV Nederlandse Gasunie signs contract for the 
importation of LNG (from Algeria) into the Nether- 
lands, whch among other things specifies that 
LNG site should be named by October 1978; 
( d )  October 1977 Ministry of Economic -4fluirs approves LNG impcjrt 
contract and government starts procedures for 
decision-making on LNG terminal siting, involving 
advisory bodies and local author i t ies ;  
(e) December 1977 NV Nederlandse G a m n i e  and Delfzi j l  Harbour  
Author i t ies  discuss - LNG, which results in 
Eemshaven site being taken into consideration 
(by the government) for LNG terminal as alterna- 
tive to  (previously considered) Maasvlakte sites. 
( f )  August 1978 Cabinet decides in favor of Eemshaven LNG site. 
These major decision points represent in some ways the events in the 
process where an important shift in the nature of the decision problem 
takes place, causing, for example, new actors to be introduced, new deci- 
sion structures to be set up or new alternatices for sites to be considered. 
It is thus possible to distinguish between "normal" events in the decision 
process and "special" events. The "special" events identified above are 
represented as vertical lines in Figure 2.6, which highlights some features 
of the decision process on LNG. 
The diagrammatic representation forces the policy analyst to raise 
essential questions concerning the vertical and horizontal lines of the 
decision event structure. The vertical lines highlight shf t s  in the normal 
decision structure and the important question thus becomes to ask why 
these shf t s  occur? Which interested party(ies) initiated the shift and 
why? Why did the shift take place when it did? What is the "dynamic" 
behind it? Important questions should also be raised as regards the 
implications of these shifts in the decision event structure, which may 
provide essential inputs to the analysis of decision events later in the pro- 
cess. As regards the horizontal lines of the diagram, analysis should simi- 
larly look into questions of why? and how? and to ask whch parties 
governed this part of the decision process. Before the decision process is 
analyzed in t h s  way, the major dimensions of the LNG decision case study 
are assessed, as well as the major interested parties. In Chapter 4, the 
different position on the major policy dimensions by the major interested 
parties are analyzed. 
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SECTION 11: 
ANALYSTS OF DECISION PROBLEM 
CHAPTER 3: 
DIMENSIONS OF THE LNG DECISION PROBLEM 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The decision problem of LNG impoi-tation and terminal siting is a 
complex issue with many different facets. Although by no means com- 
monly shared by all the interested parties, a number of major dimen- 
sions to the LNG decision-making process in the Netherlands, may be 
identified. The five major dimensions whch are considered in this 
analysis are the following: 
(1) energy policy/energy supply 
(2) economics/cost 
(3) socio-economic /industrial and regional policy 
(4) health and safety/risk 
(5) environmental impact 
In addition to the above dimensions a fair number of other issues and 
concerns have featured in the debate on LNG in the Netherlands. These 
concerns (such as public participation) will be assessed in other .parts of 
this study. In the section below the above set of key dimensions will be 
introduced in the specific context of the decision-making process as it 
occurred in the Netherlands. 
3.2. ENERGY POLICY/ENERGY SUPPLY DIMENSION 
The aspect of energy policy and the need for the importation of LNG 
into the Netherlands played an important role in the decision-making pro- 
cess. Energy supply in the Netherlands is heavily oriented towards 
natural gas and oil. The increased use of natural gas in the Netherlands 
was pushed heavily by successive governments in the 1960s, following the 
discovery and the exploitation of major natural gas fields in the northern 
part of the Netherlands. Whilst in 1963 the proportion of natural gas in 
the total Dutch use of energy was a mere 2%, t h s  share had increased to 
46% in 1972. By 1975 the natural gas share had risen to 57%, with an 
important 37% share still taken by oil. 
The Netherlands currently produces about 100 x 10'rn3 of natural gas 
per year (Schwarz 1900), of which approximately half is exported. Major 
export contracts were signed with a number of European countries in the 
late sixties," (based on the assumption that nuclear energy would soon 
take over a major role in the supply of energy and. the market price of 
natural gas would fall substantially as a result.) 
On a more specific level, the issue of energy supply involved a discus- 
sion on the ways Dutch demand for natural gas could or should be met by 
foreign suppliers. The major question here concerned firstly whether 
natural gas should be supplied in the form of LNG (thereby requiring LNG 
tankers, terminals, storage facilities, etc.), or as gas, via pipeline. In the 
Dutch LNG case this debate was further enriched by the longstanding 
arrangements between the Netherlands and Italy for the supply (until 
1994) via pipeline of Dutch natural gas to Italy (6 x l ~ ' m ~ / ~ e a r ) .  Issues 
debated in this context included the possibility of exchanging contracts, 
whereby foreign suppliers (e.g., Algeria) would transport natural gas to 
Italy (at  the expense of the Dutch) thereby enabling the Dutch to keep 
their domestic natural gas supplies in the country. Such questions of 
international (re-) arrangements concerning natural gas trade flows, also 
introduced into the Dutch LNG debate, issues of international dependence 
upon foreign energy supplies. 
The Netherlands is a net exporter of natural gas and is expected to 
remain in this position. Probable natural gas field reserves are currently 
estimated a t  about 2,000 x 10'm3, whilst yearly natural gas consumption 
is estimated to remain 40-45 x 10'm3 (Rijnmond LNG 19708, 2e Kamer 
1900). In 1974, the government published the first policy paper on 
energy, which forms the background to the energy policy dimensions in 
the LNG debate in the Netherlands. In its policy paper the government 
formulated the following aims (Schwarz 1980): 
- savings on the whole range of energy consumption, 
-- less dependency from other countries, 
- a strategic natural gas reserve, 
- substitution of oil by other energy sources. 
Within this context a natural gas policy has emerged in the Nether- 
lands, whch included restrictive management and saving of Dutch natural 
gas supplies, a more selective export policy and (most important in the 
context of the LNG debate) importation of supplementary quantities of 
natural gas into the Netherlands. The contracts at stake for the importa- 
tion of LKG in the Netherlands, thus stem from the interest of saving 
Dutch supplies of natural gas. The Dutch government intends to maintain 
a relatively hlgh share of natural gas in the energy use mix (35-40%), 
mainly because of the existence of an extremely good infrastructure for 
the use of gas and the advantages of natural gas from an environmental 
point of view. Because of its strategic importance, the government has 
pursued a policy of conserving its national gas field whenever possible. 
The security of gas supplies in the Netherlands against the background of 
Dutch official energy policy was perhaps the major dimension setting the 
context of the debate on LNG for the various interested parties. 
3.3. ECONOMICS/COST DIMENSION 
Another aspect relevant to the decision on the importation of LNG 
and the siting selection is economics. As regards to the need for importa- 
tion of LNG, the economic advantages of LNG compared to natural gas 
imports (via pipeline) are to be considered. At a broader level, the 
economic i'mportance to e attached to the supply of natural gas from 
foreign sources has entered the decision-making process in the Nether- 
lands. 
concerning the siting of a LNG terminal in the Netherlands, the 
economics of planning and construction of the terminal was of relevance. 
As regards comparison between alternative LNG sites, the following 
aspects are included in the cost dimension: transport, distance distribu- 
tion to major users, terminal infrastructure, maintenance, harbor modifi- 
cation, safety measures, etc. Another factor of economics of relevance to 
the decision-making process in the Netherlands concerned the possibility 
of a Dutch LNG terminal being used as a supply base for natural gas by 
other, neighboring, countries. At various stages of the decision process 
the possibility of re-exportation of foreign natural gas via a Dutch LNG 
terminal was brought up. 
The time of completion of a LNG terminal and possible delays in the 
completion of the LNG project may also be included in the economics 
dimension. 
3.4. SOCIO-ECONOMICS/INDUSTRIAL AND REGIONAL POLICY DIMENSIONS 
The socio-economic dimension includes the  impact on individuals liv- 
ing near a proposed facility site (exclusive of health and safety), 
increased industrial activity with its employment effects, and other labor 
impacts. 
A major issue (primarily at  the local level) concerns the employment 
generating effect of large scale LNG activities and the extent to whch 
LNG operations can be expected to stimulate further economic activity in 
the Netherlands. 
Possible positive employment effects may refer to those industrial 
sectors involved in. building, supplying and maintaining the LNG terminal. 
The benefits a terminal for LNG may bring for general harbor activity and 
infrastructure is also of relevance here. 
Indirect socio-economic effects may result from follow-on industrial 
activities which could be stimulated by or based upon LNG projects, such 
as cryogenics industries. From the point of view of industrial policy, posi- 
tive effects of a LNG project stimulus for the development of new skills 
and know-how involved in LNG and related technologies in the Nether- 
lands. 
Siting of a major LNG project can be used a s  a tool for industrial pol- 
icy. Personnel which is attracted to build, maintain or operate a LNG ter- 
minal may affect the  economic activity and the  social institutions in the 
area, and thus becomes factor relevant to industrial policy. 
Regional policy issues concern first of all the important effects for 
regional development, wh ch  are attributed to the siting of a LNG termi- 
nal. These effects also largely refer to employment and related industrial 
activities. Discussion on this point in relation to  the Dutch country plan- 
ning and regional development policies, whch  specifically favor plans 
towards a more equitable spatial distribution of land-use, social and 
economic activity and employment. One of the  areas whch  had previ- 
ously been singled out by dutch regional development policy is the north- 
eastern par t  of the Netherlands (e.g., Groningen). I t  is important t o  note 
that the Dutch government had started active planning towards industrial 
activities in the Eemshaven area .  of Groningen in 1974. Such regional 
development schemes of the government and existing and planned con- 
centrations of population, industry, employment (etc.) are  thus of 
relevance with respect to the Dutch LNG policy debate. 
3.5. HEALTH AND SAFETY/RISK DIMENSION 
The safety dimension was an  important aspect in the Dutch LNG 
debate. The discussion focused on the probabilities and the  conse- 
quences of accidents with the LNG vessel on its way, in or near the termi- 
nal. The safety discussions included the risk to  individuals, both those 
working a t  the LNG terminal as well as those living within a certain range 
from the site or shipping route. 
Some of the discussion considered the ways risk could or should be 
measured; whether it should be assessed as being "probability x conse- 
quence," or that other "measurement" of risk should be used. In this con- 
text considerable discussion concerned with the importance that should 
be attached to the perceived risks by the (local) population, resulting 
from LNG activities. 
Discussions on safety also included the scope or need for risk- 
reducing measures and the need for specific standards and conditions, in 
order to minimize the probabilities and/or consequences involved. 
Most of the discussion around risk and safety of LNG in the Nether- 
lands took place against the background of two major risk assessment 
studies, whch were performed in the Netherlands by TNO (1976), the 
Dutch organizati~n for applied scientific research (on behalf of the Minis- 
t ry of Social Affairs). In addition, some smaller studies were performed, 
focusing on the nautical aspects of LNG transport and importation. 
3.6. EIWIRONMENTAL IMPACT DIMENSION 
Environmental issues in the Dutch LNG debate include the effects 
upon the environment of (1) transportation of LNG by tanker t o  the ter- 
minal, and (2) the effects stemming from the location and operation of a 
LNG terminal. As regards to the first aspect, the need for changes to 
(natural) watenvays and technical-nautical requirements entered the dis- 
cussion. As to the effects of the terminal, various kinds of environment 
pollution, thermal effects, noise, etc. ,  were included in the various 
debates. Additionally, the ways LNG activities may affect the use of land 
(especially around the terminal) e.g., for recreation or housing develop- 
ment, must also be considered as part of the discussion on the environ- 
ment impact of LNG. Environmental impacts of LNG activities may 
include such factors as chemical changes in the water, disturbance of sea 
life and the sea bed. 
Two Dutch laws are of particular relevance in the discussion on 
environmental impact: "Wet inzake de luchtverontreiniging" concerning 
air pollution and "Hinderwet," (literally "Nuisance Act"). Both stipulate 
approval for developments from local authorities a t  the provincial level. 
(In the case of LNG the national government, however, requested in prin- 
ciple decisions from local authorities on approval, before official request 
for planning permission had been made.) 
3.7. OTHER DIMENSIONS 
The dimension of acceptance of a LNG project is another aspect and 
it includes the role devoted to  the views of local residents, environmental 
groups, local authorities and various other concerned parties. The 
degree of participation by the public and specific interest groups as 
regards LNG decisions is of importance here. Acceptance of LNG plans 
relates directly to  the impact within the socio-economic, environmental, 
economic, health, and safety dimensions. In the case of LNG in the Neth- 
erlands, acceptance by local authorities played a particular important 
role in the overall decision-making process; the national government 
required formal approval by local authorities (in the relevant areas) 
before a final decision was made. 
From a broader perspective, public involvement and acceptance of a 
LNG terminal was a definite feature of the LNG debate in the 
NetherlandsAirectly related to the issue of "perceived" risk of the  opera- 
tions. National government concern about the acceptance of its plans a t  
various levels, was reflected in the large number of advisory bodies and 
consultative agencies which were included in the decision-making pro- 
cess. At the provincial and municipal levels, authorities apparently faced 
similar issues concerning acceptability of their decisions and recommen- 
dations concerning the LNG siting question. These and other additional 
aspects of the LNG decision problems are analyzed in the context of the 
decision process rather than with respect to each party separately. 
CHAPTER 4: 
PARTY PERSPECTIVES 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This section will set out to analyze the views of the major parties 
involved in the decision-making process on LNG in the Netherlands. The 
three main areas of actors involvement in the LNG decision process are 
(1) national government and parliament, (2) local authorities, (3) 
Gasunie, and (4) other parties. 
On the part of the government, both interdepartmental committees 
involved in LNG, STUNET-LNG Working Group and ICONA, have played a 
dominant role, especially in the initial period of decision-making. Dif- 
ferent ministerial departments were represented in STUNET and ICONA 
and their advice paved the way for the Cabinet's involvement in the deci- 
sion on LNG. At the level of local authorities bodies of two regional areas 
came into play (a) for the Maasvlakte sites respectively the City of Rotter- 
dam, Public Authority Rijnmond and the Province of Zuid-Holland, and (b) 
for the Eemshaven site, the Harbor of Delfzijl and the Province of 
Groningen. In view of their close collaboration and co-ordination of views, 
the analysis below treats the relevant Groningen local authorities basi- 
cally as a single party. 
In t h s  section the respective views on the various dimensions of the 
LNG decision problems are described and analyzed. The policy positions 
of the following parties are assessed in detail: 
1. STUNET LNG Working Group and ICONA 
2a. City of Rotterdam 
2b. Rijnmond Public Authority 
2c. Province of Zuid-Holland 
3.  Groningen Local Authorities 
4. Gasunie 
5. Other parties such as the public, environmental organizations, 
trade unions, and other interested groups. 
6. Cabinet /National government 
This section will set  the context for the analysis of the political pro- 
cess leading to decisions on LNG and highlight in particular the way in 
which different interested parties had different perspectives and policy 
views on the various aspects of the LNG problem. 
The analysis of the policy views of the different parties is largely 
based upon published material, complemented by information from inter- 
views with involved interested parties. (Appendix A lists the m.ajor organi- 
zations and individuals which have been consulted in the course of this 
research.) 
4.2. STUNEX AND ICONA 
4.2.1. Background and Responsibilities 
The STUNET as a technical study group and ICONA advisory commit- 
tee were set up by the national government to advise the Dutch Cabinet 
on issues concerning the North Sea (ICONA) and (industrial) off-shore 
activities (STUNET). 
STUNET (the North Sea Island and Terminal Steering Committee) was 
first set  up in 1975, by the Dutch Minister for Transport and Public Works. 
STUNET was commissioned by the government to carry out studies con- 
cerning the desirability of an  artificial industrial island in the North Sea 
and possible LNG terminal. The government initiative came in response 
to industrial interest* (ln such an artificial island) and to a request of the 
NV Netherlandse Gasunie as regards LNG importation (STUNET 1979, p. 1). 
Gasunie had requested a formal government position on among other 
things, the possibilities for a LNG terminal in the North Sea and the 
government in response decided that an independent (interdependent) 
inquiry was necessary (ICONA 1978c, p. 10). 
The formal connection between Gasunie and the State government 
normally involves the  Energy Department of the  Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. The setting up of the special STUNET committee, however, was 
co-ordinated by the Ministry for Transport and Public Works, because of 
its overall responsibility on North Sea matters. 
*In particular, the so-called NSIGNorth Sea Island Group should be mentioned here. 
STUNET was to submit its report to ICONA, the Interministerial Coor- 
dination Committee on North Sea Affairs. The formal relationship 
between the Cabinet, ICONA, and STUNET is illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
CABINET I I requests advice 1 
I CONA 
I advises Cabinet and I I co-ordinates between relevant I 
I government departments I 
t 
conducts s tudies;  
*Formally, ICONA reports t o  MICONA (the Ministerial Inter-departmental Coordinating Com- 
mittee for North Sea Affairs), a ministerial sub-committee of the  Cabinet (Council of h n i s  
ters) .  
Figure 4.1: Governmental advisory structure 
(based on STUNET 1979, p.2) 
4.2.2. Advisory Report and Committee Membership 
One of STUNET's first tasks was to look into the desirability and pos- 
sibilities of a LNG terminal either in the North Sea or on-shore. A STUNET 
Working Group "LNG Terminal" was set up to carry out the study. This 
particular study received high priority in the light of the "urgency of the 
selection of a location for a LNG terminal" (STUNET 1979, p.1.). A t  the 
time t h s  related to negotiations between the Dutch and the Belgians 
about a Dutch LNG terminal importing LNG destined for Belgium (ICONA 
1970c, p.12); the negotiations between Gasunie and the Algerian LNG sup- 
plier Sonatrach probably was another major factor. 
The report by the STUNET "LNG Terminal" Working Group was com- 
pleted in March 1977 and submitted to ICONA, which was to use its infor- 
mation for its policy advice to the Cabinet on LNG. This was particularly 
significant in relation to  the awaited approval by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs of the Gasunie-Sonatrach LNG importation contract, 
which had been signed June 30, 1977. 
The analysis below of STUNET's position vis-a-vis the LNG decision 
problem in the Netherlands is based on the March 1977 study and appen- 
dices (STUNET 1977a,b) by the "LNG Terminal" Working Group of STUNET. 
In relation to further analysis of governmental views as regards LNG, it is 
important to  note that  the LNG Terminal Working Group was chaired by 
the deputy head of the energy department of the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs; the Working Group furthermore included representatives of the 
following State Ministries: Transport and Public Works, Social Affairs, 
Health and Environmental Protection. Further members included 
representatives NV Nederlandse Gasunie (observer-status) (STUNET 
1977a, p.1-3/4).+ The close connection between ICONA and STUNET was 
emphasized by the fact that five members of ICONA, including its Chair- 
man, were also members of STUNET. When ICONA was being installed, 
STUNET was officially explained as being the "executive committee" of 
ICONA (1978, p.42). ICONA members included representatives of all but 
two of the sixteen ministers of the national government departments 
which make up the Cabinet (ICONA 1977a, p.35). 
ICONA submitted its first policy advice to the Cabinet in October 1977 
(ICONA 1977), based on the STUNET LNG Terminal report,  which had 
incorporated a risk analysis study, performed by TNO (the organization 
for applied scientific research). A second and t h r d  advisory report by 
ICONA was completed in February (ICONA 1978a) and June 1978 (1978b) 
respectively and incorporated advice from other state bodies such as CPR 
(Committee for the Prevention of Disasters by Dangerous Substances), 
ICMH (Interdepartmental Committee for Environmental Hygiene), RPC 
(State Land Use Planning Committee) and TNO. The various inputs to 
ICONA are depicted in Figure 4.2. 
4.2.3. Problem Definition 
The STUNET LNG report and the three ICONA policy advisory reports 
progressively addressed the major issues involved in the LNG decision 
problem in the Netherlands. The task definition of STUNET and of ICONA 
in particular, was very broad. Since their work was to be the basis for the 
Cabinet's position on issues relating to a LNG terminal, the advisory com- 
mittees were requested to look into all relevant factors, whenever possi- 
ble. The anaIyses of ICONA and STUNET were concerned with two inter- 
related questions: 
1. Should LNG be imported into the Netherlands? 
2. Where should LNG terminals be located? 
In particular when ICONA involved itself in exploring the second ques- 
tion, i t  became apparent that it could, in effect, be split up into the fol- 
lowing sub-questions: 
*Sub-groups of the  STUNET LNG Terminal Working Group included also representatives of 
other ministerial departments (Internal Affairs, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance), and ob- 
servers from other organizations hcluding TNO. 
CABINET 
I I CONA ! I 
( M i n i s t e r i a l  D e p a r t m e n t s  )*  
I STUNET f A 
f .  
t 'Y 4 A k 4 4 
*Representatives for the  following ministerial responsibilities were members of ICONA: Gen- 
eral Affairs (Cabinet Office), Home Affairs, Justice, Education and Science. Science Policy, Fi- 
nance, Defense, Housing'and Physical Planning, Transport and Public Works, Economic Af- 
fairs, Agriculture and Fisheries, Social Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Recreation, Social Work, and 
Health and Environmental Protection. 
Figure 4.2. 
(2a) LNG terminal outside the Netherlands? 
(2b) LNG terminal land-based or on an (artificial) island? 
(2c) Exact location of the LNG terminal? 
STUNET and ICONA were concerned with the following dimensions of 
the LNG decision problem, as the further analysis will highlight: 
(a) energy policy/energy supply 
(b) economics/cost 
(c) *health and safety/risk 
(d) socio-economic/industrial and regional policies 
(e) environmental impact 
In the following main sections the conclusions of STUNET and the pol- 
icy views of ICONA are assessed, based on the published reports by these 
two (advisory) committees. 
4.2.4. STUNET Dimensional Views 
4.2.4.1. Energy Policy 
STUNET concluded that the importation of LNG should be considered 
positively; it based its conclusion primarily on a quantitative cost benefit 
analysis carried out by the Economics Working Group of STUNET. (LNG 
Terminal in de Noordzee, Chapter 2 and Appendix XI).* 
According to the analysis, the benefits exceeded the costs--based on 
the quantifiable factors. Additional non-quantified factors, such as stra- 
tegic considerations with respect to energy policy (e.g. diversification) 
and economic factors in the Dutch LNG project. The only major factor 
whch was not in favor of the LNG project, according to STUNET's analysis 
was safety. STUNET's favorable view towards a LNG project was firmly 
rooted in the context of securing Dutch energy sources, within the frame- 
work of the stated Dutch energy policy. The cost benefit analysis involved 
comparison between two scenarios: (1) importation of LNG; and (2) no 
importation of LNG, whereby the equivalent energy supply would be 
obtained from other sources such as oil. The analysis focused almost 
entirely on the importation of Liquefied natural gas; the option of import- 
ing natural gas via pipeline, was rejected at a very early stage, on the 
grounds that gas demand in West Europe was high, "nearby" suppliers 
were limited and a pipeline would not be viable (on practical, technical 
and economic grounds) for remote suppliers of natural gas (STUNET main 
report, p. 0-1). 
4.2.4.2. Economics/ Cost 
The cost-dimension was considered extensively by STUNET, focusing 
on two aspects:. 
(i) cost comparison between oil and LNG, 
(ii) cost comparison between land-based and off-shore LNG termi- 
nals. 
As to the way these cost comparisons were carried out as regards to the 
first point, reference can be made to the cost-benefit analysis reported 
above. As to the second aspect, the cost comparison between an artificial 
island and a land-based terminal for LNG, cost considerations clearly 
favored a land-based terminal. The calculations for a land-based terminal 
were based on a site in the Maasvlakte area. Other possible sites, such as 
Eemshaven, were ruled out, largely on nautical grounds based largely on 
research by the Netherlands Maritime Institute, NMI. 
*The follow-& factors were included in the qualitative cost benefit analysis: 
COST: Gas import, transport by sea, terminal, inland distribution, 
environmental charges, further transport costs. 
BENEFITS; Industrial benefits, lower cost (compared to oil) of 
importation and storage of fuel, benefits of re-exportation. 
4.2.4.3. Health and Safety 
The safety aspect was certainly considered by STUNET, although a 
definite conc lus ion  on the aspects of health and safety was not put for- 
ward. The risk of LNG was "comparable to other industrial risk," it was 
concluded by STUNET. STUNET emphasized the possibilities of risk 
reducing measures, limiting either the probability or the consequences of 
a possible accident. Based on the TNO risk analysis STUNET concluded 
that safety was the sole dimension of the LNG decision problem, whch 
would favor an off-shore site for the terminal location. This conclusion, 
however, bears on the decisions whether it is considered a prime concern 
to m i n i m i z e  the effect of a p o t e n t i a l  LNG a c c i d e n t .  Considering, how- 
ever, the "weighed effect" or risk involved, defined by "probability x 
consequence," no significant difference between the safety of an off-shore 
or land-based terminal was concluded (in terms of possible deaths in case 
of a major hazard--namely 0.14 deaths/year at Maasvlakte and 0.12 
deaths/year for an island terminal. Nautical risk and safety considera- 
tion formed the basis of STUNET's rejection of all but one land-based 
site--Maasvlakte. In t h s  respect STUNET mentioned the scope for risk- 
reducing measures (STUNET 19771, p.0-7). The STUNET working group 
concluded that it was unable to give unequivocal (eenduidig) advice as 
regards the safety aspect of LNG, also because no generally accepted cri- 
teria exist for large-scale effects (such as those involved in LNG). 
4.2.4.4. Environmental Impact 
The STUNET analysis concluded that the negative environmental 
effects of a LNG project would be limited, and at  all times within "accept- 
able" limits. What those limits were, was not elaborated on. Some 
aspects of the potential environmental impact had favored a sea- 
terminal, whilst others favored a land-based location. No overall conclu- 
sion in favor of one option or the other could be drawn, according to 
STUNET. As regards to comparison with oil, LNG was considered as being 
environmentally less damaging. 
4.2.4.5. Socio-Economics 
The positive and negative socio-economic effects of a LNG project 
were only briefly evaluated by STUNET. The only reference in this con- 
text, concerns an item in the cost-benefit analysis regarding industrial 
employment and generated industrial activities. No quantification of this 
aspect is made by STUNET. Nor is it related to the policy conclusions 
STUNET puts forward, whch can be interpreted as keeping the socio- 
economic policy dimension virtually out of the analysis. 
4.2.4.6. ETUNET Perspective 
The STUNET views on the main four dimensions considered can be 
summarized as follows (also see Table 4.1): 
The main decis ive factors for STUNET, in relation to its endorse- 
ment of further consideration of a LNG terminal, seem to have 
been energy policy and economics. Concerning the recommen- 
dation that the importation of LNG should be considered posi- 
tively by the Cabinet, a major factor was the perceived lack of 
prospects in respect of the option of importing natural gas by 
pipeline. STUNET views on this point simply stated that Euro- 
pean demand for natural gas was hgh ,  and consequently 
imports of gas from nearby suppliers would be limited. Importa- 
tion of natural gas over large distances would thus require LNG 
transport, for economic and practical reasons, STUNET asserted 
(1977a, p. 0-1). Once LNG was judged by STUNET as the only 
practical way of importing natural gas,, the favorable position of 
STUNET vis-a-vis importation of LNG was easily argued, withn 
the framework of the stated Dutch policy on energy (emphasiz- 
ing diversification of sources and favoring gas). Energy policy 
thus became the dominant  d imension in relation to the first pol- 
icy question, on the desirability of LNG importation. Supported 
by the imperative of this favorable position concerning LNG, the 
economics dimension then became the major factor in determin- 
ing the outcome of STUNET's discussion of options concerning 
the second policy choice, on off-shore versus land-based LNG 
sites. STUNET concluded that cost considerations would favor a 
land-based site, whilst all other dimensions would also favor a 
land-based site, with the exception of the safety dimension. Of 
the other land-based sites, all but Maasvlakte were turned down 
on ground of nautical and safety grounds (STUNET 1977a, p.0-5). 
The health and safety dimension nor the environmental dimen- 
sion seem to have played a decisive role in STUNET's technical 
analysis. STUNET itself acknowledged that these two single fac- 
tors would not be a sufficient selection criteria. The importance 
of safety was acknowledged, but STUNET apparently considered 
itself unable to make unequivocal recommendations with 
respect to the safety aspect of LNG, for which no agreed criteria 
were available (STUNET 1977a, p.0-7). It is important to note 
here that STUNET had made use of the risk analysis for LNG 
which had been carried out by TNO, and had been included as an 
appendix to STUNET's report. 
The first two dimensions, energy policy and economic factors, can be 
said to have been the primary dimensions on which STUNET had based its 
main conclusion, concerning the importation of LNG and the location of 
the terminal. As Table 4.2 illustrates STUNET was in favor of LNG importa- 
tion and in favor of a land-based terminal.' 
*This statement does not imply that STUNET did not give considerable uf ten f ion  to the as- 
pects of safety, but rather relates to the impluafions of the safety studies, in terms of the 
find conclusions and advice of STUNET, as reported to ICONA. 
Table 4. I 
ENERGY POLICY: LNG importation favored gas import via pipeline 
unrealistic for large distance. 
ECONOMICS/COSTS: Natural gas favored over oil; land-based LNG terminal 
less expensive. 
HEALTH / SAFETY: No definite conclusion sea terminal "not significantly" 
safer (in terms of consequences) no basis for 
concern/risk-reduction possible. 
ENVIRONMENT: Limited effect; no basis for deciding on location 
of terminal site gas compares favorably to oil 
Table 4.2. 
KEY: + favor able 
unfavorable 
+/- not decisive - marginally favorable 
-/+ not decisive - marginally unfavorable 
except when safety concern of large-scale 
effect of accident is dominant dimension. 
. Dimensions 
1. energy policy 
2. economics/cost 
3. health and safety 
4. environmental impact 
Outcome 
LNG Import? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Yes 
Land-Based Terminal? 
+ / -  
+ 
-/  + 
-/  + 
yes* 
4.2.5. ICONA 
In t h s  section the policy views of ICONA are assessed with reference 
to the major policy dimensions and policy questions which were taken 
into consideration by t h s  governmental advisory group. In view of the 
importance ICONA has played in the decision-making process in the Neth- 
erlands, its views are analyzed in somewhat more detail than most of the 
other interested parties. The analysis is based on ICONA's three policy 
reports to the Cabinet, submitted between October 1977 and June 1978 
(ICONA 1977, 197Ba,b; ICONA 1977 is also referred to as Tweede Kamer 
1977, no. 3). The later focused in particular on the comparison of 
Maasvlakte sites with the proposed site a t  Eemshaven, which by 1978 were 
the only two contenders left. 
4.2.5.1. Energy Policy 
In ICONA's first policy advice (1977) the advisory committee whole 
heartedly supported the desirability of LNG importation, from the per- 
spective of securing Dutch energy supply. The justification of this posi- 
tion (as referred to by ICONA) was found in the stated Dutch governrnen- 
tal policy on Energy (Tweede Kamer 1974), whch  included diversification 
of energy supply, strategic reserves of Dutch natural gas, environmental 
benefits of gas compared to oil, active import policies for natural gas, etc.  
(Tweede Kamer 1977, no. 3, and ICONA 197Ba, p.2-1). the case against the 
"economic and practical" viability of importing natural gas via pipeline 
from distant suppliers (those outside north-west Europe) was largely in 
line with the  assessments made by STUNET (Tweede Kamer 1977, no. 3, 
p.3). In ICONA's own words, "the desirability of importing LNG must 
(thus) be considered against the  general desirability of importing natural 
gas," (my emphasis) (ICONA 197Ba, p.2-1). Exchange of agreements 
involving foreign suppliers of natural gas and importers of Dutch natural 
gas was discussed as a possibility by ICONA, but was considered to  be of 
little real value ("weinig realistisch") (ICONA 1978a, p.2-7). Having con- 
sidered the various options for Dutch energy policy vis-a-vis natural gas, 
ICONA strongly favored the importation of LNG into the Netherlands (gen- 
erally supporting the policies put  forward by the Gasunie and the Ministry 
for Economic Affairs in this context --EZ 1977). Consideration was given 
to the possibility of acquiring foreign LNG through a terminal outside the 
Neth.erlands--possibly in (bordering) Belgium or the  Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG), whlch were both considering such a terminal. ICONA con- 
sidered t h s  option "undesirable" because of strategic factors (e.g., secu- 
rity, dependency of supply) in relation to e n e r g ~ - ~ o l i c y  (ICONA 197Ba, 
p.3-8). 
A s  regards the location of a Dutch LNG terminal, from the viewpoint 
of Dutch energy policy, ICONA concluded that  natural gas imports (and 
LNG for that  matter) should be made available to Dutch domestic users at 
the lowest possible economic cost. ICONA thus shifted the question of the  
location of the LNG terminal (partly) into the realm of the economics 
dimension (see Section 4.2.5.2.). From the perspective of energy policy, 
ICONA was concerned with the "time dimension" of the problem: consid- 
ering the date by which a Dutch LNG terminal could be completed, ICONA 
favored a land-based terminal. This view was based upon the specific 
interest of having available a LNG term.ina1 by 1984, in order to receive 
the first imports of Algerian LNG (as was in principle contracted for by 
Gasunie and approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs, shortly after 
ICONA's first policy advice) (Tweed Kamer 1977, no.3, p.8). An island ter- 
minal would be "impractical" to complete in time for this purpose. The 
general opinion of ICONA from an energy policy point of view, was that  the 
Algerian LNG contract should be regarded as a "great opportunity" for 
Dutch energy supply, for securing foreign sources of natural gas at  a time 
there was a (alleged) "sellers market" (TCONA 1978a, pp. 1-3 and 2-5). 
Considering the different LNG locations included in ICONA's analyses, at  
Maasvlakte and Eemshaven, the first was given marginal preference 
within the context of energy policy. Maasvlakte sites were regarded as 
providing more favorable opportunities for coal-gasification installations 
in conjunction with a LNG project (ICONA 1978b, p. 2-5). Additionally, 
Maasvlakte was also favored (compared to Eemshaven) in relation to the 
locations of the major users of natural gas, who are heavily concentrated 
in the West of the Netherlands, relatively close to Maasvlakte (ICONA 
1978b, Bijlage 2, p.7). The lat ter  aspect is closely related to economic 
considerations (see Section 4.2.5.2.). 
4.2.5.2. Economics/ Cost 
The cost dimension as assessed by ICONA played no relevant role with 
respect to the first policy question, concerning the desirability of LNG 
imports into the Netherlands (other than the economic advantages of 
secure supply of natural gas a t  an  acceptable price). The cost dimension 
did include consideration of possible use of a foreign LNG terminal, off- 
shore, but relatively little attention was paid to this option, because it was 
regarded as undesirable from the strategic energy policy perspective 
(see Section 4.2.5.1.) (ICONA 1978, p.3-8). Cost of foreign land-based ter- 
minals were considerably higher than a Dutch terminal, ICONA concluded. 
As regards the cost implications of alternative locations for a LNG termi- 
nal, ICONA clearly established that  the option of an off-shore LNG terminal 
(on an artificial North Sea Island), was by far the most expensive alterna- 
tive (see Table 4.3). This option should only be considered, ICONA stated, 
when financial collaboration with neighboring gas-importing countries 
could be secured (Tweede Kamer 1977, no. 3, p.9). ICONA concluded that 
an  island terminal would be more expensive by a factor three, compared 
to a land-based terminal a t  the Maasvlakte (ICONA 1978a, p.4-29). 
Whlst the second ICONA report (1978b) focused on the comparison of 
an  island-terminal and a land-based LNG terminal a t  Maasvlakte, the thlrd 
policy advice (1978b) considered the differences between the land-based 
sites a t  Maasvlakte and Eemshaven. Regarding the cost dimension ICONA 
clearly favored a Maasvlakte site, based on the following cost-related 
aspects (1978b, p.2-30). 
-- shorter route (compared to  Eemshaven) from Algerian suppliers 
(10%) would result in savings 
-- LNG terminal closer to  major industrial users 
- no additional dredging required (contrary to Eemshaven) to 
allow for the required shipping movements. 
Table 4.3. 
Site 
Maasvlakte A and B 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam-Maasvlakte 
(breakwater terminal) 
1 Off-shore island 
Cost* 
520 - 530 
1150 - 1325 
1575 - 1675 
'millions of guilders 
Whereas the main other cost-related factors failed to show significant 
differences between Eemshaven and the Maasvlakte sites, ICONA con- 
cluded that  the total additional cost of an Eemshaven terminal would be 
in the order of 250-700 Million Dutch Guilders (for LNG imports ranging 
from 4-10 x 10'm3 LNG/year). The cost estimates for the other LNG sites 
considered by ICONA are summarized in Table 4.3 (ICONA 1978a, p.4-28). 
From the  point of view of economics, ICONA clearly favored a LNG termi- 
nal a t  a Maasvlakte site (ICONA 1978b, p.3-3). 
4.2.5.3. Health and. Safety 
The health and safety dimension of LNG was clearly recognized by 
ICONA as an important aspect of the declsion-making process. The main 
source of information used by ICONA as regards to the risks involved in 
the transportation, handllng and storing of LNG was a risk analysis per- 
formed by TNO (which was includ'ed in STUNET's report to  ICONA--STUNET 
1977b--as an  appendix). On the basis of the TNO report and additional 
information--including advice from CPR (the Committee for the Preven- 
tion of Ilisasters by Dangerous Materials) ICONA discussed the problem of 
"risk," making a distinction between "factual risk" and "perceived risk." 
Factual risk was being defined by the mathematical product of the  proba- 
bility (of an accident occurring) and the consequences (when such an  
accident occurs). In addition to this "probability x consequences" risk, 
ICONA discussed "perceived risk," being the apparent risk as  perceived by 
the population. ICONA pointed out that perceived risk is often hgher  
than the factual risk, because of the public "sensitivity" to accidents that  
have large effect (regardless of the probability of such a n  accident occur- 
ring). 
ICONA did not relate directly the risk involved in a LNG project to the 
policy question of the desirability of LNG importation. The committee 
merely stated that the balance of risk on the one hand versus the bene- 
fits of LNG (secure energy supply, relatively clean energy source, etc.) on 
the other, would justify a LNG island terminal (Tweede Kamer 1977, no. 3, 
p.6). As regards a land-based terminal at Maasvlakte, ICONA stated that 
the risk involved (probability x consequences) would be hardly different 
from that at  an island-terminal, thereby implying that the perceived posi- 
tive result of the balance between risks and benefits involved in LNG 
would also apply to a land-based terminal. 
Concerning the siting of a LNG terminal in the Netherlands, ICONA 
compared the "factual risk" of various locations (based on the TNO risk 
analysis) and concluded that an island terminal would be the safest loca- 
tion and Maasvlakte sites A and B the least safe, but only marginally so 
(the Eemshaven site was at that point not yet taken into consideration). 
The results of the comparison of the factual risk of the above mentioned 
alternatives are summarized in Table 4.4 (ICONA 197Ba, p.4-9). 
Table 4.4. Factual risks based on TNO data 
Terminal Consequences Maasvlakte A/B Island off-shore 
no. deaths /yr 0.14 0.12 
no. injured/yr 0.12 0.11 
( material damage/yr 0.15 0.001 I 
(x million Dutch guilder) 
ICONA concluded on the basis of these and other data, that the safety 
gains of: an island terminal were relatively small. ICONA furthermore 
stressed that risk-reducing measures should be introduced. In the case 
of the Maasvlakte terminal, for example, this would include restricting 
other shpping movements, whenever LNG carriers are moving near the 
terminal. 
The calculated risks and reduced risks of the four locations initially 
considered by ICONA are summarized in Table 4.5 (ICONA 197Ba, p.29a). 
ICONA concluded that an island terminal had the lowest risk factor, 
having a marginally smaller "factual risk" and a considerably smaller 
"perceived risk" than the other sites considered. The Maasvlakte sites 
had the highest perceived risks, ICONA concluded (ICONA 1978a, p.4-29); 
a t  the time the Eemshaven site had not yet been properly evaluated by 
ICONA. 
Table 4.5 
Locations Ftiskl) Reduced Risk+ 
Maasvlakte A/B 0.135 0.028 
Maasvlakte C 0.131~)  0 ,026~)  
I 
Voornedam (Breakwater) 0 .123~)  0 .024~)  
Island 0.120 0.022~) 
NOTES: Through additional measures 
1) statistical no. of deaths per year, obtained by the 
summation of all products of probabilities x consequences 
0 3 of considered accidents, involving 12 x 10 m LNG per year. 
2) estimated 
3) considering one pipeline from the island to the shore. 
It is important to mention here that in evaluating the above risk date 
ICONA had noted the advice of the CPR which, among other things, stated 
that: 
1, there are no pre-determined safety criteria; the question to be 
answered concerns the risks involved vs the benefits of LNG 
importation, 
2. the TNO study had under valued the importance of "perceived 
risk" and "psychological shock" of large scale effects among the 
population. 
3. risk involved in LNG is comparable with other risks, already pub- 
licly accepted. 
On the basis of t h s  advice and other inputs made to ICONA, and its own 
evaluation, the advisory committee concluded that in addition to the 
(safer) island terminal, also a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte sites is "not 
unacceptable to society" (ICONA 19'78a, p.4-30)-referring to already 
"accepted" risks in the Maasvlakte area and elsewhere in the Netherlands. 
ICONA strongly stressed that the safety dimension could not be used 
as the sole criteria for the selection of a site for the LNG terminal. It ack- 
nowledged for example, that an island-terminal would be the safest alter- 
native, but immediately emphasized that the safety dimension was the 
only aspect favoring an  island terminal, thus requiring comparison with 
other sites which were preferred because of other aspects. Considering 
the risk vs, cost trade-off, ICONA concluded that the higher cost of an 
island could not be justified by the limited reduction of factual risks, this 
an option would bring about (ICONA 197Ba, p.4-30). How exactly this 
trade-off was evaluated has not been made explicit by ICONA. In its con- 
clusions little mention is made of "perceived risk" involved in the various 
alternatives. ICONA stated that  t h s  aspect of risk is difficult to assess 
objectively (i.e., by ICONA) (ICONA 1978a, p.4-30) and believed the deci- 
sion procedures a t  the local authority level could perhaps provide more 
insight in this respect. 
By the time the advisory committee was requested to include 
Eemshaven in its considerations, the basic position of ICONA as regards 
the assessment of risk and the importance which should be attached to 
this dimension (in relation to the other dimension) had already been 
spelled out. Having considered the Eemshaven site (in its t h r d  report: 
1978b) ICONA concluded (on the basis of CPR advice): 
- the maximum consequence of a LNG accident would be lower at  
Eemshaven by a factor of 10; 
-- longer route to Eemshaven counterbalanced this act ,  because of 
the increased probability of accidents a t  sea; 
-- the perceived risk--for the local population in the Eemshaven 
area--would be considerably hgher  in this area of the Nether- 
lands, compared to the Maasvlakte area, where industrial activi- 
ties were already very much developed. 
The most important conclusion as to the comparison of risks 
between Maasvlakte and Eemshaven, however, was the relative lack of 
implications derived from the safety dimension, as a determining variable 
in relation to  the outcome of the policy questions addressed by ICONA. 
ICONA concluded that on the basis of its assessments (between the two 
sites) "no clear preference can be made on the basis of the safety 
aspects" (ICONA 1978b, p.3-1). ICONA noted, however, that more insight 
into the importance of "perceived risk" could possibly be obtained 
through further study a t  a later stage of the decision-making process 
(ICONA 1978b, p.3-5), involving local authorities' views. 
4.2.5.4. Socio-Economics/Industrial and Regional Policy 
This dimension was interpreted. by ICONA as comprising mainly 
environmental land use planning aspects and the impact of LNG develop- 
ments upon local economic activities, particularly employment. As 
regards planning. ICONA concluded there were no objections to  the 
Maasvlakte site for the location of a LNG terminal. In ICONA's early 
reports, discussion mainly focused upon the Maasvlakte sites, since i t  was 
widely expected that  this area would provide the only viable option. Both 
Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites were considered to be viable from the 
perspective of planning (ICONA 1978a, p.4-22). The only reservation con- 
cerned the requirements of the governmental electricity supply plans, 
which could possibly rule out a LNG terminal in the same area of a 
nuclear power plant. 
The major source of information on the aspect of planning was a 
study (commissioned by ICONA) of the State Land Use Planning Commit- 
tee,  RPC. On the  basis of this study ICONA concluded that: 
(a) from the point of view of planning, both Eemshaven and 
Maasvlakte locations were feasible for a LNG terminal; 
(b) there were not structural objectives for the two sites from the 
point of view of land use planning. 
The socio-economic dimension was heavily biased towards the 
employment effects of LNG developments. ICONA did stress, however, 
several general advances of LNG developments in the Netherlands, ini- 
tially focusing upon Rotterdam area, as the most desirable LNG terminal 
site. ICONA concluded: 
1. LNG could form an important stimulus for Dutch employment 
(positive effects on employment in such sectors as building con- 
tracting, shrp building, etc.),  
2. indirect industrial activities associated with LNG (e.g., cryogen- 
ics) would be stimulated, 
3. LNG terminal in the Netherlands would enhance know-how on 
LNG industry, 
4. LNG terminal a t  the Maasvlakte could mean a welcome extension 
of Rotterdam's harbor activities (ICONA 1978a, p.4-23). 
The initial assessment of the employment effects of a LNG terminal 
showed that  they are proportionally related to  the investment involved in 
the LNG project, thus having the smallest impact at  the Maasvlakte sites. 
The ICONA assessment on economic activity, in terms of employment is 
summarized in Table 4.6 (ICONA 1978a, p.4-29a). 
Table 4.6: Employment Generation. 
Site Economic Activity* 
Maasvlakte A / B  5880 - 6840 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam (Breakwater) 
I Island 16850 I 
Eemshaven 7150 
* No, of man years/per year (approx.): employment involved in shipbuilding excluded. 
Source: ICONA 1D7Bb, p.2-22. 
The direct employment effect on the construction of the LNG termi- 
nal were equal for the Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites, ICONA concluded. 
As regards the permanent employment involved in operating the LNG ter- 
minal 50 man-years/per year were estimated for both sites. Additionally, 
ICONA concluded, Eemshaven would give rise to  a further 70 man-years of 
permanent employment as a result of infrastructural activities (ICONA 
197Bb, p.2-23). 
Prospects for additional employment for "external" industrial activi- 
ties related to LNG, were better a t  the Maasvlakte, however, ICONA con- 
cluded mainly as a result of the then existing industrial infrastructure 
(ICONA 197Bb, p.2-23). The expected stimulus for the Dutch ship building 
industry would in any case go to Rotterdam, regardless of the location of 
the LNG terminal ICONA concluded (1970b, p.2-24). On the socio- 
economic effects (employment) lCONA thus concluded that  the  direct 
employment was somewhat more positive a t  Eemshaven; the "external" 
indirect, employment effects, however, were more promising at  the  
Maasvlakte (1978b, p.4-25). 
The slight advantage of Eemshaven as regards the socio-economic 
dimension resulted from the employment benefits of 300 temporary and 
70 permanent additional man-years of employment (ICONA 197Bb, p.3-3). 
The Eemshaven site had, on the  other hand, less external socio-economic 
and employment effects, relative to the Maasvlakte site. On t h s  basis 
ICONA concluded that  the regional effect as regards employment were not 
significantly different a t  the considered sites (197Bb, p.3-5) and on the 
basis of the expected qualitative employment effects of LNG "no clear 
preference was made by ICONA for either side" (197Bb, p.2-25). 
Finally, it should be mentioned that ICONA specifically stated in its 
advice that  i t  considered it inappropriate to give its opinion as regards 
the importance that  should be attached to the "political" dimensions of 
regional policy (1 97Bb, p.3-6). 
The ICONA representative of the Ministry for Economic Affairs stated, 
howeverh, (in a separately worded final conclusion) that  if the Cabinet 
decided to  favor an Eemshaven site because of regional economics the 
trade-off with respect to  the (hgher  relative) cost involved in the  
Eemshaven site should be fully taken into account (1978, p.3-6). 
4.2.5.5. Environmental Impact 
ICONA acknowledged that the operation of a LNG terminal would have 
negative consequences for the  environment, such as noise, water pollu- 
tion and air pollution. I t  pointed out, however, that  natural gas is a rela- 
tively clean energy source from an environmental point of view, com- 
pared to oil or coal (197Ba, p.4-16). As far as disruption of the marine 
environment is considered, ICONA concluded that the Eemshaven site will 
cause the strongest negative effect, primarily as a result of the required 
dredging operations in that  area. The ranking of the various sites as 
regards the disruption of the marine environment is given in Figure 4.3 
(ICONA 1978a, p.4-29a and 197Bb, p.2-14). 
Least environmental disruption 
of marine environment 
Maasvlakte A/B 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam (Breakwater) 
Island 
Eemshaven 
Most environmental disruption 
of marine environment 
Figure 4.3. Environmental impact. 
ICONA based its assessment on a study performed by the Inter- 
departmental Committee for Environmental Hygiene (ICMH) (Appendix 6 
to ICONA 1978b). ICONA supported the view of ICMH which lead to the con- 
clusion that from the environmental point of view (excluding safety 
aspects) the larger negative consequences can be expected at 
Eemshaven, than compared to the Maasvlakte sites (ICONA 1978b, p.2-16). 
As regards recreational activities near the considered sites, ICONA 
concluded the Maasvlakte to be closer to recreational areas. The ship- 
ping route to the Eemshaven, however, would pass several islands whch 
are being used for recreation, and the Eemshaven site will thus also have 
negative effects from this point of view, ICONA stated. ICONA concluded 
that as far as the environmental impact (affecting nature and the 
landscape) is concerned, neither the Maasvlakte sites, nor the Eemshaven 
location give rise to any "fundamental objections" (ICONA 1978b, p.2-2). 
In its final conclusion, ICONA stated that the dimension of environ- 
mental impact favored the Maasvlakte--primarily because of the dredging 
requirements at  the Eemshaven site, which could result in considerable 
disruption of the sea environment. 
4.2.5.6. Minority mews 
Before further analysis is made of ICONA's perspective and "aggre- 
gate view" on LNG, it is important to note, that there was no unanimous 
agreement about its position, among the representatives from the various 
ministry departments, which make up the advisory body. As a result, the 
representatives of three departments, notably of the Ministry for Health 
and Environmental Protection, published their specific reservations as 
appendices to the ICONA reports. The representative for the Ministry of 
Health and Environmental Protection aired its disagreement with the 
conclusions of ICONA regarding several major issues. The following posi- 
tions were stated in this respect: 
1. it is not absolutely clear that LNG importation into the Nether- 
lands is needed for Dutch energy supply, 
2.  LNG detonation is not impossible and may have disastrous 
effects, 
3.  the STUNET project Group on LNG should have considered the 
"maximum credible accident", 
4. public concern of the local population in the Rijnmond area is 
justified because of the dangers of industrial activities in this 
are a. 
On the basis of the above (and other) factors the Public Health Minis- 
t ry representative concluded that  "location of a LNG terminal a t  the 
Maasvlakte is unacceptable" (bijlage, ICONA 1977; emphasis added). This 
position was stated in two of ICONA's policy reports (1977 and 1978a), 
which in both cases did not involve assessment of the Eemshaven area as 
a viable option for a LNG terminal.' I t  is also of interest to note that  the 
representative of the Ministry for Housing and Physical Planning stated in 
the second ICONA report (1978a, p.5-7) to take a position "close" to the 
Health Ministry's view, without thereby refusing the overall policy advice 
submitted by ICONA to the Cabinet. The representative of the Minister for 
Science Policy, focused its critical note (with respect to the first ICONA 
report, 1977) upon the structure of the analyses of ICONA, especially in 
relation to the assessment of alternatives (Tweede Kamer 14626, no. 3, 
p.14-15). 
In the final ICONA report to the Cabinet--where for the first time the 
Eemshaven alternative was re-evaluated--no reservation concerning its 
outcome by any of the ministerial representatives was made. 
4.2.5.7. ICONA Policy Perspective 
Considering the overall ICONA policy perspective and the evaluation 
of the various policy questions, the above minority views once more 
emphasize the fact that  the information used by ICONA and the weight 
attached to the various dimensions included in its analysis, can be inter- 
preted in different ways. 
There seems to be a clear hierarchy of dimensions, as considered by 
ICONA, when evaluating the different policy questions a t  stake. ICONA's 
own decision-making logic can be illustrated by Table 4.7. The dimensions 
of cost and energy policy have taken a h g h  position in ICONA's dimen- 
sional hierarchy. This can perhaps be related to the fact that  an island- 
terminal was rejected by ICONA as a desirable option, despite the recog- 
nized (albeit small) safety advantages of an  off-shore terminal, in relation 
to the high costs. The relative lack of influence of dimensions of safety 
and socio-economics upon the final policy outcome of ICONA can be gath- 
ered from the  explicit statement that these dimensions should be used as 
*On the basis of earlier nautical/safety studies, Eemshaven was concluded to be unsuitable 
as a LNG harbor. 
Table 4.7. ICONA views on main policy questions. 
Policy Question Outcome 
I LNG Importation? 1. energy policy Yes 1 
$.r 
Dutch terminal? 1. energy policy Yes 
4 
0 
Land-based vs, off-shore? 1. economics/cost 
k 
E 2. energy policy Land-based 
U 3. health and safety off-shore* 
C 
0 
LNG site?** 1. econor~~ics/cost  
2. energy policy Maasvlakte 
3. environment 
NOTES: Although ICONA eventually supported a land-based terminal on the 
grounds of economics/cost and energy policy, in its fist policy 
advise (1877) it concluded that from the viewpoint of health and 
ssfety only, an off-shore site should be preferred. Later policy 
advice, however, rejected the island alternative. 
* *  This is based on the policy advice of ICONA as submitted in 1878 
(ICONA 1878a, b). 
criteria to  distinguish between the final two alternative sites (Maasvlakte 
and Eemshaven) (rather than be resolved as part  of underlying policy 
issues; e.g., acceptability). Although the safety dimension was extensively 
explored by ICONA--incorporating studies and advice by TNO and RPC--the 
policy implications of the safety factors seems to have been rather lim- 
ited, in comparison to considerations of cost and energy policy. 
Finally, Table 4.8 indicates which of the dimensions considered by 
ICONA played a decisive role in determining the outcome of each of the 
policy questions, ICONA was faced with in its analysis. 
The above analysis thus indicates that  energy policy and cost were 
the most important dimensions in relation to ICONA's policy advice out- 
come. The great relative importance attached to  these two dimensions 
help to explain how ICONA arrived at i ts  final policy recommendations. 
Table 4.9 illustrates the implications of this dimensional hierarchy 
for the  various policy questions. This table also indicates that there is not 
only a dimensional hierarchy but also a hierarchy of policy questions, 
determining in which order each of the  policy issues is being analyzed , 
and answered. The outcome of a previous policy question decided on the 
basis of dimensional criteria--thus sets the context for each policy ques- 
tion and its resolution. 
Table 4.8. ICONA views on dimensions on policy questions. 
Policy 
Question 
\\. Dimension 
1. energy policy 
3. environmental 
impact 
4. health and safety 
5. socio-economics 
Outcome 
LNG 
Import? 
Yes 
Dutch 
Terminal? 
Yes 
Land- 
based? 
+ 
+ 
+ /- 
- / + 
+ 
Yes 
Siting: 
a) Maasvlakte 
Yes 
Siting: 
b) Eemshaven 
KEY: + favorable 
- unfavorable 
+/- indecisive: marginally favorable 
-/+ indecisive: marginally unfavorable 
o no preference; not affecting outcome 
1) when land-based terminal was considered; in case of 
off-shore terminal, foreign LNG terminal would yield 
lower cost. 
tion and its resolution. 
4.3. LX)CAL AUTHORITIES ROTTERDAM / ZUID-HOLIAND 
4.3.1. Background and Involvement 
Most of the discussions concerning a large-scale LNG terminal in the 
Netherlands up to late 1977 have emphasized the Rotterdam area as the 
prime site for a LNG terminal. Consequently the local authorities relating 
to Rotterdam became involved in the LNG decision-making process, at  a 
relatively early stage. Early 1977, Gasunie applied to  the City of Rotter- 
dam for approval for a LNG terminal site a t  the Maasvlakte-before any 
firm contract for the importation of foreign LNG had been agreed upon. 
In particular Gasunie itself, had always been very outspoken about its 
Table 4.9. Implications of dimensional views 
Dimension 
1. energy policy 
Implications for LNG Policy 
LNG Importation required 
Dutch terminal desired 
Land-based terminal favored 
alternatives reduced to: 
Maasvlakte A/B and Eemshaven 
3. environmental impact MaasvIakte preferred 
1 4. health and safety No obvious implications 
5. socio-economics No obvious implications 
intentions of establishing its LNG terminal at  the Maasvlakte (adjacent to 
its LNG peak shaving plant). 
The local authorities responsible for activities in the Rotterdam har- 
bor area concern three levels: 
1. The City of Rotterdam (including the Rotterdam Harbor Authori- 
ties) 
2. Public Authority Rijnmond 
3. The Province of Zuid-Holland (to which Rotterdam belongs) 
The responsibilities and interests of these three local authorities overlap 
only to a limited degree, and it is therefore necessary to consider their 
respective positions vis-a-vis LNG separately. 
To a limited extent, however, the activities concerning LNG by these 
three levels of local authorities were being co-ordinated. The main joint 
activity in the LNG decisi.on-making process concerned the preparation 
and publication of an information brochure for the public. It was pub- 
lished in April 1978 and set the context for the discussion a t  the respec- 
tive local levels about the official positions concerning a LNG terminal in 
their areas of responsibility. Although all three parties had involved 
themselves in the LNG decision-making process before the publication of 
their brochure (Zuid-Holland 197Ba), it provides an indication of the com- 
mon perspective shared by the local authorities as regards a LNG termi- 
nal in the Rotterdam harbor area. 
The brochure, entitled "LNG at the Maasvlakte: Yes or No", relied 
heavily upon information provided by reports of STUNET, ICONA and 
reflected the government's stated energy policy. In it, the local authori- 
ties largely acknowledged the need for LNG importation into the 
Netherlands from the perspective of Du.tch energy policy. They also 
stressed the economic importance for the Rotterdam area to become the 
site for a LNG terminal, as  well as the expected socio-economic benefit it 
was thought to bring with it. The main policy question addressed by the 
local authorities, increasingly shf ted  towards the conditions of accep- 
tance for a LNG terminal in the area, having taken into account the 
economic and socio-economic benefits LNG could bring to the Nether- 
lands (energy supply) and the Rotterdam area  in particular. 
The way in which each of the local authorities perceived the question 
of a LNG terminal in their region of responsibility and the position they 
took as regads the various dimensions of the decision problem, is dis- 
cussed in the following sections. Official involvement of the local authori- 
ties in the LNG decision-making process, commenced on 21st March 1978, 
following a Cabinet request to submit official views concerning LNG to the 
Cabinet by 1st July, 1978. 
It is important to note here, that  by the time the local authorities 
were formally involved in the LNG decision process, the Cabinet was con- 
sidering only two alternative LNG sites: Maasvlakte ( A  or B) and 
Eemshaven. Local authorities responsible for the Maasvlakte sites, how- 
ever, took into consideration other potential LNG sites, outside 
Maasvlakte sites A and B, as requested by the Cabinet. In Table 4.10 the 
various sites involved in the LNG decision process as far as the local 
authorities around Rotterdam were concerned are summarized, also list- 
ing some important characteristics. 
In the  following sections the respective views of the three relevant 
local authorities concerning the Maasvlakte LNG sites are assessed. Each 
of these authorities have a two-tier internal decision structure of a board 
of governors formulating policies and a council of representatives finaliz- 
ing the policy decisions. Following consultation with various external 
organizations the three local authorities formulated their respective pol- 
icy positions and informed the Cabinet. Figure 4.4 illustrates the deci- 
sional network involved. 
4.3.2. City of Rotterdam 
4.3.2.1. Background and Responsibilities 
The City of Rotterdam was one of the  first parties to be involved in 
the LNG decision process in the Netherlands. The plans of the Gasunie for 
a possible terminal for the importation of LNG via tanker into the Nether- 
lands resulted in a request (8 February 1977) by the Gas industry to the 
City of Rotterdam for approval of a site a t  the Maasvlakte for a LNG termi- 
nal. This particular site would be ad.jacent to the Gasunie's own LNG 
peak-shaving plant in the  southeastern region of the Rotterdam harbour 
area (referred to as Maasvlakte site A), which had been in use by Gasunie 
for a number of years. As early as 1976 the Harbour of Rotterdam had 
carried out an initial feasibility study on the costs and economic benefits 
of LNG activities ("Aanvoer van vloeibaar methaan naar de Maasvlakte," 
Rotterdam Havenbedrijf, March 1976). 
Table 4.10. 
Maasvlakte (site A) South-western corner of Maasvlakte, adjacent 
existing Gasunie peak shaving plant; relatively 
small site; distance to nearest towns Hoek van 
Holland - 5 km, Oostvoorne - 4 km. 
. 
Maasvlakte (site B) North-western point of Maasvlakte; larger than 
site A; distance to nearest towns Hoek van 
Holland - 6 km; Oostvoorne - 0 km (shipping 
route sites A and B kead 2 km from centre of 
Hoek van Holland). 
LNG ~ e r & n a l  Sites 
- 
Details 
Maasvlakte (site C) extension west of existing Maasvlakte area to 
be constructed; size of area can be designed as 
required; distance to nearest towns 
Oostvoorne -7 km, Hoek van Holland - 9 km. 
Voornedam Breakwater extended dam to be constructed 7 or 10 km in 
(short or long) 
sbpping route does not interfere with other 
Rotterdam Harbour traffic; nearest distance to 
Oostvoorne 10-13 km (short or long dam) 
1 Island location artificial island to be built 27 km off Dutch 
coast; connected via pipeline to Maasvlakte or 
other part of Dutch coastline. 
Off-Shore Tunnel platform 4 km off-shore from Maasvlakte for 
Terminal System reception of LNG; underwater pipeline for 
transport of LNG to storage site at Maasvlakte; 
distance to nearest town Hoek van 
Holland - 1 1 km. 
The City of Rotterdam is responsible for giving planning permission 
and issuing a building permit, whlst it also has an advisory function with 
respect to legislation concerning environmental hygiene and investment 
plans. 
Activities of the Harbour area are the prime concern of the City of 
Rotterdam. Rotterdam Harbour is the largest in the world--with a goods 
turnover exceeding 270 million tons; together with the petrochemical 
industries the Harbour is at  the Centre of Rotterdam's economy. Conse- 
quently economic interest in attracting LNG to  Rotterdam has been high 
and the authorities of the Harbour of Rotterdam has been high and the 
Authorities of the Harbour of Rotterdam played a particularly important 
Province of Zuid-Holland 
R i  j nmond 
Harbour of Rotterdam 
advises 
I 
Advisors/ t 
Information DCMR 
KEY: DCMR Dienst Centraal Milieubeheer Rijnmond 
RANNR Raad van Advies voor Natuurbehoud en Natuurbeheer Rijnrnond 
PRM Provinciaale Raad voor de Milieuhygiene 
NZH hspectie Volksgezondheid Zuid-Holland 
Figure 4.4. Local authorities Maasvlakte sites. 
role in this respect. The Harbour of Rotterdam clearly perceived it to be 
of great importance for Rotterdam to be involved in LNG activities. Large 
scale importation of LNG into Western Europe was thought to result in a 
reduction in demand for oil, thereby impairing Rotterdam's harbour 
activities; two-thirds of Rotterdam's harbor trade concerns oil and oil 
products (1978, p.46). 
The general agreement on the benefits of LNG activities for Rotter- 
dam was a m.ajor contextual factor in the LNG decision-process in the City 
of Rotterdam which stated to gain momentum in early 1977. Following 
the Gasunie's request, the mayor and aldermen of Rotterdam officially 
involved the Harbour of Rotterdam. The Harbour authorities subse- 
quently prepared advisory reports for the governors of Rotterdam on the 
feasibility of and requirements for the establishment of a LNG terminal a t  
the Maasvlakte. 
Two reports were completed in October 1977--one of which concern- 
ing the commercial economic aspects--was never made public. A second, 
published report (Rotterdam 1977a) dealt with the requirements for LNG 
activities, the harbor infrastructure, the risks and safety aspects, 
environmental aspects and cost-benefit analysis. This report forms one of 
the information inputs of the analysis below. More important, however, is 
the position stated on LNG by the governors of Rotterdam (mayor and 
aldermen) and the City Council, which ultimately led to the final official 
view of the City of Rotterdam, as  communicated to the national Cabinet. 
The Rotterdam Harbour Authorities provided direct input to the  
Mayor and Aldermen of Rotterdam on LNG, and they seem to  have been 
the strongest proponents of LNG a t  the Maasvlakte. The various informa- 
tional inputs and organizational relationshps concerning LNG decision- 
making in the City of Rotterdam are depicted below (see Figure 4.5). 
- -C 1 r P u b l i c  , 
Municipality I Hearings 
advises 
, /information 
Off ic ia l  View City of Rotterdam dvises Communicated - Mayor and Aldermen 
t o  Cabinet - - - - - - - -  
advises  Rotterdam City Council I I 
Figure 4.5. 
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Advi.sory input to the City of Rotterdam Mayor and Aldermen was also 
provided by the municipality of Hoek van Holland, closest to the  
Maasvlakte sites, and within the greater Rotterdam area (see section 
4.3.2.8). Other information inputs to  the Rotterdam Mayor and Aldermen 
and Council included the information given in a public hearing a t  Rotter- 
dam on 9 May 1978, following two "information days" a t  Oostvoorne and 
Hoek van Holland municipalities (see also Section 4.6.8). 
information 
4.3.2.2. Problem Definition 
A t 
ICONA I ( STUNET 1 I TNO Gasunie 
Administration 
The City of Rotterdam did not involve itself in a comparison between 
different LNG sites in the Netherlands, but focused instead upon deter- 
mining the most suitable location for LNG in the Rotterdam area. Its 
involvement in the decision-making process stemmed from the initial 
request from the  Gasunie to  approve a LNG site at  the Maasvlakte. The 
principle policy questions the City of Rotterdam were subsequently 
addressing, were the following: 
1. Is a LNG terminal site a t  the Maasvlakte feasible and desirable? 
2 .  (Under what conditions) is a LNG terminal a t  the Maasvlakte 
acceptable? 
3. Whch site is recommended? 
The City of Rotterdam was thus primarily concerned with the follow- 
ing dimensions: 
(a) economics/costs 
(b) health and safety/risk 
(c) socio-economic /industrial and regional planning 
(d) environmental impact 
The dimensions of (e) energy policy strictly falls outside the City of 
Rotterdam's concern. Attention was, however, paid to t h s  aspect to pro- 
vide a specific context for discussion of the above policy questions. 
4.3.2.3. Energy Policy 
The City of Rotterdam was not directly concerned with issues of 
Dutch national energy policy, but the attention which was in fact paid to 
this dimension, provided a context for the discussion of the other dimen- 
sions of the LNG decision process. The City of Rotterdam largely ack- 
nowledged the view put forward by STUNET and ICONA with respect to 
energy policy. It emphasized the importance of natural gas in the Dutch 
energy mix and argued that importation of natural gas was therefore 
desired (Rotterdam 19?8c, p.1052). The City of Rotterdam underlined 
ICONA's position that LNG was the only viable way of importing natural gas 
from such distant suppliers as Algeria. It also agreed with ICONA on the 
absence of any other alternatives, such as the exchange of contracts with 
importers of Dutch natural gas (Rotterdam 19?8a, p. 14). 
The City of Rotterdam had no doubts that "the importance of LNG 
importation into the Netherlands (was) in the interest of the national 
economy" (Rotterdam 19?8a, p.64). In th.e context of the Rotterdam 
itself, it seems to have emphasized the need for LNG importation mainly 
for strategic reasons: the desire to attract a major new energy activity to 
Rotterdam. The underlying reasons for this position related to the fact 
that LNG was thought to stimul.ate the Rotterdam infrastructure, to help 
maintain Rotterdam's position as Europe's "energy harbor" and become 
an impulse for LNG s h p  building in the area (see also section 4.3.2.6. on 
socio-economics). 
4.3.2.4. Economics/ Cost 
Since Rotterdam was not concerned with selecting the best LNG site 
from a national point of view, the dimension of economics largely cen- 
tered around the economic benefits a LNG terminal could bring to  Rotter- 
dam and at  what price. 
In order to establish whether a LNG terminal would be attractive to 
Rotterdam from an economic point of view, the Harbour Authorities of 
Rotterdam performed a qualitative cost-benefit analysis of a LNG project 
(Rotterdam 19??a, Chapter 12). The outcome of this analysis was to 
determine the desirability of the project: a benefit: cost ratio of more 
than 1 would mean that "LNG is acceptable from a societal point of view" 
(Rotterdam 19??a, p.84). The different elements of the cost-benefit 
analysis used by the Harbour of Rotterdam are listed below: 
COST FACTORS 
purchase of natural gas 
transport by sea 
infrastructure investments 
infrastructure maintenance 
traffic control 
suprastructure (terminal building, etc.) 
operation suprastructure 
cost of re-export. of gas 
possible delays shipping 
blocking of harbour (not quantified) 
risk of accidents (not quantified) 
environmental impact (not quantified) 
BENEFIT FACTORS 
Savings cost of foreign storage and gasification 
savings cost of foreign transport (via pipeline) 
harbor income 
lease of land 
savings of cost of oil (if LNG were to be substituted by oil as 
energy source) 
savings of measures against SO2 pollution (associated with oil) 
avoidance of other air pollution (not quantified) 
savings on storage oil reserves 
contribution to GNP and employment 
possible benefit to ship building industry (not quantified) 
income from re-export on natural gas 
diversification of energy supply (not quantified) 
applications of low-temperature activities (not quantified) 
other benefits after year 2000. 
Based on calculations assuming a maximum import of 25 x loom3 
LNG per year (including a large amount for re-export) all ~aasvlakte'sites 
considered by the Harbour of Rotterdam report yielded positive results, 
as summarized in the Table 4.11 (Rotterdam 1977a, pp.94-95): 
If, however, the maximum imports are set at  only 8 x loom3 LNG per 
year, solely for Dutch internal gas demand, the benefit/cost ratio become 
smaller than 1: 0.73, 0.71, and 0.67 respectively (Rotterdam 1977a, 
pp.96-97). On this basis the Harbour of Rotterdam report concludes that 
when large quantities of LNG are imported, a Maasvlakte LNG terminal is 
of social-economic importance to the Netherlands (Rotterdam 1977, p.9; 
emphasis added). 
The governorSs of Rotterdam (and especially the Economic/Harbor 
Committee) made heavy use of the Harbour's report on LNG, when they 
argued their case before the Rotterdam City Council. As regards the 
economics dimension they stressed the overall economic importance of 
LNG to  Rotterdam. The economic benefits of LNG are to safeguard the 
economic future of the Harbour of Rotterdam and maintain Rotterdam as 
Table 4.11. 
Site 
Maasvlakte A 
Maasvlakte B 
Maasvlakte C 
Benefit /Cost Ratio 
1.09 * unquantified factors 
1.08 + unquantified factors 
1.07 + unquantified factors 
a major energy port (Rotterdam 1978a, pp.64/65; 1978c, p.1043). It was 
expected that  increased LNG imports into Western Europe would lower oil 
demands and thus lower Rotterdam's economic activities related to  oil 
products. The City of Rotterdam was convinced that with respect to the 
position of Rotterdam as energy centre in Western Europe LNG import at  
the Maasvlakte was very important (Rotterdam 1978a, p.54; 1978c, 
p.1054). The maintenance of Rotterdam's international position was a 
major factor used to argue in favor of a Maasvlakte site for LNG and 
against a LNG terminal at  Eemshaven (Rotterdam 1978b, p.12). 
The City of Rotterdam welcomed new activities in support of the 
economic structure of the Harbour of Rotterdam area (1978a, p.63). Hav- 
ing established the desirability of attracting LNG to Rotterdam, the City 
of Rotterdam concluded that there was no clear preference for one of the 
specific Maasvlakte sites, based on the cost-benefit analysis (performed 
by the harbour authorities) (Rotterdam 1978a, p.52). 
As regards the investment cost of a LNG terminal, Table 4.12 indicate 
the figures that were used (Rotterdam 1977a, p.12/13; 1978~ .  p.1051). 
The third Maasvlakte site (C) was left out of further consideration by the 
City of Rotterdam governors (1978a, p.25); a major factor in this respect 
was the high cost. 
Rotterdam Harbour had also indicated its clear preference for 
Maasvlakte site A and B, from the point of view of economics. The total 
quantifiable cost seemed, however, to be little different between the 
three sites, a s  the following Table 4.13 indicates (Rotterdam 1977a, 
pp. 94-97). 
Cost comparison between the Maasvlakte sites and Eemshaven 
showed that  the latter was 700 million guilders more expensive, according 
to  the figures of the City of Rotterdam (1978b, p.12). 
Table 4.12. Investment cost. 
(millions of Dutch guilders) 
Maasvlakte A 
Maasvlakte B 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam 
(three berths) 
(three berths) 
Table 4.13. Total quantifiable cost. 
(million of Dutch guilders) 
9 3 (max. 25x10~rn~ (mar. 8x10 m 
Site LNG per year) LNG per year) 
Maasvlakte A 18,574.0 3,824.8 
Maasvlakte B 18,684.8 3,935.6 
Maasvlakte C 18,942.7 4,196.5 
4.3.2.5. Health and Safety 
Assessments of the Health and Safety aspects by the City of Rotter- 
dam was largely based upon the reports by the Rotterdam Harbour 
Auth.orities and the TNO risk analyses. The Rotterdam Harbour Authori- 
ties (1977a, p.41) were critical of the TNO study (e.g., with respect to the 
reliability of statistical data based on limited data bases), but neverthe- 
less stated that its conclusions were in line with its own calculations. The 
Harbour Authorities made use of the definition of risk = probability x 
consequences and--despite its critical comments--made use of the TNO 
data to compare the risks associated with LNG with those of other activi- 
ties. 
The Harbour of Rotterdam did not include in its evaluation the risk of 
detonation. Its comparison between the risk of LNG and other statistical 
changes of death due to other activities is shown in Table 4.14 (Rotterdam 
1977a, p. 54). On this basis the Rotterdam Harbour Authorities concluded 
that "the risks of LNG constituted only a slight increase of the 'daily' risks 
experienced by the population--even without any risk reducing measures 
(Rotterdam 1977a, p.54). 
Table 4.14. Chances of death. 
in traffic, at home 
at  work 
due to LNG import 
due to fire 
due to flooding 
The Rotterdam Harbour report (1977a, p. 15) also included a contri- 
bution of the Rijnmond Environmental Administration (DCMR). It con- 
cluded that LNG does not represent a danger to the population when the 
closest populated area is 3 to 5 km away from the LNG terminal. The 
environmental administration estimated the probability of a major 
accident occurring 1: 100.000, whereby windows in buildings would be 
shattered by an explosion up to 3 kilometers away (5 km if detonation 
occurs). The Environmental administration recommended that no indus- 
trial installation should be closer to the terminal than 1.5 kilometers or 
be able to withstand pressures of 0.1-0.3 bar. 
As regards the acceptability of a LNG terminal a t  the Maasvlakte, the 
Harbour Authorities report (Rotterdam 1977, p.55) concluded that a LNG 
terminal at either of the three Maasvlakte sites considered would not 
"effect demonstrably" the risk of accidents in the area. Maasvlakte site C 
is further away from the populated area and can thus be regarded as 
safer, the report concluded. Referring, however, t o  STUNET conclusion 
that the risk (probability. x consequences) of a LNG terminal off-shore 
would be virtually the same as for the Maasvlakte site A (whch is closest 
to the populated area), the Harbour Authorities concluded that the differ- 
ence between Maasvlakte sites A and C are "undoubtedly even smaller." 
The City of Rotterdam--relying heavily on risk-analytical data from 
TNO--concluded that the location of a LNG terminal is no more dangerous 
than many another industry in the Rotterdam Harbour area (Rotterdam 
197Ba, p.38). Ths  conclusion is mainly based on considerations of "fac- 
tual r i s k  (probability x consequences), rather than "perceived risk," 
which is only briefly mentioned in the City of Rotterdam reports. 
In the Rotterdam analysis, the safety objections with respect to LNG 
had been split up into three aspects: 
( 1) industrial safety--technical nature 
(2) nautical safety--technical nature, and 
(3) psychological nature. 
With respect to the psychological safety aspect much value was being 
attached to the government's pledge (to Rotterdam local authorities) 
that  a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte would effectively rule out the siting 
of a nuclear power plant in the Rotterdam area (Rotterdam 1978c, 
p.1053). 
Concerning the technical safety aspects, the City of Rotterdam 
argued for stringent safety requirements, without proving specific details. 
The City of Rotterdam failed to specify under whch  exact safety condi- 
tions a LNG terminal would be acceptable or not. The "rest-risk" of LNG 
activities--once risk-reducing measures have been employed--should be 
evaluated against the societal advantages of a LNG terminal, it argued 
(Rotterdam 1978c, p.1054). 
The overall conclusion of the City of Rotterdam was that  LNG activi- 
ties "will not impair the present safety level in the area (Rotterdam 
1978a, p.62; 197Bc, p. 1053). 
I t  also notes that the safety system which should be developed for 
LNG shpping activities could in fact also benefit the safety of transport of 
other dangerous materials in the area (Rotterdam 1978c, p.1053). The 
City of Rotterdam thus concluded that there were no objections to a LNG 
terminal a t  the Maasvlakte from the point of view of risk and safety (Rot- 
terdam 1978a, p.54)--assuming certain risk reducing measures (Rotter- 
dam 197Ba, p.63). 
Rotterdam's approval of a LNG terminal a t  the Maasvlakte was specif- 
ically linked to the following three factors: 
-- strict traffic control requirements for shipping; 
- . location of nuclear power plant in the area is ruled out with LNG; 
-- risk reducing measures must be agreed upon (Rotterdam 1978a, 
p.66). 
Concerning the relative safety of the three Maasvlakte sites; the  City of 
Rotterdam states that  it gives preference to  Maasvlakte site B from the 
viewpoint of safety. 
As regards comparison between Eemshaven and the Maasvlakte sites, 
the  City of Rotterdam argues that the risk of tanker collisions is lower a t  
the Maasvlakte than a t  Eemshaven, mainly because of the  larger scope 
for strict waterways control and the availability of better navigational 
aids a t  Rotterdam (1978a, pp. 3 h 11). Additionally, the City of Rotterdam 
argues that  the shipping route to  Eemshaven increases the dangers, 
because it leads close to  the West-German island of Borkum (Rotterdam 
1978a, p.31). From the perspective of safety, the Maasvlakte sites should 
thus be preferred t o  Eernshaven, according t o  the City of Rotterdam. 
4.3.2.6. Socio-Economics 
The City of Rotterdam concerned itself with the dimension of socio- 
economics in two major ways: 
(a) general improvement of socio-economic activities in the Ro tter- 
dam area; and 
(b) employment generation resulting from LNG activities. 
The position of Rotterdam as the "energy centre" of Western Europe 
played a major part in the discussions on LNG in Rotterdam. The City of 
Rotterdam viewed it as extremely important that a major energy activity 
such as LNG would be attracted to Rotterdam and improve the socio- 
economic situation of the Harbour of Rotterdam. 
The position of the City of Rotterdam was directly related to its pol- 
icy for harbor activities which stressed (among other aspects) the 
improvement of harbor infrastructure, maintenance earning capacity of 
the harbor, and the creation of jobs--all of which were thought to be 
enhanced by a LNG terminal a t  the Maasvlakte (Rotterdam 1978a, p.62). 
In t h s  context, the City of Rotterdam also stressed the need for addi- 
tional economic activities in the Rotterdam area and the scope for gen- 
erating new activities alongside LNG, such as a cryogenics industry, which 
would in turn have a positive effect upon employment in the region (Rot- 
terdam 1970a, p.63). 
As regards to permanent employment due to a LNG terminal at the 
Maasvlakte, the City of Rotterdam concluded that for the operation of the 
terminal 40-50 people would be employed (Rotterdam 1970a, p.47). These 
figures are probably taken from the report by the Harbour of Rotterdam 
(Rotterdam 1977a, p.91), which showed the following figures for the three 
Maasvlakte sites considered (see Table 4.15). The report by the Harbour 
of Rotterdam, furthermore showed the following number of man-years of 
employment generated by a LNG project at the Maasvlakte sites (Rotter- 
dam 197?a, p.90). 
Table 4.15. 
direct employment 
7 
Additional employment could also be expected--according to the Har- 
bour Authorities--due to (support services a t  the LNG terminal during 
arrival, handling and departure of LNG tankers. No direct estimate is 
made of this employment effect. 
(man-years) 
Maasdakte Sites 
A 
* 
40 
B 
52 
C 
52 
Table 4.16. Employment during construction (man-years) /year 
From the figures provided by the Harbour Authorities on the 
estimated financial gains of this employment effect, it can be deduced 
that the employment generation in this respect is highest for Maasvlakte 
site C and lowest for site A--the difference being relatively small (less 
than 15%). 
Concerning the construction of a LNG tanker, the City of Rotterdam 
estimated that a 125,000m3 LNG tanker would require 400 million guilders 
of investment and provide employment for 1800 people (Rotterdam 
19?8a, p.48). This figure is not dependent on the exact location of the 
LNG terminal. 
In addition to the increase in employment expected because of LNG, 
the City of Rotterdam also warned against the dangers of loss of jobs, due 
to a reduction of oil-related activities in the Rotterdam Harbour area and 
over-capacity of the chemical industry. LNG activities were seen to be 
able to offset these downward employment trends in the Rotterdam area 
(Rotterdam 19?8b, p.12) and to increase the number of economic activi- 
ties in the area (Rotterdam 1978c, p. 1054). 
- 
4.3.2.7. Environmental Impact 
The City of Rotterdam paid relatively little attention to the environ- 
mental aspects of LNG. The report prepared by the Harbour of Rotter- 
dam calculated air pollution figures for LNG activities (including tankers 
and terminal activities) for NO, CO, SOz and carbohydrates--without mak- 
ing a distinction between different emissions between the various sites. 
The use of natural gas as a substitute for oil, was seen as having a 
positive effect upon the environment, since the polluting emission pro- 
duct of natural gas are much lower than in the case of oil (Rotterdam 
19?8c, p.1053/1054). This would result in savings of costs otherwise 
incurred through pollution-reducing measures. In the cost-benefit 
analysis performed by the Harbour of Rotterdam, all Maasvlakte sites 
were considered as providing the same extent of benefits in this respect. 
Other environmental effects were not quantified by the City of Rotterdam. 
employment 
direct -- infrastructure 
direct -- suprastructure 
indirect 
Total 
M aasvlakte Site 
A 
5 0 
1200 
1750 
3000 
I3 
50 
1320 
1918 
3288 
C 
175 
1320 
2093 
3588 
The City of Rotterdam concluded that it has no environmental objections 
to a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte (Rotterdam 1978c, p.1055). 
4.3.2.8. Hoek van Holland Advice to Rotterdam 
The municipality of Hoek van Holland, near the Maasvlakte area, lies 
within the greater Rotterdam area and gave official advice to the Mayor 
and Alderman of Rotterdam with respect to a LNG terminal a t  Maasvlakte. 
The municipal council of Hoek van Holland debated the LNG issue on 23 
May 1978 and concluded the following: 
-- storage of LNG at Maasvlakte is acceptable, but reception and 
handling is to take place off the Maasvlakte shore; shipping 
along the Nieuwe Waterweg (the channel between the North Sea 
and Rotterdam harbor) by LNG carriers is not acceptable; 
-- LNG import should benefit local industry in the area in terms of 
its required gas supply, in order to limit air pollution (due to  
other energy sources); 
- siting of a nuclear power station at  Maasvlakte is not possible (if 
LNG terminal accepted) 
The municipality stated that in case its advice concerning safety would 
not be followed up by the relevant higher authorities, as regards LNG sit- 
ing, and a LNG terminal would be sited in the area, it was only permitted 
after a set of conditions were implemented. These included a new official 
organization to be set up for the control and regulation of all shpping 
movement in the area, operational use of an advanced radar system, and 
specially designed safe transport ships with gas tanks up to 5,000 m3 
capacity (Rotterdam 1978c, p. 1049). 
4.3.2.9. City of Rotterdam Policy Perspective 
The nature of the policy questions addressed by the City of Rotter- 
dam had implications for the ways the different dimensions were inter- 
preted both absolutely and as regards relative importance. The first pol- 
icy question on the feasibility and desirability of a LNG terminal at  the 
Maasvlakte, largely concerned the technical feasibility on the one hand 
and the economic and socio-economic dimensions on the other. The 
economic and socio-economic aspects of the LNG discussion were thus 
important dimensions in the decision process. The energy policy dimen- 
sion played a very limited role. 
Once the question of desirability of LNG was answered positively the 
second context policy question on acceptability became merely a con- 
straint for LNG activities. The question thus shifted towards a discussion 
of the conditions of LNG activities in the Maasvlakte area, largely focusing 
upon the aspect of risk. The City of Rotterdam stressed, however, that 
safety could not be evaluated by itself, but should be assessed in relation 
to the economic costs and benefits involved in deciding upon a safe site. 
The question of acceptability thus largely became a discussion of a cost 
us. safety trade- off. This discussion could only take place after the City 
of Rotterdam had stated that 
1. LNG activities would not be more dangerous than other indus- 
trial activities already in the area, and 
2. it would not increase the "cumulative" level of risk in the region. 
As regards the final question concerning the location of the LNG ter- 
minal economic and socio-economic dimension seemed to have had the 
upperhand. Although no specific public statement were made as regards 
the final trade-off in this respect, it seems that Maasvlakte site C was 
ruled out because of its high cost. As regards the choice between sites A 
and B, the latter was favored by the City of Rotterdam, because it enabled 
industrial activities to be developed alongside the LNG terminal. 
The dimensions which seem to have played the dominant role in 
resolving the three man policy questions addressed by the City of Rotter- 
dam are summarized below (see Table 4.17). The following Table 4.18 illus- 
trates the role played by the various dimensions in relations to the policy 
questions identified in Table 4.17. 
Table 4.17. City of Rotterdam Policy Views. 
6 Policy Question Major Dimension(s) Outcome 
0 
d 
o LNG terminal feasible 1. socio-economics 
C 
Yes 
o and desirable? 2. economics/cost 
Ll 
c (at Maasvlakte) 
U 
C 
o LNG terminal acceptable? 
.c( 
1. health and safety Yes* 
v, (at Maasvlakte) 
.A 
U 
a, 
a Preferred Maasvlakte 1. economics/cost site B* 
4 site? 2, socio-economics 
*One of the conditions for acceptance of LNG was that the (future) sit- of a nuclear power 
plant a t  Maasvlakte would be ruled out by the national government. 
4.3.2.10. Rotterdam City Council 
The proposals of the Mayor and Alderman of the City of Rotterdam 
were discussed in the Council of Representatives of Rotterdam (on 29 
June 1978). Despite apparent opposition from some parties of LNG siting 
(mainly on safety grounds), the majority of the council was in agreement 
with the governors proposal and a motion against LNG at the Maasvlakte 
was defeated (Rotterdam 1978d, p.242). The council subsequently 
approved a final position on LNG based on the following considerations 
(Rotterdam 1978d, p.220): 
- 63 - 
Table 4.18, 
KEY: + favorable 
o no preference 
not considered/not relevant 
+/- marginally favorable 
. Dimension 
1, economics/cost 
2. socio-economics 
3. health and safety 
4. environmental impact 
Outcome 
NOTES: 1) depending on quantity imported 
2)  if LNG would provide economic benefit; LNG tanker built 
in Rotterdam; supply supply in area to be guaranteed 
3) no nuclear power plant in Rotterdam area was condition 
-- LNG will have positive 'economic effects for Rotterdam Harbour; 
-- 15 x 10'm3 LNG per year is maximum for importation; 
-- long-term gas supply in Rotterdam (industrial) area is 
guaranteed; 
Preferred 
site? 
A 
B 
C 
o 
site B 
LNG at 
M aasvlakte 
desirable? 
+ 1) 
+ 
Yes 
-- LNG tankers are to be built in the Rotterdam area. 
LNG at 
Maasvlakte 
acceptable? 
+2 
+ 2) 
+ 3) 
+ /- 
Yes 
The official position of the City of Rotterdam was the following: 
(1) in-principle decision in favor of a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte 
Site B; 
(2) acceptability depends upon strict traffic control, the absence of 
nuclear power plant in the area, and the introduction of risk 
reducing measures; 
(3) specific requirements and conditions would be formulated at a 
later stage in the decision process. 
4.3.3. Rijnmond Public Authority 
4.3.3.1. Responsibilities and Involvement 
Rijnmond Public Authority is collective of 16 municipalities in the 
Rotterdam Harbour area, including the City of Rotterdam itself. The Pub- 
lic Authority provides advice and governs regional activities with respect 
to environmental planning, housing policy, transport, health and safety 
and pollution control, and other areas. By law the Rijnmond Public 
Authority is responsible for drafting guidelines to the municipalities on a 
wide range of policies in the separate municipalities. One of the main 
areas of interest of Rijnmond is the environment, a special Rijnmond 
Environmental Administration (DCMR) was set up in 1971. It provides 
assistance on environmental matters and pollution control and has a wide 
network of sensors in the Rijnmond area for the monitoring of environ- 
mental conditions. 
Rijnmond Public Authority has a strong tradition of special interest 
in environmental affairs and safety. Environmental control is probably its 
main single area of active responsibility; Rijnmond public authority was 
the first local authority in the Netherlands to initiate (industrial) safety 
studies and risk analyses, and to become involved in pollution and noise 
surveillance and control. 
Rijnmond Public Authority was initially responsible for the approval 
of industrial activities at the Maasvlakte (e.g., LNG) with respect to the 
pollution act. In 1978 this responsibility moved to the Province of Zuid- 
Holland. Consequently, Rijnmond Public Authority was left with only an 
advisory function in relation to the LNG decision process in connection 
with legislation on investment, environmental planing and pollution. 
In 1977 the Rijnmond Public Authority became involved in the deci- 
sion process on LNG, when the Gasunie approached Rijnmond for discus- 
sions on the siting of a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte. In October, 1977, 
Rijnmond received a request from the Ministry of Economic Affairs to 
start procedures which led to an official position concerning the accepta- 
bility of a LNG terminal at Maasvlakte (PW Groningen 1978). 
Following questions in the Rijnmond Council and anticipating a min- 
isterial request for advice on LNG, the Public Authority, a first public 
information brochure on LNG was published in October 1977 (Rijnmond 
1977b). As part of the Rijnmond decision procedures on LNG, public hear- 
ings were also planned at a relatively early stage. At one stage interest 
surfaced within Public Authority Rijnmond to stage a special "public par- 
ticipation program" as part of the LNG decision-process. Although such 
an initiative never actually materialized, it is perhaps indicative of its 
concern about LNG developments and public acceptability. 
The official request from the Cabinet for Rijnmond's view as to 
Maasvlakte site A and B for the location of a LNG terminal, came in March 
1978. Another public information brochure was prepared--this time in 
collaboration with the City of Rotterdam and the Province of Zuid- 
Holland. 
Based on the outcome of the public hearings, previous reports on 
LNG by ICONA, STUNET, TNO and the Harbour Authority of Rotterdam, the 
Governors of Rijnmond prepared a policy paper on LNG in June 1978 (Rijn- 
mond 1978a). It also made use of a specially requested advice from the 
State Inspection for Public Health in Zuid-Holland and the advice of the 
General Energy Council of the Netherlands. Following discussions in the 
Rijnmond of the policy paper, a final official position on LNG was formu- 
lated. The various information inputs and outputs as well as organiza- 
tional structures are depicted in Figure 4.6. 
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advice on 
.advice on 
leg is la t ion  
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Figure 4.6. 
4.3.3.2. Problem Definition 
Rijnmond Public Authority seems to have concerned itself with most 
of the major aspects relating to the siting of a LNG terminal in the Rijn- 
mond region. Rijnmond (1977b, p.25) initially distinguished two major 
policy questions: 
(1) whether to import LNG, and 
(2) where to site a LNG terminal. 
These questions were evaluated within the context of the following dimen- 
sions : 
Energy Policy 
Economics/Cost 
Health and Safety 
Socio-Economics/Industrial and Regional Policy 
Environmental Impact 
The official request by the Cabinet for Rijnmond Public Authority to 
establish its position vis-a-vis a LNG terminal at  Maasvlakte sites A or B, 
provided a more limited question, focusing on the acceptability of these 
two sites. Rijnmond Public Authority decided, however, to evaluate LNG 
activities in a wider context, addressing the following major policy ques- 
tions: 
1. Is a LNG site in the Rijnmond region desirable? 
2. Under which conditions is importation, handling and storage of 
LNG acceptable? 
3. Whch site is recommended for a LNG terminal? 
Rijnrnond Public Authority acknowledged that questions of national 
energy policy were in the first instance maters of the Cabinet, and these 
issues should remain at the background of the policy discussions on LNG 
in the Rijnmond region. 
The discussion of siting policy of LNG by Rijnmond Public Authority 
was not limited to the evaluation of Maasvlakte sites A and B, as requested 
by the Cabinet. According to Rijnmond, the assessment of the &fferent 
relevant dimensions required also to take account of alternative locations 
for LNG within or near the Rijnmond area (Rijnmond 1978a. little c.,  p.3). 
Consequently, the Rijnmond Public Authority considered the following 
possible sites for LNG activities: 
-- Maasvlakte site A 
-- Maasvlakte site B 
-- Maasvlakte site C 
-- Voornedam breakwater dam 
-- Off-shore Tunnel Terminal System (OTTS) 
-- Off-shore artificial island 
In the following analysis, the prime sources of information are the 
Rijnmond Public Information brochure of 1977 (Rijnmond 1977b) and the 
policy paper prepared by the Rijnmond governors for discussion in the 
Rijnmond Council (Rijnmond 1978a). 
4.3.3.3. Energy Policy 
Rijnmond Public Authority largely accepted the position of ICO-NA and 
the Cabinet as regards the necessity for importing natural gas from the 
perspective of energy policy. Additionally, Rijnmond acknowledged that 
natural gas imports could only be realized by means of LNG tankers, 
rather than via pipeline from less distant sources (Rijnmond 1B77b, p.6). 
Rijnmond also quoted the advice from the General Energy Council to 
the Cabinet, which argued strongly in favor of LNG importation into the 
Netherlands, for reasons of energy supply. The Rijnmond Public Authority 
also stressed the importance of maintaining a high percentage of natural 
gas in the Dutch energy supply mix in the future and the associated 
environmental advantages over oil. 
The option of using a foreign LNG terminal for Dutch natural gas was 
not discussed by Rijnmond Public Authority in any major way. Rijnmond 
Public Authority considered national energy policy primarily a matter for 
central government. The Dutch government's intentions to import LNG at 
a Dutch terminal, therefore became the underlying premise for the Rijn- 
mond Public Authority in its evaluation of its position on the siting of a 
LNG terminal (l9?Ba, p.67). 
4.3.3.4. Economics/ Cost 
Rijnmond Public Authority considered the economic importance of 
LNG for the Rotterdam harbour area in the same way as the City of Rot- 
terdam: LNG activities could of-set some of the expected decrease of oil- 
related activities in the Rotterdam Harbour. LNG activities should there- 
fore be welcomed from an economic point of view, according to the Rijn- 
mond Public Authority (see also Section 3.3.6, socio-economics). As far 
as the investment cost of a LNG terminal was concerned, the Rijnmond 
Public Authority made use of various estimates by the Rotterdam Har- 
bour Authority, ICONA, State Public Works and industrial contractors, to 
arrive at  the cost figures illustrated in Table 4.19 (Rijnmond 19?8a, p.42). 
The final evaluation by Rijnrnond Public Authority on the preferred 
site for a LNG terminal does not seem to have been influenced signifi- 
cantly by the difference in investment cost. The economics dimensions 
was, however, taken into account as far as the broader economic benefits 
for the Harbour of Rotterdam was concerned (see 3.3.6. Socio- 
economics). 
4.3.3.5. Health and Safety 
The assessment by Rijnmond Public Authority on the health and 
safety aspects of LNG siting was based entirely on data and analytical 
methods of other organizations, such as TNO, ICONA and the Rotterdam 
Harbour Authority. 
Rijnmond concluded that STUNET in its estimates had overvalued the 
risk involved in an off-shore LNG island. Consequently the Rijnrnond Pub- 
lic Authority concluded that the risks involved in a LNG terminal at the 
Maasvlakte sites A and B were considerably higher than the risk (probabil- 
ity x consequences) at a LNG island-terminal. The Rijnmond Public 
Authority also argued that the government had too much emphasis upon 
the "total" risk involved in LNG activities at the different sites. 
According to Rijnmond the risk should be separated into those 
aspects which are independent of the location of the LNG terminal, such 
as risk to the LNG tanker crews, terminal personnel, etc., and the risk 
specific to a particular site, such as the risk to the local neighboring 
population. Rijnmond Public Authority concluded that not enough weight 
had been given to the location-specific risk factor. 
Table 4.19. Estimated investment cost. 
(millions of 1977 guilders) 
Location 
Maasvlakte 
A 
B 
C 
(different 
options) 
Voornedam 
(long dam) 
Voornedam 
(short dam) 
LNG - Island 
OTTS 
Harbour 
Estimate 
63 
07 
315 
Public Works 
Authority 
Ballast Nedharn 
(industry) 
Ogem 
Industry 
390 
OTTS = Off-Shore Tunnel Terminal System 
1) 1078 prices 
2) 1076 prices 
Rijnrnond did not put forward definite safety requirements under 
which LNG terminal siting would or would not be acceptable, but confined 
itself to questions of the acceptability of Maasvlakte sites A and B. With 
respect to the location-specific risks, Rijnmond Public Authority does, 
however, consider the different estimated deaths involved in major LNG 
accident (resulting in detonation). The results are summarized in Table 
4.20 (Rijnmond 197Ba, p. 67). 
Rijnrnond Public Authority believed that the number of casualties 
which are independent of the precise terminal location is only of 
relevance to the policy question of whether LNG should be imported. As 
regards the siting of a LNG terminal only the risk to the neighboring 
population etc. is relevant, according to Rijnrnond Public Authority. 
Table 4.20. 
Average Number of Deaths Among 
Location Neighboring Povulation 
Maasvlakte A or B 
Island 
Voornedam (long) 0 
Voornedam (short) 220 
OTTS 475 
1) only the deaths among island crews 
Withn this context Rijnmond believed that the question of accepta- 
bility of LNG should be separated into two aspects: 
(1) storage of LNG: and 
(2) transport and handling of LNG. 
Rijnmond Public Authority concluded that the storage of LNG had rela- 
tively small safety risks and the handling and transportation of LNG con- 
stituted the major danger to the population. It therefore came to the 
conclusion that reception and handling of LNG should take place at sea at  
an off-shore terminal, whlst the storage of LNG could take place at  a 
land-site. 
Rijnmond Public Authority also concerned itself with the risk of LNG 
as perceived by the local population. With respect to the acceptability of 
increased risk in the Bjnmond region it noted that the Rijnmond area is 
already experiencing higher risks than the rest of the Netherlands whch 
has led to a "mental pressure" upon the local population. According to 
Rijnmond, the siting of a LNG terminal in the Rijnmond area would 
increase the "psychological-social" pressure among the population, in 
particular because an accident with LNG a t  Maasvlakte would have a large 
effect, even though the probability of such an incident is very small (13ijn- 
mond 19?8a, p.66). 
As regards the safety dimension, Rijnmond finally concluded that, the 
storage of LNG at  Maasvlakte sites A or B constituted relatively small 
risks. The reception and handling of LNG on the other hand, could have 
large consequences for the local population in case of an accident, Rijn- 
mond concluded. Ths was largely due to the shipping route to terminal 
sites A and B, which lead only about 2 kilometers from the town of Hoek 
van Holland. Consequently Rijnmond Public Authority concluded that 
reception and handling of LNG at the Maasulakte  s i t e s  A a n d  B was n o t  
a c c e p t a b l e  (Rijnmond 1978a, p.68). For reasons of safety the governors of 
Rijnmond therefore also argued for the locational separation of storage of 
LNG on the one hand, and the reception and handling of LNG on the other. 
4.3.3.6. Socio-Economics/Industrial and Regional Policy 
The assessment of the siting of a LNG terminal in the Rijnmond 
region was considered by the Rijnmond Public Authority against the back- 
ground of regional economic development. The economy of the Rijnmond 
area was facing difficult times, the Ri.jnmond Public Authority argued, and 
LNG activities would provide welcome new opportunities for economic 
activities (Rijnmond 1978a, p.63) 
As far as increased employment benefits were concerned, Rijnmond 
concluded that the number of man-years required for the infrastructure 
of a LNG terminal would be approximately proportional to the investment 
involved. Consequently off-shore locations for LNG would bring about the 
greatest socio-economic benefits to the area. In line with the estimates 
by both ICONA and the Rotterdam Harbour Authority, Rijnmond Public 
Authority concluded that an off-shore terminal would provide 3 times as 
much additional employment than a terminal at Maasvlakte sites A or B. 
The Rijnmond Public Authority mentioned three main reasons why a 
LNG terminal is of socio-economic importance--and therefore of impor- 
tance to the Rijnmond region (1978a, p.67). 
(1) stimulus for employment: direct (construction of terminal) as 
well as indirect (supporting activities, ship building industry); 
(2) possibilities for broadening the economic infrastructure through 
cryogenics industry around terminal; and 
(3) the contribution which handling and storage of LNG could bring 
for the maintenance of the base of the national economy. 
These advantages were seen to apply to any LNG site; Rijnmond Public 
Authority argued, however, that in particular with respect to the develop- 
ment of related industries (e.g., cryogenics), Rijnmond region provided 
optimal conditions. 
Regional-economic considerations led Rijnmond Public Authority to 
argue in favor of a LNG terminal site in or near the Rijnmond area. The 
two main reason for this conclusion were: 
(1) major natural gas users are in the Rijnmond area; and 
(2) LNG activities could be combined wit large scale LPG activities, 
which were anticipated to be located in the Rijnmond area. 
As mentioned earlier, the Maasvlakte site A and B were, however, rejected 
by Rijnmond Public Authority for the siting of a LNG terminal. 
4.3.3.7. Environmental Impact 
Rijnmond Public Authority paid relatively little attention to the 
dimension of environmental impact. Like most other parties involved in 
the LNG decision process, Rijnmond Public Authority acknowledged that 
in comparison to oil, natural has considerable environmental advantages 
due to lower air pollution emissions. 
Rijnmond Public Authority made use of STUNET's data concerning 
sources of environmental pollution of the soil, thermal pollution and 
noise. The overall conclusion of Rijnmond Public Authority with respect 
to environmental impact of a LNG terminal, was that pollution of the air, 
water, soil as well as noise, would be limited to such a degree, that no 
objection on these grounds was anticipated (Rijnmond 1978a, p.68). 
4.3.3.8. Ftijnmond Council 
The proposals of the governors of Rijnmond Public Authority were 
discussed in the Rijnmond Council of representatives in June and July 
1978. The initial policy position of the Rijnmond governors concluded the 
following views: 
(a) reception and handling of LNG at Maasvlakte sites A and B is 
rejected; and 
(b) preference for spatial separation between LNG storage (which is 
acceptable at Maasvlakte) and the reception and handling of 
LNG (whch should be off-shore). 
By and large the majority of the Rijnmond Council seem to have been 
in agreement with mot of the views put forward by the Rijnrnond Gover- 
nors (Rijnmond 1978a). One political party, however, did think Maasvlakte 
B was acceptable for a LNG terminal, whllst another did not t hnk  LNG was 
acceptable a t  the Maasvlakte sites a t  all. The desirability of LNG importa- 
tion received relatively little attention by the Council. 
Following debates in the Rijnmond Council, the second part (b) of the 
proposed position was narrowly defeated. Instead a separate motion was 
narrowly carried by the Rijnmond Council, stating that s torage of LNG at 
Maasvlakte sites is acceptable. 
The final position of Rijnrnond Public Authority, as communicated to 
the Cabinet in July 1978 (Rijnmond Council 120th and 121st session, 26th 
June and 6th July, 1978), thus became: 
1. reception/handling of LNG at the Maasvlakte sites is not accept- 
able. 
2. storage of LNG is acceptable at Maasvlakte. 
This position, in fact, implied a choice in favor of the so-called OTTS- 
system (Off-shore tunnel terminal), whch had been suggested by an 
industrial group (OGEM), but had been rejected on the grounds of mari- 
time objections. (Modifications to the original plan in order to enable a 
technically and nautically feasible terminal location would require further 
study of approximately two years, according to ICONA.) 
4.3.3.9. Rijnmond Policy Perspective 
Rijnmond Public Authority thus rejected a LNG terminal at 
Maasvlakte sites A or B, but were by no means uninterested in attracting 
LNG activities to the Rijnmond area. Rijnmond was primarily concerned 
with the socio-economic infrastructure of the region and argued strongly 
in favor of a LNG terminal in or near the Rijnmond area. A major concern 
was, however, health and safety; it was within this context that Rijnmond 
Public Authority rejected a terminal for LNG at  the Maasvlakte sites 
(involving both reception and handling as well as storage). This concern 
was directly related to Rijnmond's special responsibility for environmen- 
tal and safety affairs in the region. 
Rijnmond's position on the three main policy questions identified 
before, are summarized in Table 4.21 in relation to the major dimensions 
Table 4.21 
Policy Question Major Dimension(s) Outcome 
LNG desirable for 1. socio-economics Yes 
Rijnmond area? 2. economics/cost 
LNG acceptable in 1, health and safety yes /No1) 
Rijnmond area? 
Where to site LNG 1. socio-economics in/near Rijnmond; 
terminal? 2. health and safety not at ~aasvlakte') 
1) as far as Maasvlakte sites A and B were concerned: 
storage-acceptable; 
handling/reception--not acceptable 
2) handling/storage combhed LNG/LPG terminal off-shore. 
which seem to have governed their outcome. The position of Rijnmond 
Public Authority thus was a trade-off between the desire to attract LNG to 
Rijnmond area for socio-economic reasons, and to resist on-shore han- 
dling and reception of LNG out of concern for safety of the local popula- 
tion. 
The Governors of Public Authority Rijnmond, in further contact with 
the Cabinet and parliamentary committeen 14626, argued in favor of a 
combined location for reception and handling of LNG and LPG at an  off- 
shore terminal. This policy position related to the concern on the part of 
Rijnmond Public Authority about the safety aspects of LNG and LPG, anti- 
cipating increasing requirements for supply and transport in the Rijn- 
mond region (Rijnmond 1978d; 1978e). 
4.3.4. Province of Zuid-Holland 
4.3.4.1. Involvement and Decision Procedure 
The Province of Zuid-Holland became officially involved in the LNG 
decision process, following the application from Gasunie for a LNG termi- 
nal a t  Maasvlakte. The Province of Zuid-Holland was responsible for 
approval of the site withn existing legislation concerning pollution, plan- 
ning and housing regulations. Following the Cabinet's request of March 
1978 the Province of Zuid-Holland was obliged to prepare its position with 
respect to approval of a LNG site at  Maasvlakte sites A or B--whch would 
be binding in connection with subsequent approval in the context of the 
different national planning laws mentioned above. 
In preparing its policy statement, the Governors of Province of Zuid- 
Holland made use of information from STUNET, ICONA and TNO and furth- 
ermore requested advice from the Provincial Council for Environmental 
Hygiene (PRM). It also set out to incorporate information and opinions on 
LNG from public hearings and through "public objections" whch were 
received by the Province. A policy statement was subsequently produced 
by the Provincial Governors in May 1978 and discussed by the Provincial 
Council. The main part of the analysis below is based upon the published 
policy statement by the Governors of Zuid-Holland. Following the council 
debate a final provincial position was communicated to the Cabinet in late 
June 1978. 
The different organizations involved in the provincial decision pro- 
cedure on LNG and the main sources of information are depicted in Fig- 
ure 4.7. 
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4.3.4.2. Problem Definition 
The Cabinet's request for an official position on LNG from the Pro- 
vince of Zuid-Holland strictly concerned only Maasvlakte sites A and B, 
sine the other sites in the Zuid-Holland region had by then been ruled out 
by the Cabinet. The Governors of Province of Zuid-Holland, however, 
decided to include in its analysis and advice possible alternative LNG sites 
(Zuid-Holland 197Bb, p.3), in the area. The Province of Zuid-Holland thus 
considered the following alternative LNG sites: 
1. Maasvlakte site A; 
2. Maasvlakte site B; 
3. Maasvlakte site C (requiring an extension of the harbor area); 
and 
4 Voornedam (breakwater dam). 
The major policy question addressed by the Province of Zuid-Holland 
were almost identical to those considered by the City of Rotterdam--with 
the exception of the (technical) feasibility of a LNG project. It thus faced 
the following major questions: 
1. Is LNG importation at the Maasvlakte desirable? 
2.  Is a LNG terminal in the Zuid-Holland region acceptable? 
3. Whch site should be preferred for a LNG terminal? 
In evaluating these question the Province of Zuid-Holland assessed 
the following dimensions: 
1. energy policy 
2. economics/cost 
3.  health and safety 
4. socio-economics 
The environmental impact of LNG was briefly discussed by the Pro- 
vincial Governors as part of the health dimension. No separate treatment 
of the environmental dimension and its implications for LNG siting was 
given. The different positions with respect to these dimensibns are 
assessed in the sections below (based primarily on the main policy paper 
of the Provincial Governors Zuid-Holland 197Bb). 
4.3.4.3. Energy Policy 
The position of the Province of Zuid-Holland with respect to energy 
policy provided the background for the discussion of the major policy 
question. The Province simply had to respond to the national energy pol- 
icy whch planed to import LNG into the Netherlands. The Provincial 
Governors of Zuid-Holland supported the Cabinet's view that the dimen- 
sion of energy policy justified the importation of LNG and it believed LNG 
should be imported via a Dutch LNG terminal, rather than via a pipeline 
from a foreign LNG terminal in one of the neighboring countries (Zuid- 
Holland 1978b, p.22). 
The discussion of the energy policy aspect by the Governors had 
implications for answering the question of the need for LNG importation 
in general, but it did not address the question of desirability of a terminal 
at  the Maasvlakte. 
4.3.4.4. Economics / Cost 
The purely economic aspects of LNG importation played a limited 
role in the decision process on LNG in the Province of Zuid-Holland. The 
province accepted the view expressed by the Rotterdam Harbour Authori- 
ties, that it was of economic importance to locate a LNG terminal in the 
Rotterdam Harbour area. 
As regards the investment cost of a LNG terminal a t  the considered 
sites, the Provincial governors based their assessment on figures from 
JCONA. The results (as provided by the Provincial Governors) are sum- 
marized in Table 4.22 (Zuid-Holland 1978b, section 10). 
Table 4.22. Cost LNG terminal Zuid-Holland 
(millions of Dutch Guilders) 
I 1 M aasvlakte 1 Voornedam 1 
1 cost infrastructure 1 30 1 40 1 600 1 1100 1 850 1 C 
( 1 )  breakwater dam 10 km 
(2) breakwater dam 7 km 
investment terminal 
Based on these figures the Provincial Governors concluded that the 
Voornedam sites are disadvantageous from an economic point of view 
(Zuid-Holland 1978b, p.23). It is important to note here that the Provin- 
cial Governors of Zuid-Holland-unlike the City of Rotterdam--decided not 
to  carry out a comprehensive cost/ benefit analysis, mainly because of 
the lack of complete data in t h s  respect. The quantification of certain 
aspects, such as environmental impact, give rise to  additional gaps in 
such an analysis, the Governors concluded. 
site A site B site C 
500- 
600 
(1) 
500- 
600 
500- 
600 
500- 
600 
500- 
600 
4.3.4.5. Health and Safety 
In its evaluation of the health and safety aspects of LNG activities, 
the Provincial Governors referred largely to figures on risk (defined as 
probability x consequences) of the TNO risk analysis and the information 
contained in the reports by ICONA. With reference to STUNET they con- 
cluded that a gas cloud explosion (following a spill of LNG) with pressures 
of 0.03 bar (under which most buildings would collapse) could take place 
3km from the terminal. The Provincial Governors therefore believed that. 
it is required that the minimum distance from the terminal to any bui.lt;- 
up area should be 3 to 5 km (Zuid-Holland 1978b, p.17). They further- 
more concluded that from the point of view of safety, the terminal should 
be built at the largest possible distance from other industries. 
The Province of Zuid-Holland assessed the safety aspects of each of 
the considered sites (Zuid-Holland 1978b, pp. 19-21). The results are sum- 
marized in Table 4.23. 
Table 4.23. 
Maasvlakte A - shpping route leads 2 km from Hoek van Holland 
(danger zone) 
- small site; relatively dangerous 
- terminal 4 km from nearest town 
Maasvlakte B - safer site - larger and shorter pipes from ship to  
terminal required 
- shpping route leads 2 km from Hoek van Holland 
- negative safety aspect: 2 LNG shps  are side by side 
attached to a single jetty 
- terminal 6 km from closest town 
Maasvlakte C - attractive from point of view of nautical safety 
- LNG traffic can be kept separately from other shipping; 
minimal probability of fatal collision 
- nearest town: 7 km 
The Provincial Governors concluded that from the perspective of 
health and safety (as well as environmental impact) the "stand still" prin- 
ciple should become a "boundary condition" for LNG activities, i.e., no 
decrease of environmental condition and/or safety as a result of the 
introduction of large-scale LNG activities would be acceptable. They 
furthermore concluded that risk-reducing measures should be 
employed--in particular in view of the environmental /risk burden upon 
the population in the area, resulting from existing activities (Zuid-Holland 
1978b p.22). 
From the point of view of safety and the environment, the Governors 
of Zuid-Holland concluded that Maasvlakte site A and B would not be 
favorable; the limited distance of moving tankers to the town of Hoek van 
Holland (Zkm) played an  important role in this respect (Zuid-Holland 
19?8b, pp.21/22). The Voornedam location would be the most attractive 
LNG site from the safety and environmental point of view, the Provincial 
Governors concluded (Zuid-Holland 1978b, p.23). 
4.3.4.6. Socio-Economics 
The Governors of Zuid-Holland considered the socio-economic bene- 
fits of LNG activities in the Rotterdam area and distinguished three main 
areas of concern (Zuid-Holland 1978b, p. 6): 
-- implications for harbor activi.ties; 
-- development of economic activities based on cold-energy LNG; 
-- employment in operational phase of LNG terminal. 
They largely supported the position of the Rotterdam Harbour 
Authorities that  LNG would provide a positive stimulus for economic 
activities in the harbor area. As regards indirect socio-economic activi- 
ties related to  LNG (such as cryogenics), the Provincial Governors 
believed it would have a positive effect, whch could, however, not be 
quantified (Zuid-Holland 1978b, p.7). 
As far as the direct operational employment prospects were con- 
cerned, the Governors of Zuid-Holland expected the net-gain to be 
limited--in the order of several tens rather than hundreds of (relatively 
highly-skilled) jobs. These figures are most likely taken from previous 
ICONA reports. They quoted the following employment gains for each of 
the LNG sites considered (in man-years)--see Table 4.24. 
Concerning the direct operational employment, the Governors of 
Zuid-Holland concluded that there was no significant difference between 
the LNG sites. The major difference between the different sites as 
regards socio-economics, concerned the scope for adjacent industrial 
activities near the LNG terminal, whch were rather limited for Maasvlakte 
sites A and C. The Provincial Governors concluded that  both the 
Maasvlakte site C and the breakwater sites would provide better oppor- 
tunities for LNG related industrial activities (Z  1978b, pp.20/21). 
From the perspective of regional and industrial policy, the overall 
conclusion of the Provincial Governors was, that all considered sites would 
result in socio-economic benefits (Zuid-Holland 1978b, p.22). As far as 
the socio-economics dimension was concerned, the province of Zuid- 
Table 4.24 
1 1 MaasTllakte I Voornedarn 1 
1 
Employment 
(1) breakwater dam lOkm 
(2) breakwater dam 7km 
w.r. t. infrastructure 
and LNG preparations 
(x 1000 man-years) 
Holland thus saw no need for "boundary conditions" for the siting of a LNG 
terminal. 
As regards the evaluation of the different sites, the Provincial Gover- 
nors concluded that Maasvlakte site A was unacceptable because of the 
lack of scope for related industrial activities, whilst they also had some 
doubt about the socio-economic advantages of Maasvlakte site C.  
The Governors of Zuid-Holland favored the Voornedam site for a LNG 
site, partly because of the socio-economic developments whch it would 
enable with respect to the handling of either dangerous material from the 
same terminal site (7 or 10 km from the Maasvlakte). The construction of 
the Voornedam breakwater stretch would furthermore provide additional 
employment, the Provincial Governors concluded (Zuid-Holland 197Bb, 
p.23). 
I 
site A 
4.3.4.7. Policy Perspective Zuid-Holland 
Table 4.25 summarizes the implications of each of the dimensions for 
the three main policy questions addressed by the governors of the Pro- 
vince of Zuid-Holland. I t  should be realized that the outcome of the policy 
decision in the body of Governors of Zuid-Holland was only reached after a 
careful trade-off between the different aspects for which the basis or cri- 
teria are not known in detail. The above table does suggest, however, that 
with respect to the final decision of siting the safety dimension played a 
dominant role (Zuid-Holland 1978d). With this apparent concern for 
safety, it is perhaps surprising that there was relatively little discussion 
about the desirability and acceptability of LNG importation in general, 
and in the Zuid-Holland region in particular. Although, the Provincial 
Governors apparently found it important to include alternative sites-to 
the Maasvlakte A and B sites, which were the only ones, considered by the 
government in their analysis, they seem to have gone along without many 
objections with the assumptions and premises of the Cabinet. 
6-7 
As regard the final preferred selection of a LNG site, in addition to 
the safety dimension, the socio-economic dimension seemed to have 
played a major role. The Provincial Governors rejected Maasvlakte site A 
mainly because of its lack of space for related industrial activities and 
site B 
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site C (1) 
14-15 17-18.5 15-i7 
Table 4.25. 
LNG terminal 
in province 
acceptable? 
Question 
1. energy policy 
2. economics/cost 
3. health and safety 
4. socio-e conomics 
Preferred 
site? 
LNG terminal 
in province 
desirable? 
+ 
+ 
C 1 
+ 
Maasvlakte A or 3 
Voornedam 
Maasvlakte B 
Outcome Yes Yes Voornedam 
KEY: + favorable 
[I not considered; not relevant 
NOTES: 1) condition: risk-reducing measures 
were against Maasvlakte C mainly because of reasons of regional planing. 
In view of the additional dominant role of socio-economic arguments put 
forward by the Provincial Governors in relation to the policy questions of 
desirability of a LNG terminal in the area of Rotterdam, the socio- 
economic dimension was perhaps the major aspect governing the decision 
outcome. It is thus concluded that the dominant dimensions in the deci- 
sion process for the Governors of Zuid-Holland were socio-economics and 
health/safety. The provincial governors' preference for Voornedam 
related to their belief that the existing environmental burden in the 
Rijnmond/Rotterdam region was such that a decision in favor of alterna- 
tive, potentially less economical, sites was justified (Zuid Holland 1978b, 
p.23). 
Finally it must be noted that the provincial position vis-a-vis LNG sit- 
ing as proposed by the Governors of Zuid-Holland did not directly respond 
to the Cabinet's request, whlch was solely concerned with a local 
authority's view of Maasvlakte sites A and B. Instead the Provincial Gover- 
nors put forward an alternative LNG site for consideration by the Cabinet: 
Voorndam. 
4.3.4.8. Provincial Council 
The proposal by the Governors of Zuid-Holland was discussed in the 
provincial council on 15th June 1970. This debate focused around the 
governors' policy statement and the proposed policy statement, which 
concluded that Voornedam was the preferential site for a LNG terminal. 
Following the debate in the provincial council a motion was carried, 
which resulted in a new official policy position by the Province of Zuid- 
Holland. This position made specific mention of 
(1) the short period of time which had been available to consider 
the mater, 
(2) the abundance of sometimes contradictory infor-mation on LNG, 
and 
(3) the fact that  consideration of alternative off-shore sites were 
not incorporated in the request from the Cabinet to the Pro- 
vince of Zuid-Holland. 
The basis of the new policy position were the following considerations: 
-- LNG importation in the region was of outstanding importance to  
Rotterdam as an energy harbor; 
-- the risk of LNG a t  Maasvlakte, on the other hand, was consider- 
able; especially a t  site A, due to proximity of populated areas; 
-- the scope for additional activities near Maasvlakte site A and B 
were small; and 
-- the pros and cons of possible alternative LNG sites had not been 
adequately explored. 
On the basis of the above, the provincial council of Zuid-Holland con- 
cluded that  its official position would be that: 
"a forced choice between Maasvlakte site A and B ... has to lead 
to a rejection of site A, whilst it cannot lead to  a positive choice 
in favor of site B, until other seemingly more attractive alterna- 
tives (including Voornedam) are explored and reconsidered." 
The Province of Zuid-Holland furthermore decided to  urge the responsible 
Minister for Traffic and Public Works to allow further study into the alter- 
natives (Zuid-Holland 1970c, p.4361). A motion declaring outright opposi- 
tion to a LNG terminal a t  Maasvlakte and requesting further information 
on alternatives for further reconsideration at  a later date, was rejected 
by the majority of the Provincial Council (Zuid-Holland 1970c, 
p.4366;4370). 
4.4. LOCAL AUTHORITIES GRONINGEN 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The local authorities in the Province of Groningen which were 
involved in approval of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven concern three main 
levels : 
1. Province of Groningen--legislature and provincial water author i- 
ties 
2. Municipality of Uithuizermeeden (Which includes Eemshaven 
are a) 
3.  Harbour of Delfzijl (whch is responsible for managing 
Eemshaven harbor). 
By and large the local authorities in Groningen were able to present a 
common position with respect to a LNG terminal at Eemshaven, and many 
activities and discussions were in fact coordinated, either by the provin- 
cial authorities or the harbor of Delfzijl. Figure 4.8 shows the major par- 
ties involved at  the local authorities level in the province of Groningen, 
and the various groups which provided advice and/or comments to the 
provincial authorities concerning the siting of a LNG terminal at 
Eemshaven. The respective views of the provincial and municipal authori- 
ties are discussed in sections 4.4.4. to 4.4.8. Views of other groups, such 
as trade unions, and environmental groups are discussed separately (sec- 
tion 4.6), despite the fact that to some extent their views have been 
incorporated in policy statements of the provincial governors of 
Groningen. 
4.4.2. Background and Involvement 
Until late 1977 the local authorities in the province of Groningen 
were not significantly involved in the major policy &scussions concerning 
a Dutch LNG terminal. Before 1977, Eemshaven was generally considered 
as an unviable option for the siting of a Dutch LNG termi.na1, mainly on 
nautical grounds (relating to the limited depth of part of the shippin-g 
route approaching the harbor). STUNET, ICONA and Gasunie are believed 
to have based their early rejection of Eemshaven largely upon a 1976 
report carried out by the Netherlands Maritime Institute (NMl 1976). 
Eemshaven is a newly-built harbor complex in the province of 
Groningen established mainly in a governmental move to stimulate 
economic activities and employment in the relatively under-developed 
northern parts of the Netherlands. Eemshaven was officially opened in 
June 1973. By 1977 it had become evident that various attempts to 
attract to Eernshaven large-scale "development projectsu-such as stup- 
yards and other related industries-had largely failed. Delfzijl Harbour 
authorities , which were to manage Eemshaven activities, and the provin- 
cial authorities of Gronmgen continued to search for (industrial) users for 
Eemshaven. As late as January 1977, Delfzijl harbour authorities 
approached Gasunie to inquire about possible interest for using 
Eemshaven, but the response remained negative. 
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Figure 4.8. Local Authorities Eemshaven Site 
By late 1977, however, Gasunie was experiencing considerable oppo- 
sition and delays as regards the approval of a LNG terminal site in the 
Rotterdam area which was favored by Gasunie and generally supported by 
advice of ICONA. In an  attempt to investigate the feasibility for alterna- 
tive sites, Gasunie formally approached the Delfzijl Harbour authorities 
on December 1, 1977, with the specific request to initiate a study into the 
possibilities for a LNG terminal at Eemshaven. 
The study was carried out, within 2 1/2 months, by a working group 
involving in addition to Delfzijl Harbour authorities, Gasunie and the Pro- 
vincial and State Waterworks authorities of the province of Groningen. 
The Delfzijl Harbour authorities furthermore commissioned studies into 
the feasibility and risks involved in a LNG terminal a t  Maasvlakte with 
respectively the Netherlands Shipping Testing Station (Nederlands 
Scheepsbouwkundig Proefstation, NSP) and TNO. 
Following the internal study by the working group, which indicated 
the feasibility of using Eemshaven as a LNG terminal site (in the light of 
new evidence), Gasunie made the formal request to the relevant local 
authorities to announce their position vis-a-vis the acceptability of impor- 
tation of LNG at  a terminal at  Eemshaven (Report to Board of Delfzijl Har- 
bour February 28, 1978). 
An official appeal was made to the national government by the Pro- 
vincial Authorities of Groningen and Delfzijl Harbour Authorities in Febru- 
ary 1978, requesting to take into consideration Eemshaven harbor as an  
additional option for a site for the  Dutch LNG terminal. Positive response 
by the national government came 5 weeks later (21 March 1978) when the 
Provincial Authority and the municipality of Uithuizermeeden were 
invited to  prepare their official positions with respect to the siting of a 
LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven and to inform the Minister for Traffic and 
Public Works (in his capacity of coordinating Ministry) about their respec- 
tive views by July 1, 1978 (letter Ministry for Traffic and Public Works, 21 
March 1978, HW/NZI  21257). 
I t  meant that  at  this point Eemshaven was given the same treatment 
by the national government as the  Maasvlakte sites. I t  accelerated activi- 
ties in the province of Groningen in terms of approval procedures of a 
LNG site at Eemshaven, an  induced a concerted effort by the provincial 
governors to emphasize the advantages of Eemshaven over the 
Maasvlakte sites. 
The following discussion concerning the various dimensions of the 
LNG siting perspectives in Groningen, relates in the first place to policy 
statements and documents by the provincial authorities. Specific policy 
statements by the Delfzijl Harbour Authorities and the municipality of 
Uithuizermeeden a re  discussed separately when relevant. 
4.4.3. Problem Definition 
Involvement by local authorities in the province of Groningen as 
regards the siting of a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven, started largely 
against a background of longstanding interest to  attract economic and 
industrial activities to Eemshaven harbor. When a renewed approach was 
made to the province by Gasunie to re-assess the viability and acceptabil- 
ity of Eemshaven as  a possible LNG site, the local authorities in Groningen 
therefore excluded any discussions on the desirability of LNG importation 
in general, but directly set  but to  consider the following policy question: 
"Is LNG importation a t  Eemshaven acceptable?" This central policy ques- 
tion could, only be pursued realistically after it was established to what 
extent LNG importation a t  Eemshaven was in fact a feasible option in 
terms of technical and nautical requirements. Initial problem definition 
as regards the importation of LNG at Eemshaven therefore include the 
following issue: "Is LNG importation a t  Eemshaven feasible?" The latter 
question was not related directly to policy-making but a positive outcome 
on the matter  of feasibility was a prerequisite for addressing the major 
policy question as regards acceptability. 
In its evaluation of the acceptability of Eemshaven as a LNG site the 
local authorities in Groningen assessed the following major dimensions: 
1. Economics/cost 
2. Health and Safety 
3.  Socio-economics /regional policy 
4. Environmental impact 
In the following sections the positions of the local authorities in Groningen 
are discussed in relation to these various dimensions. 
The cost dimension seems to  have played only a minor role in the 
policy discussions in Groningen concerning LNG. The provincial governors 
acknowledged that LNG importation would involve additional financial 
cost, compared to a Maasvlakte site, but noted that the yearly additional 
cost incurred was not a determining factor as regards the acceptance or 
rejection of LNG a t  Eemshaven (Groningen 197Be, p.276). Early policy 
papers of the provincial governors did not quote costs figures for addi- 
tional expenses incurred a t  Eemshaven for the establishment and opera- 
tion of a LNG terminal. I t  was merely noted that the final "return" (rend- 
ment) on the undertaking "would be positiveW(Groningen 1978b, p.56-6). 
The province of Groningen authorities acknowledged that a LNG ter- 
minal at  Eemshaven would result in additional expense for importing LNG 
from Algeria by tankers (of 125,000 tons) relating to the following two fac- 
tors: 
(1) outlays t o  cover adjustments and changes to harbor water 
access routes for handling LNG tankers of 125,000 tons weight, 
and 
(2) the longer shpping route from Algeria to  Eemshaven (160 miles 
longer than to Maasvlakte sites). 
In relation to the first factor, an  investment of 30 million guilders was 
estimated of wh ch  a considerable part would be financed by the national 
government (Ministry for Traffic and Public Works), as part of a 1971 
agreement, designed to make Eemshaven harbor accessible for ships up 
to 70,000 tons (Groningen 1978f, p.4). 
With respect to  the total additional cost involved in an Eemshaven 
LNG terminal, compared to a siting a t  Maasvlakte, the province of 
Groningen did not indicate disagreement with the estimate made by 
ICONA, of 250 million guilders (Groningen 1978g, p.2). The provincial 
governors argued, however, that the additional cost should not be attri- 
buted entirely to  the siting of a LNG terminal, since part of the required 
investment would be allocated under existing investment subsidies to  
industrial development (some of whch would not apply to  investment in 
the Rotterdam area). They also stressed that  the extra financial cost 
involved in bringlng LNG to  Eemshaven, should be considered within the 
broad governmental mechanisms for providing financial support to  
regional industrial development, rather than as a separate investment 
solely for a LNG terminal (Groningen 197Bg, p.3). 
The province of Groningen argued that the major part of the 
estimated (by ICONA) total investment of 700 million guilders for siting a 
LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven could be incorporated in the sales price of 
natural gas to Dutch consumers, resulting in an increase in price of 1 
guilder per 1000m3 of gas (0.1 cent/m3). The only major direct invest- 
ment involved in making eemshaven accessible for large LNG tankers was 
estimated a t  42 million guilders, of whch 14 million would be covered by 
the national government under previous arrangements. Net figure would 
result in an investment of 28 million guilders--according to the provincial 
authorities comparable to investment required at Maasvlakte. Additional 
costs involved in an Eemshaven L N G  site was quoted as being a yearly fig- 
ure of 2.8 million for dredging operations (Groningen 1978h, p.6). 
In relation to  cost comparison with Maasvlakte, the Groningen pro- 
vincial authorities stated that  operations and handling of LNG tankers 
would be cheaper a t  Eemshaven, because LNG shipping movements within 
the Rotterdam harbor area would have to be accompanied by a helicopter 
for safety reasons, and other shpping movements would be delayed--at a 
total estimated cost of 5 million guilder per year. Finally, the provincial 
governors stressed with respect to the cost dimension, that the lack of 
use of Eemshaven would lead to capital "losses," given the considerable 
investments made in the past for the Eemshaven harbor infrastructure 
(Groningen 1978h, p.6). 
The provincial authorities in Groningen submitted a policy statement 
arguing their case to members of parliament in early October 1978, prior 
to the parliamentary debate on the decision by the Cabinet to site the 
LNG terminal at  Eemshaven. In this final policy paper (Groningen 1978i) 
the local authorities of Groningen put forward somewhat different finan- 
cial figures, as summerized below (see Table 4.26). 
Table 4.26. Cost figures Eemshaven LNG terminal site-additional 
investment required (in Dutch guilders). 
In addition to  the above cost figures, the provincial authorities men- 
tioned further capital costs involved in distribution of LNG to  major con- 
sumer areas (whch are closer to Rotterdam than t o  Groningen area) 
resulting in a figure of 45 million guilders per year (Groningen 1978i, 
p.14). The additional cost incurred in using Eemshaven as a LNG terminal 
will (partly) be covered by the user of the terminal, Gasunie, the 
? 
Investment for access and operation of Eemshaven for 111 million 
LNG tankers (of which 55 million was already allocated by 
national government for 70,000 ton ships) 
Additional transportation cost due to  longer shipping 144 million 
route for 4 x 1oQm3 LNG/year 
provincial governors stated. Assuming a national gas consumption in the 
Netherlands of 50 x 109m3 year, the additional finance could be incor- 
porated in the gas price charged to domestic consumers, resulting in an 
increase of figures put forward here by the provincial governors, the main 
line of argument as regards the cost dimension remained unchanged. 
4.4.5. Health and Safety 
The Groningen provincial authorities made use of two main studies 
relating to the risk of LNG in the Eemshaven area: 
-- a study carried out by the National Shipping Test Station (NSP 
1978); and 
-- the 1978 TNO risk analysis for LNG in the Eemshaven area (TNO 
1978). 
The risk data from these studies was used by the provincial authorities to 
assess the acceptability of the LNG siting plans. 
The provincial water authorities of Groningen which were commis- 
sioned to analyze the risk data, concluded that the risks involved in a LNG 
site were neither unacceptable nor outright acceptable. It concluded 
that the level of risk involved in a LNG site belonged to the category of 
risk where further tests were required to determine that acceptability. 
According to the provincial authorities of Groningen, this implied that 
"taking into account the conditions outlined in the report and the safety 
measure to be determined, the location of a LNG terminal is acceptable" 
(Groningen 1978a, p.5). 
It is of interest to note that the initial risk estimate involved in a LNG 
site would not have been acceptable withln the limits set by the 1976 pro- 
vincial policy memo on environmental norms (Nota Milieunormen). At the 
time LNG was discussed in early 1978, however, moves were already 
underway to make changes to the proposed environmental limits. Within 
the new, lower, limits, the siting of a LNG terminal was acceptable the 
provincial authorities concluded (Groningen 1978a, p.6/7), The level of 
acceptable individual ri.sk as used in the adjusted environmental limits 
was 10-~/year  (Groningen 1978b, p.56-10). The report by the provincial 
authorities Concluded that the risk for the population in neighboring 
municipalities to a LNG terminal at Eemshaven would be 0.5 to 2% of the 
risk limit set by the environmental regulations. These calculations were 
based on a volume of imported LNG of 4 x 1 0 ' m ~ / ~ e a r .  The provincial 
authorities concluded, however, that the importation of LNG at  
Eemshaven would also be acceptable a t  volumes of 10-15 x loom3 
(Groningen 1978f, p.10). 
The risk figures quoted by the provincial authorities of Groningen 
were those provided by (i) ICONA, (ii) TNO, and (iii) the Provincial Water 
Authorities. A summary of the relevant figures are given below (see 
Tables 4.27 and 4.28). 
As regards the numbers of casualties a t  or near the terminal of an 
accident at Eemshaven, the following TNO figures are quoted by 
Groningen Province authorities: 
Table 4.27. Risk to population LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven. 
Eemshaven (1978 empty state) 
Eemshaven (in full use) 
Borkum (island) 
Sc hiermonnikoog (island) 
Table 4.28. Number of casualties Eemshaven LNG accident. 
Eemshaven (empty) 0-1 
Eemshaven (full) 1-15 
Borkum 1-6 
Schiermoonikoog 1-9 
The above figures did not take into account detonation. "Only in 
the v e r y  unlikely case of detonation, will the number of casual- 
ties rise to several hundreds" (my emphasis), stated the provin- 
cial authorities of Groningen (Groningen 197Bi, p.8). 
The Groningen provincial authority stressed that the levels of risk for 
a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven are considerable lower than those present 
a t  the Maasvlakte sites, by a factor 10-100 (Groningen 197Bi, p.8), due to  
the large concentration of population and industry in the Rotterdam area 
and the higher traffic of in and outgoing ships, compared t o  the 
Eemshaven area (Groningen 1978b, p. 56-1 1 ; 197Bi, p.8). The provincial 
authorities acknowledged that the risk of a shpping accident on route to 
the Eemshaven harbor was larger in comparison with Maasvlakte sites, 
because of the increased length of the shipping route (from LNG suppliers 
such as Algeria) (Groningen 1978h, p.3). 
As regards the risk experienced by the population ("ondervonden 
risico") the province of Groningen did acknowledge that this "psychologi- 
cal" factor was higher in the case of Eemshaven compared to the 
Maasvlakte sites. It concluded, however, that such a relative increase in 
the risk factor would have occurred with respect to any new industrial 
activity in the Eemshaven area. Consequently, the provincial authorities 
concluded that in terms of considering the acceptability of a LNG termi- 
nal at Eemshaven, this particular aspect was an unrealistic (irreeel) argu- 
ment to advance against a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven (Groningen 1978h, 
p.4). 
The overall conclusion of the provincial authorities in Groningen was 
that "the safety aspects of the transport by s h p  of LNG has been subject 
to detailed research and the unanimous conclusion of all researchers is 
that the objective risk is not unacceptable, compared to other sizeable 
industrial projects" (Groningen 197Bi, p.8). 
The way the province of Groningen formulated its policy position vis- 
a-vis LNG siting at  Eemshaven, indicated that the safety dimension was 
n o t  of primary concern. The provincial authorities of Groningen argued 
in favor of LNG at  Eemshaven on the grounds of socio-economic factors 
(see section 4.4.6); the other aspects considered in the debate in 
Groningen on LNG included the safety dimension, but "these factors . . . do 
not result in arguments whch will alter our overall conclusion [on the 
desirability and importance of LNG at Eemshaven]" according to the pro- 
vincial authorities (Groningen 1978b, p.56- 11 / 12). 
Socio-economic factors are at the center of the involvement and 
interests in a LNG terminal by the province of Groningen. The local 
authorities responded positively to the issue of a LNG terminal at 
Eemshaven because of the role industrial activities in Eemshaven were 
expected to play in creating new employment. The unemployment situa- 
tion in the province of Groningen and the disappointing take-up by other 
potential industrial users of Eemshaven (e.g., petro-chemical company 
DSM, which at one stage was considering locating a large facility a t  
Eemshaven) spurred the local authorities to approach the issue of a LNG 
terminal positively, right from the start (Groningen 1978a, p.7). 
The positive response by Groningen local authorities to the request 
by Gasunie to investigate the possibilities for a LNG terminal at 
Eemshaven related first of all to the positive effect it was perceived it 
could have in terms of employments (Groningen 1978b, 56-1). The 
Eemshaven was one of the cornerstones of the province's employment 
generation program, and the LNG activities were seen as a part of 
Groningen local authorities' intention to create 14,000 new jobs in the 
province by 1985 (Groningen 197813, p.56-5). 
Primary employment affects of the siting of a LNG terminal a t  
Eemshaven were estimated by the local authorities of Groningen as sum- 
marized in Table 4.29. (The figures were largely based on ICONA 
estimates-Groningen 1978b, p.56-5; 197Bh, p.2). The employment whch 
is generated by the siting of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven was equivalent 
to that expected at  a Maasvlakte site (or any other). The local authorities 
Table 4.29. Employment effects LNG terminal. 
Temporary Employment: 
building infrastructure 330 man-years 
downstream employment 4,000 man-years 
(transport, materials supply, etc.) 
construction of terminal 2,650 man-years 
Permanent Employment: 
maintenance 70 man-years /year 
terminal operation 50-70 man-years /year 
in.direct employment (support) 150 man-years /year 
in Groningen claimed however that given the hgher unemployment figure 
in Groningen compared to the Rotterdam area, the direct employment 
generated by such activities is relatively and "qualitatively" more impor- 
tant in the Eemshaven area (Groningen 197Bg, p.4). 
The local authorities saw the siting of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven 
of real importance for the start of industrial development of the harbor, 
and the main argument put forward by the Province to the national 
government in favor of Eemshaven concerned the importance of LNG to 
regional socio-ec onomic policy. The local .authorities stated repeatedly 
that with the issue of siting a LNG terminal gave the national government; 
"a unique opportunity" [following its numerous policy statements on 
regional development] to show its sincerity as regards its policy of 
regional distribution of new activities and to show that it acknowledges 
the advantages of Eemshaven and that it takes seriously the socio- 
economic problems of the province of Groningen" (Groningen 197Bb, 
p.56-12; 19781, p. 11). 
In addition to the direct employment effects of a LNG terminal, the 
provincial authorities of Groningen saw an important "psychological" 
effect of such an activity a t  Eemshaven in that it would stimulate other 
interest in Eemshaven by other industrial users. The local authorities 
argued that if the national government would show its confidence in 
Eemshaven, this would act as a stimulus for other new investments in the 
area. Specifically the local authorities of Groningen pointed at  two indus- 
trial activities related to the siting of LNG terminal, which could be gen- 
erated: (i) a coal gasification plant, and (ii) cryogenics industry 
(Groningen 1978f, p.4). At the center of Groningen's position vis-a-vis the 
siting of a LNG terminal was thus the importance for regional policy and 
socio-economic factors such as employment. The local authorities of 
Groningen argued in favor of Eemshaven, compared to Maasvlakte sites 
on the grounds of three main factors: 
(1) direct and indirect employment generation more significant in 
Groningen high-employment area (Groningen 1978h, p.2); 
(ii) national government confidence in Eemshaven and start-up of 
industrial activities in the new harbor would stimulate further 
investments in the region; and 
(3) Groningen very suitable for related industrial activities such as 
coal gasification ( h g h  calorific gas produced could be distri- 
buted through gaspipes from natural gas fields located in 
Groningen) and cryogenics industry (Groningen 1978b, p.56-6). 
4.4.7. Environmental Impact 
The environmental impact of a LNG terminal was given relatively lit- 
tle attention by the province of Groningen. The environmental impact as 
discussed by the local authorities concerned three aspects: (i) water pol- 
lution, (ii) noise, and (iii) visual impact. 
Water pollution can occur when cooled water of the LNG gasification 
plant is discharged (Groningen 1978f, p.7). The cold energy can be used 
for other industrial ends, or for cooling of a power station. The negative 
environmental impact can hereby be minimized. As regards the visual 
aspect, it is anticipated that storage tanks for LNG will have to be 
installed of 55 meters tall; these tanks would be visible from the sea (Wad- 
denzee) at a distance of 12 kilometers. Ths visual impact may be partly 
alleviated by building the tanks partly underground, the local authorities 
of Groningen concluded (Groningen 197Bi, p.9). The third environmental 
impact factor concerns the noise involved in LNG operations. Also in this 
respect the provincial authorities of Groningen stated that it will be possi- 
ble to limit this factor to "acceptable levels." (Groningen 1978h, p.7). 
Overall it was concluded by the Groningen provincial authorities that 
the negative environmental effect of a LNG terminal are small, and can be 
kept withn acceptable limits, both for populated areas and the Wadden- 
zee regian (Groningen 1978h, p.8). 
4.4.8. Local Authorities Groningen Pdicy Perspectives 
The policy perspective of the local authorities in Groningen was 
mainly determined by a de sire--share d by most local parties involved-to 
stimulate industrial development in the province at large and at 
Eemshaven in particular. The policy question addressed by the local 
authorities largely concerned the conditions which should be attached to 
the siting of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven-if indeed Eemshaven was 
technically feasible as a LNG harbor. The most important dimension 
determining the outcome of the Groningen policy perspective was that of 
socio- economics with the safety aspects playing only a secondary role. 
Groningen local authorities did not assess the desirability of the 
importation of LNG into the Netherlands, but restricted the discussion--as 
requested by the national government--to the question of acceptability of 
a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven. In particular in the later stages of the 
national policy discussion, the local authorities of Groningen also 
addressed the relative strength of a Eemshaven over a LNG site a t  the 
Maasvlakte. Here again, the socio-economic dimension and the safety 
aspect respectively played the dominant roles. The following table sum- 
marizes the main dimensional perspectives of the local authorities of 
Groningen with respect to the policy questions whch were addressed 
(Table 4.30). 
Table 4.30. Local authorities Groningen dimensional views 
on policy questions. 
Policy Question \ 
Dimensions 
(in order of 
significance 
1. socio-economics 
2. health and safety 
3. economics/cost 
4. environmental impact 
5. energy policy 
Outcome 
LNG at Eemshaven 
acceptable? 
Yes 
Eemshaven preferred 
to Maasvlakte? 
1 
Yes 
KEY + favorable 
- unfavorable 
o no preference; not affecting outcome 
[I not considered; not relevant 
4.5. NV NEDERLANDSE GASUNE 
4.5.1. Introduction 
Decision developments in relation to the importation of LNG into the 
Netherlands were initiated by the plans of N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, the 
semi-state company (hereafter referred to as Gasunie) responsible for 
Dutch national gas supply. The relationship between the Dutch State and 
Gasunie is institutionalized, primarily via the Minister for Economic 
Affairs, the latter being responsible for Dutch energy policy. Gasunie's 
close links with the national government and direct contacts with local 
authorities relevant to the LNG terminal siting issue, enabled the gas 
company to make relatively few public statements about its views on the 
respective positions vis-a-vis LNG siting. To a greater extent than in the 
preceding sections, information on Gasunie, therefore, was based upon a 
series of interviews, with Gasunie representatives and others (held during 
1980 and 1981). 
4.5.2. Responsibility and Involvement 
N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie was established in April 1963, in order to 
manage the sale and distribution of natural gas from the Dutch gas fields. 
Gasunie was also made responsible for all matters concerning supply of 
natural gas to Dutch users--including importation of foreign sources. 
Whilst institutionally connected and partly owned by the Dutch State, 
Gasunie operates as a commercial company. 
Gasunie shares are divided as follows: 
The State of the Netherlands 10% 
DSM Aardgas B.V. 
(DSM-Dutch State Mines is itself a State Company) 40% 
Shell Nederland BV 25% 
Esso Holding Company Holland, Inc. 25% 
The Dutch state thus holds 50% of the shares of Gasunie. Thls division of 
shares ensures that no decisions can be made without the consent of the 
State and Dutch State Mines. State representation in the governing body 
of Gasunie, takes place through the Ministry for Economic Affairs. In 
addition to this formal institutionalization, there is a separate agreement 
between the Dutch State and Gasunie, stipulating that approval is 
required from the Minister for Economic Affairs, for decisions concerning 
the annual sales plan, the gas price and the construction of transport 
lines and 0the.r equipment for transport and storage of gas (Tweede 
Kamer 1974, p.85). 
Within the mandate set by the governmental policy paper on Energy 
(Energienota, Tweede Kamer 1974) Gasunie corporate policies were 
designed to conserve the Dutch natural gas fields as long as possible. 
This strategy included the policy of importing foreign supplies of natural 
gas including LNG. In 1978 natural gas contributed 52% of total energy 
supplies and long term security of supply to the Dutch users was one of 
the major stated aims of Gasunie (Gasunie 1979a, p.5). First efforts in 
this field date back to the early seventies; the first contract for importa- 
tion of Norwegian natural gas, via pipeline, was concluded in early 1973. 
Its contribution to Dutch gas supplies was about 2%, in 1978 (rising to 3% 
in f979). Annual gas consumption in the Netherlands is about 40-45 x 
10'm3 (Gasunie 1978b, p.5). 
Gasunie involvement with LNG started in 1972, when first discussion 
were held with the Rotterdam Harbour Authorities and local authorities 
responsible for the Rotterdam region, concerning plans for siting a LNG 
peak shaving plant a t  Maasvlakte. The plans related to an area of 12 hec- 
tares and the preference for Rotterdam as a location related to commer- 
cial and strategic interests to site Gasunie's LNG activities close to the 
major gas users in the Netherlands and in the region of the harbor. The 
Maasvlakte site was selected by Gasunie specifically to enable further LNG 
activities--such as a LNG terminal--to be carried out from the same com- 
mercially attractive site, if required at  a later date. 
Official planning permission for the LNG peak shaving plant a t  
Maasvlakte was requested in October 1974. After considerable political 
discussion, including consideration of the safety aspects, (especially 
encouraged by Rijnmond local Authorities), the peak shaving plant was 
approved by local authorities around Rotterdam. The LNG storage plant 
became operational in May 1977 (Gasunie 1978a, p. 14). 
In the preceding years Gasunie had carried out extensive discussions 
with the Algerian state company Sonatrach for the supply of LNG and 
Gasunie was seriously investigating the opportunities for a Dutch LNG ter- 
minal. Although Gasunie had indicated preference for a LNG terminal a t  
Maasvlakte, next to its peak shaving plant, at  an early stage, the gas com- 
pany was also involved in moves to investigate alternative LNG terminal 
sites, both on-shore and off-shore. GasunieUs contract with the Algerian 
company Sonatrach was finally reached in 1977 as part of the arrange- 
ments made by a West German consortium of which Gasunie was a 
partner (other partners were Ruhrgas AG and Salzgitter GmbH). 
Gasunie saw its prime role in relation to the siting of a LNG terminal 
in indicating its preference considering two main dimensions: 
1. energy policy and 
2. economics /cost. 
Both these dimensions are related to Gasunie's commercial interests. 
The dimension of energy policy may be said to relate closely to its 
longer-term strategic interests, such as competitive survival whilst the 
cost dimension may refer to the corporate strategy of profit maximiza- 
tion. Other dimensions could be said to have been treated as "operational 
conditions," i.e., once a site was selected by Gasunie on the grounds of 
energy policy and economics/cost, the feasibility and acceptability of the 
site was to be determined in terms of aspects such as nautical access, 
safety, environmental impact, socio-economics, etc. 
Gasunie was primarily concerned with one policy question in relation 
to the LNG siting process: "What is the optimal site for a LNG terminal?" 
This policy question resulted from Gasunie's prime responsibility as the 
sole company in charge of Dutch gas supplies. Gasunie did not involve 
itself in further discussion on the  issue of the necessity of importing 
natural gas and LNG into the Netherlands, since this official policy Line 
was incorporated in the 1974 governmental energy policy paper and had 
been approved by the Dutch parliament. 
In the following sections, the dimensional views of Gasunie in relation 
to the central policy question on the LNG terminal site are discussed. 
4.5.3. Energy Policy 
The dimension of energy policy, i.e., in the case of Gasunie, the sup- 
ply of natural gas to the Netherlands was of prime concern for Gasunie, in 
selecting an appropriate LNG terminal site. The Dutch governmental 
energy policy was designed to conserve Dutch national gas reserves and 
to supplement its own natural gas sources with foreign supplies. 
The corporate phlosophy of Gasunie with respect to importation of 
natural gas, was to maximize flexibility for gas supplies in the Nether- 
lands and commitments whch had been made in the past for sales of 
Dutch gas to other Western European countries. Such a policy included 
buying in foreign supplies of natural gas on a commercial basis (Gasunie 
197Bc, p.1). 
Against the background of the governmentally approved policy of 
conserving Dutch national gas fields, Gasunie was able to pursue its cor- 
porate strategy of strengthening its role as main gas supplier in Western 
Europe. Pipelines from the Groningen gas fields in the Netherlands to 
France, FRG, Belgium, and Italy already existed, and Gasunie was supply- 
ing about half of Western Europe's natural gas needs. 
In order to enlarge its role as major supplier of natural gas- in the 
first instance to be able to secure long-term Dutch gas supply--Gasunie 
thought the importation of LNG to be necessary. It was seen in the 
interest of Dutch energy policy to import LNG at the most economical 
cost and this was the first factor that lead Gasunie to select Rotterdam as 
its prime site. 
The main users of natural gas in the Netherlands were located in the 
West of the country, and in this context Rotterdam harbor was the logical 
choice for Gasunie, in relation to Dutch energy supply. From a broader 
perspective of energy policy, Rotterdam would give Gasunie and Dutch 
gas policies greatest flexibility in its operations of buying and selling of 
natural gas. Rotterdam was the largest and most important harbor of 
Western Europe, strategically placed in relation to the major western 
European buyers of natural gas. In the 1960s Gasunie had signed long- 
term contracts with several Western European countries whch would con- 
tinue until the 1980s or 1990s, for the supply of natural gas (initially) 
from its national fields. Exports of natural gas from the Netherlands total 
0 3 approximately 50 x 10 m per annum. 
An additional reason why Rotterdam was favored as a LNG terminal 
site by Gasunie, related to the timescales involved in agreeing upon con- 
tracts and in constructing the terminal. The LNG market was perceived 
by Gasunie at the time as being a "sellers market," which was expected to 
experience considerable growth in the late 1970s and beyond. It was 
therefore seen in the interest of Dutch energy policy to be able to agree 
upon foreign supply contracts for LNG at the earliest possible time and to 
minimize the time which would be required for ensuring a suitable LNG 
terminal. The infrastructure of Rotterdam and the presence of a LNG 
peak shaving plant at  Maasvlakte, operated by Gasunie, would ensure that  
the time involved in establishng a LNG terminal--once a LNG supplier was 
found--would be minimized. 
The concern about timely access to a terminal, by the time the con- 
tracted LNG from Algeria would be supplied to Gasunie, also forced 
Gasunie to look for alternative sites, in addition to  Rotterdam. Discus- 
sions with Eemshaven harbor were initiated by Gasunie in late 1977 (less 
than a year before the LNG terminal site was to be announced) once it 
became clear to Gasunie that the considerable opposition in the Rotter- 
dam region(on the part of the local authorities) could--at best-- cause 
substantial delays. In 1978, whilst remaining broadly in favor of a Rotter- 
dam LNG site, Gasunie declared that an Eemshaven location would also be 
acceptable--albeit as a second choice (Gasunie 1978c, p.2/3). 
4.5.4. Economics /Cost 
The dimension of cost was an important factor in Gasunie's decision 
to opt for a Rotterdam LNG terminal, rather than for alternative sites, 
off-shore, a t  Eemshaven, or elsewhere. 
Gasunie's stated justification for selecting Rotterdam as its pre- 
ferred LNG site included the following issues (Gasunie 1978c, p.2/3): 
- Importation of LNG a t  Maasvlakte was the cheapest option. The 
shipping route to Maasvlakte is shorter than to Eemshaven. 
Whlst addition of imported gas to the national gas supply net- 
work was feasible both a t  Eemshaven and a t  Maasvlakte, the 
largest concentration of demand for natural gas is in the 
western part of the Netherlands. The construction of an island 
terminal, off the Dutch cost was rejected because of the h g h  
costs involved. 
-- Unloading and storage of LNG in insulated tanks and subsequent 
regasification of LNG, could be seen both technically and 
economically as an extension of the LNG peak shaving activities, 
already existing a t  the Maasvlakte and operated by Gasunie. 
Ths  factor would be  optimized in the case of Maasvlakte location 
A. 
-- From the point of view of cost, a Maasvlakte site for LNG enabled 
better opportunities for supplying imported gas to neighboring 
countries which could result in economies of scale, with conse- 
quent economic benefits. 
In particular in the early period of planning for a LNG terminal by 
Gasunie, it was a significant factor that the most cost-effective location 
was at  Maasvlakte, next to  Gasunie's existing LNG peak shaving plant. In 
fact, the possibilities for extending Gasunie's Rotterdam facilities to 
include a terminal for importing LNG was an  important consideration for 
siting the LNG peak shaving plant at Maasvlakte in the first half of the 
1970s. The Maasvlakte site already had considerable infrastructure, 
which would be required for a LNG terminal, and Gasunie had operational 
facilities at the site. 
As regards the additional costs involved in siting a LNG terminal at a 
location other than the most cost-effective Maasvlakte site, Gasunie 
specifically stated that if such an alternative site was indeed selected by 
the national government, the finance for infrastructure, etc. should be 
covered by the government, rather than by Gasunie (Gasunie 19?8c, p.4). 
4.5.5. Policy Perspective 
Gasunie's policy perspective was provided by the desire to minimize 
the financial cost involved in the establishment of a LNG terminal. The 
cost dimension, together with its responsibility to Dutch energy policy, 
resulted in a clear preference by Gasunie for locating the LNG terminal at 
Rotterdam. The dimension of safety did not enter Gasunie's selection 
process, apart from the fact that  it was assumed that, whatever the 
selected site, the location of a LNG terminal "should fulfill the safety 
requirements in an acceptable manner" (Gasunie 19?8c, p.3). 
The interests of Gasunie, in terms of Dutch gas supply policy and 
commercial importance, for completing the details for the supply of 
Algerian LNG (as was contracted for) was significant. In an attempt to 
find a politically acceptable LNG site, before the stipulated deadline in 
the contract with Sonatrach, Gasunie eventually was willing to  accept a 
LNG terminal at  Eemshaven, as a second choice (Gasunie 19?8c, p.3). 
Other alternatives including an island terminal, were never seriously con- 
sidered by Gasunie because of the high financial costs involved and/or 
lack of technical feasibility as perceived by Gasunie. 
Table 4.31 summerizes the policy perspective as it was formulated by 
Gasunie on the major policy question concerned. 
4.6. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE PUBLIC 
4.6.1. Introduction 
In t h s  section a brief overview is given of the main interest groups 
which were involved in the discussion on LNG siting in the Netherlands. In 
most cases, the organizations involved have no formal power or responsi- 
bility with respect to  the outcome of the decision-making process on LNG, 
although in some cases they were invited by local or  national authorities 
to express their respective views on the issues. In section 4.6.8. a brief 
discussion is given of the two public hearings on LNG whch were organ- 
ized by local authorities in the Rotterdam and Groningen regions respec- 
tively. It must be stressed that public hearings in the Netherlands are 
usually meeting of relatively short duration--typically less than one day-- 
in which the local population is informed about planned developments and 
is given the opportunity to  formulate its objections and express its views 
on the issues a t  stake. 
The following interest groups are discussed in the sections below: 
- Werkgroep Noordzee - - the North Sea Working Group, an 
environmental organization for the protection of the North Sea 
environment working in collaboration with broader (environmen- 
tal) interest groups in the Netherlands;+ 
*North Sea Working Group collaborated with the following organizations: Landelijke Vereing- 
ing tot Behoud van de Waddenzee (national organization for protection of the Waddenzee), 
Table 4.31. Gasunie policy views. 
KEY: + favorable 
+/- indecisive: marginally favorable 
o no preference; not affecting outcome 
[] not considered; not relevant 
* Only considered if Rotterdam site could not be approved 
within required time limits. 
Dimension 
1. energy policy 
2. economics/cost 
3. health and safety 
-- FNV Federa t ie  Neder lands e  Vakvereniging - - the largest and 
main employees' organization in the Netherlands, Dutch federa- 
tion of trades unions; 
-- Werkgroep E e m s m o n d  - - environmental group concerned with 
the area of Eemsmond (the mouth of the river Eems), north and 
north-east of the province of Groningen; 
-- K a m e r  van Koophnndel  e n  Fabr i eken  v o o r  d e  Veenkolonien e n  
Oostelijk Qroningen : - Chamber of Commerce for Eastern 
Groning en; 
-- Elec tr ic i t e i t sbedr i j f  v o o r  Qroningen e n  Rr en the  - - Electricity 
corporation for the provinces of Groningen and Drenthe; 
-- Koninkl i jke Neder la nds e  Redersuerenig ing  KNRV - - Dutch asso- 
ciation of shippers. 
In addition to the above interested parties, most of which submitted writ- 
ten presentations to local and national government, views of interest 
groups and individuals were also submitted at two public hearings on 24 
April 1978 in Uithuizermeeden and on 9 May 1978 in Rotterdam in the 
1 
Optimal Site for LNG Terminal? 
Stichting Natuur en Milieu (foundation for nature and the environment), Nederlandse Vere- 
inging tot Bescherming van Vogels (Dutch association for the protection of birds), Verbond 
van Wetenschappelijke Onderzoekers (association for scientific workers), Vereinging Milieu- 
defensie (organization for environmental protection), Wereld Natuurf onds Nederland (Dutch 
section of Worldlife Fund) as well as a number of interested individuals. 
a. Rotterdam 
+ 
+ 
[I 10 
b. Eemshaven 
(2nd choice)* 
+ /- 
+ /- 
[ ] lo  
province of Groningen. 
4.6.2. K W  Federation of Dutch Trades Union Organizations 
The main dimension focused upon by FNV with respect to the siting 
of a LNG terminal was the dimension of socio- economics. The organiza- 
tion stressed the structural weakness of the northern provinces (includ- 
ing Groningen) in the Netherlands and pointed out that LNG activities at 
Eemshaven, could play an important role in starting industrial develop- 
ment in the Eemshaven region and could stimulate further economic 
activities. FNV recommended the siting of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven. 
As regards energy  policy,  FNV did not state any objections to the 
importation of LNG into the Netherlands, but the organization believed 
that the LNG developments should in no way negatively affect the search 
for alternative sources and developments towards greater conservation of 
energy. The dimension of s a f e t y  was only briefly discussed by KNV. The 
organization subscribed to the definition of risk = probability x conse- 
quence and by and large supported the views put forward for by the local 
authorities of Groningen, concluding that a terminal for LNG at 
Eemshaven was acceptable, (at quantities of 4 x 10 'm~/~ear )  (KNV 1978). 
4.6.3. Werkgroep N oordzee (North Sea Working Group) 
The North Sea Working Group played an important role in promoting 
a critical discussion at various levels about the plans for LNG importation 
and the siting of a LNG terminal. Although primarily concerned with 
aspects related to the environment, including safety, the organization 
also questioned the governmental policy on energy, in particular the need 
to import l iquefied gas. 
The North Sea Working Group opposed the establishment of a Dutch 
LNG terminal at the time the governmental discussion took place, and 
stressed the need for further investigation of various aspects and con- 
sideration of alternatives for the importation of LNG. The main views put 
forward by the group are summarized below. 
According to the group it was not possible to acquire a considered 
view as to the r isk  dimension of LNG, bebause of lack of experience with 
LNG transporting and handling. The great uncertainties notwithstanding, 
the group believed the probability of an accident with LNG (as calculated 
by TNO) to be unacceptable;  in this respect the group quoted the Califor- 
nia norms for a LNG terminal siting (Senate biU 1081, par.5582), showing 
that at both Eemshaven and Maasvlakte sites, the population density 
would be too h g h  to be withn acceptable safety limits (Noordzee 1978b, 
p.5). As regards the enwironnental  i m p a c t  of a LNG terminal the organi- 
zation believed the effects had been underestimated by official advisory 
bodies and the government, and it urged more research to  assess the 
possible damage to the environment (Noordzee 1978b, p.7). With respect 
to energy  policy the North Sea Working Group questioned the need for 
importing gas in liquefied form and suggested that alternatives (e.g., 
imports via pipeline, involving exchange of contracts with customers for 
Dutch natural gas such as Italy) should be further investigated before a 
final decision on LNG was taken. An off-shore terminal for LNG was 
rejected by the group in the grounds of environmental considerations 
(Noordzee 1978a). The socio- e c o n o m i c  i m p o r t a n c e  of a LNG t e r m i n a l ,  in 
t e r m s  of employment and further local economic activities, had generally 
been over-estimated, the North Sea Working Group claimed. It pointed 
out that the risks involved in LNG activities could in fact have a negative 
effect upon prospective industrial developments in the region, and this 
factor should deserve more attention, before a siting decision was made 
on the basis of socio-economic considerations (Noordzee 1978b, p.8). 
In the light of the above aspects, the North Sea Working Group, called 
for a postponement of the decision on the importation of LNG and the 
subsequent siting of a LNG terminal in the Netherlands. 
4.6.4. Werkgroep Eemsmond (Eemsmond Working Group) 
The Eemsmond Working Group has expressed views on LNG similar to 
those of the North Sea Working Group, but at some points the group was 
somewhat more specific in its criticism of the issues as formulated by the 
national and local government. The Eemsmond Working Group was 
opposed to the importation of LNG at both Eemshaven and Maasvlakte, 
but focused its attention to the first. The risk involved in the shpping 
and handling of LNG to and at Eemshaven (taking it past populated areas 
and islands) was thought to be u n a c c e p t a b l e  to the group (Eemsmond 
1978b, p.4). The group state that the definition of risk as the product of 
probability x consequence can not be used as a meaningful variable as the 
effects become very large, since certain consequences are not accept- 
able, to the public at large, under any circumstances (Eemsmond 1978a, 
p.4). 
The group also discussed e n v i r o n m e n t a l  aspects of LNG activities at 
and around Eemshaven, such as the negative effects upon the wildlife and 
the seabed. It stresses the importance of the Eemsmond area as an 
unpolluted ecologically attractive area (Eemsmond 197Bb, p.6). 
In relation to e n e r g y  p o l i c y  the Eemsmond Working Group questions 
the necessity of importing LNG (at  the time it was being discussed) point- 
ing at  the lower gas consumption in the Netherlands, compared to the fig- 
ures originally anticipated by the Gasunie and the 1974 governmental 
energy policy plan (Eemsmond 197Bb, p.3). Eemsmond Working Group 
indicated that the cos t  advantage of importing liquefied gas compared to 
transport via pipeline from Algeria, would virtually vanish, in the case of 
LNG tanker having to take a longer shpping route to the Netherlands, 
avoiding the busy English Channel route (Eemsmond 1978b, p.9). 
The group discussed possible alternatives for the importation of 
liquefied gas into the Netherlands, and concluded that given the h g h  
risks involved in LNG preference was given to transport via pipeline. As 
long as transport via pipeline was technically and economically a feasibil- 
ity, the group concluded that a LNG terminal was undesirable (Eemsmond 
197Ba, p.3).  
4.6.5. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor de Veenkolonien en 
Oostelijk Groningen (Chamber of Commerce Eastern Groningen) 
The local Chamber of Commerce of Eastern Groningen argued in 
favor of a LNG terminal at  Eemshaven, based on socio- economic argu- 
ments. It stressed the importance of stimulating new economic activities 
in the structurally weak province of Groningen. LNG activities were 
expected to have a positive effect in terms of strengthening the economic 
development in the region. The Chamber of Commerce concluded that 
the importation of LNG and subsequent storage at Eemshaven was accept- 
able, both on grounds of environmental aspects and in terms of safety 
(Kamer van Koophandel 1978, p.2). 
4.6.6. Electriciteitsbedrijf voor Groningen en Drenthe GDE 
(EXectricity Corporation for Groningen en Drenthe provinces) 
EGO, the electricity corporation for Groningen and Drenthe Pro- 
vinces, submitted a brief statement to the provincial authorities of 
Groningen, concerning the safety aspects of a LNG terminal at  
Eemshaven. EGD stated that the consequences involved in a possible 
accident with LNG, involving detonation, would be such that its electricity 
power station (in the vicinity of Eemshaven) would be seriously damaged. 
The r isk  involved in a LNG terminal at Eemshaven was thus judged to be 
unacceptable by EGD (EGD 1978). 
4.6.7. Koninklijke Nederlandse Redersvereniging KNRV 
(Royal Dutch Shipowner's Association) 
The Dutch shp-owners' association KNV argued in favor of a LNG ter- 
minal at  Maasvlakte site B., mainly on the grounds of nautical safety and 
considerations relating to optimal nautical feasibility. The main objec- 
tions to a LNG terminal at  Eemshaven, concerned nautical aspects, 
including the increased probability (compared to Maasvlakte) of running 
a ground in the narrow passages en route to Eemshaven and the difficul- 
ties in maneuvering the LNG tanker on its approach to the harbor. 
Another objection to Eemshaven--as formulated by KNRV--concerned the 
limited times of entry to the harbor; entry maneuvers can only be carried 
out during h g h  tides (resulting in waiting periods), whrlst safety require- 
ments dictate entry should take place during day light. According to 
KNRV, waiting periods outside the harbor would lead to problems with 
"boil off" of gas. 
Considering the nautical safety aspects of LNG, the Dutch ship- 
owners' association concluded that Maasvlakte site R should be preferred 
over Eemshaven and other sites. The organization noted, however, that 
approval of LNG operations at a Rotterdam terminal should be conditional 
to future measurements to limit transport of dangerous substances (inc. 
LNG) through the main approach to  Rotterdam Harbor (KNRV 1978). 
4.6.8. Public Hear ings  
A public hearing was organized in Uithuizermeeden in the province of 
Ch-oningen on 24 April 1978, to enable the public to give its reaction to the 
possible siting of a LNG terminal at Eemshaven. The meeting took 2 1/2 
hours and mainly consisted of brief statements and questions by Eems- 
mond environmental working group and the Dutch trades unions KNV 
(Northern section), followed by replies from representatives from the 
provincial authorities of Groningen. No new viewpoints of significance 
were put forward (Groningen 1978j). In the R o t t e r d a m  region a public 
hearing was held at Rotterdam on 9 May 1978, following two information 
meetings (at Oostvoorne and Hoek van Holland), where the interested 
public was made aware of the issues involved in LNG siting, as presented 
by the local authorities and Gasunie. The public hearing took place in the 
context of Dutch legislation concerning pollution and "nuisance," whch 
stipulates the need for public involvement before local approval of a site 
may be granted. 
At the public hearing, local political parties, environmental organiza- 
tions and trade union groups put forward their respective views and corn- 
ments. A major point concerned the aspect of s a f e t y  and risk. Environ- 
mental groups and the (left-of-center) political parties represented, 
stressed the importance of the safety factor and argued against location 
of a LNG terminal at Maasvlakte. Some argued that a decision on LNG sit- 
ing should be postponed to allow for further research on the safety 
aspects. Others believed the risk factor had been underestimated in the 
discussions at local and national level (including the perceived risk to the 
population in the Rijnrnond region). The need for further investigation of 
alternatives of importing 
4.7. CABINET /NATIONAL GOYERNPENT 
4.7.1. Introduct ion  
The policy perspective of the national government was formulated in 
a final policy paper presented to parliament on 15 September 1978, by 
the Cabinet. The Cabinet's view is a resolution of positions and interests 
from different ministerial departments involved (which themselves do not 
represent necessarily single objectives or interests). This section sum- 
marizes the major aspects of Dutch government poli.cy on the siting of 
LNG terminal, as formulated in the policy documents agreed upon by the 
Cabinet and submitted to Parliament (Tweede Kamer 14626; especially nr.  
11; whch is referred to as Tweede Kamer 1978). Where relevant, the 
government's statements made during the parliamentary debate on LNG 
are also mentioned. 
The following sections discuss the Cabinet's view on the major policy 
dimensions with respect to the main questions surrounding decision- 
making on LNG siting in the Netherlands. 
4.7.2. Problem Definition 
The Cabinet considered three interrelated policy questions (Tweede 
Kamer 1978, p.5): 
( 1) the desirability of importing LNG into the Netherlands; 
(2) the desirability of importing LNG a t  a Dutch terminal; 
(3) the selection of the location of a Dutch LNG terminal. 
The Cabinet based its decision on the advice given and studies carried out 
by a large number of organizations, notably ICONA, STUNET, the state 
land use planning commission RPC, and the inter-departmental commit- 
tee for environmental hygiene ICMH. The central position of the Cabinet 
in relation to other parties involved in decision-making on LNG, is illus- 
trated in Figure 4.9 (based on TNO 1980). 
The final governmental policy paper on LNG, outlining the Cabinet's 
final position on LNG (Tweede Kamer 1978) identified nine different 
aspects in relation to the selection of a LNG terminal site in the Nether- 
lands. In the context of this study (and in line with earlier discussions on 
party perspectives) the Cabinet's policy views will be discussed in relation 
to  the following five (re-grouped) major dimensions: 
1. energy policy 
2. economics/cost 
3.  safety/risk 
4. socio-economics/regional policy and planning 
5. environmental impact 
Other factors which were part  of the Cabinet 's  policy paper on the siting 
policy for a LNG terminal--but which are not discussed separately in the 
sections below--are: technicalhautical aspects, international agreement, 
the required time for completion of the terminal, and the (expected) 
approval of a LNG site by relevant local authorities. 
4.7.3. Energy Policy 
The issue of LNG importation was considered by the Cabinet within 
the context of the 1974 governmental policy (approved by Parliament) of 
importing natural gas, in order to  guarantee long-term supply of natural 
gas supplies in the Netherlands and to conserve Dutch national gas fields 
(Energienota  Tweede Kamer 1974). In principle, the government had two 
options with respect to the importation of natural: via pipeline or as LNG 
by ship. (Both were mentioned in the 1974 Energy policy paper.) The 
Cabinet concluded that  whlst in general it would prefer the importation 
via pipeline, nearby suppliers of natural gas would be very limited in 
Western Europe; more distant natural gas suppliers would necessitate 
transport of gas to the Netherlands in liquid form. The potential supply of 
natural gas via pipeline from Western European countries was not con- 
sidered as being particularly "abundant" (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.7). 
Furthermore, the Cabinet believed that  the demand for imports of 
natural gas in Western Europe was considerable and competition would 
make i t  more difficult for a country llke the Netherlands to fulfill its 
demands for natural gas from nearby Western European suppliers 
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(Tweede Kamer 1978, p.7). In view of the small number of potential 
Western European suppliers, which could deliver the gas via pipeline, the 
Cabinet concluded that a Dutch capability for importing LNG would be 
desirable for longer-term energy policy for the Netherlands. 
With respect to the option of transporting the Algerian LNG con- 
tracted for by Gasunie by means of a pipeline to the Netherlands, the 
Cabinet noted that t h s  route would be 30% more expensive than tran- 
sport via LNG tanker (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.7). (To some extent this 
option was considered to be an academic one, since a t  the time the 
government formulated a final position on LNG importation, Gasunie had 
already signed (and the Ministry of Economics Affairs had approved) a 
contract with Algeria for the supply of liquefied natural gas.) It is impor- 
tant to keep in mind here that the Algerian contract concerned an 
amount of 4 x 109m3 per annum for the period 1985-2005; the Cabinet 
anticipated, however, that total Dutch LNG imports would be further 
increased to reach 8-12 x 109m3 LNG per year by 1990 and 10-15 x 10'rn3 
LNG/year by the year 1995. from the point of view of long-term Dutch 
energy supply access to a LNG terminal would thus become increasingly 
important. 
The Cabinet ruled out the possibility of involving in the LNG issue, the 
contractual arrangements with foreign customers of Dutch natural gas, 
such as France, Italy, and Norway and to come to a redistribution of 
Dutch and foreign natural gas resources being re-exported from the Neth- 
erlands (e.g. Norway) (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.8). The main problem iden- 
tified by the Cabinet in relation to an "exchange" of contracts involhg 
the supply of natural gas to and from the Netherlands, was the "unique" 
nature of the different supply contracts already agreed upon in the past. 
Each contract involved different timescales, amounts and calorific values 
of the natural gas, conditions of sales, etc. An additional problem cited in 
the Cabinet policy paper was the fact that several customers for Dutch 
natural gas had signed (or intended to sign) contracts themselves with 
Algeria (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.7/8). Furthermore, as regards the 
possibility of having Algerian gas supplied via pipeline to long-time con- 
tracted buyers of Dutch gas, such as Italy, was considered to be unattrac- 
tive, practically and financially (among other things because the Dutch- 
Italian gas pipeline would have kept available to guarantee supplies to 
Italy in all circumstances (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.9). Further prob- 
lems of decision making changes to the arrangements with Algeria, was 
the fact that the contract was agreed upon in collaboration with West Ger- 
man LNG buyers (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.13, p.17). 
Once the need for importation of LNG was established by the Dutch 
Cabinet, the question of the location of a terminal was addressed. The 
Cabinet policy paper considered the issue of a foreign versus a Dutch 
national terminal and concluded that on grounds of energy policy, 
employment and the acquisition of technical knowledge, preference 
should be given to a Dutch terminal (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.9). The major 
factor underlying the Cabinet's position, concerned the "flexibility" of 
controlling supplies of natural gas to the Netherlands. The Cabinet 
believed that dependence upon a foreign LNG terminal--thereby affecting 
the practical ability for the Netherlands to negotiate supply contracts for 
LNG--could be d e t r i ~ e n t a l  to the Dutch policies of active natural gas 
imports and diversification of supply sources (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.9). 
Factors concerning energy policy also related to the policy question 
of selecting the exact location of a LNG terminal in the Netherlands, 
although both major prospective sites (Maasvlakte and Eemshaven) were 
technically feasible in terms of transport and handling of LNG. The 
Maasvlakte sites were, however, more accessible for larger LNG carriers-- 
especially those with a capacity exceeding 165,000m3 (ships up to this 
capacity could be handled at Eemshaven after carrying out necessary 
harbor modifications). From the perspective of energy policy, it was 
noted that the use of large LNG tankers would enhance supply opportuni- 
ties as well as diversification of foreign sources of supply (Tweede Kamer 
1978, p.10). Mention was made of the possibility of combining LNG opera- 
tions with a coal gasification plant--to enable mixing of the LNG and coal 
gases to bring the gas to the calorific level required for use in Dutch gas 
supply. The Cabinet clearly emphasized, that coal gasification and LNG 
activities would not  necessarily have to be combined geographically, 
thereby separating t h s  particular energy policy factor from any prefer- 
ence for one or another LNG site under consideration (Tweed Kamer 1978, 
p.10). 
The governmental decision to import natural gas in liquefied form, 
using LNG tankers, was directly related to the dimension of 
economics/cost. Transport of natural gas via pipeline was considered to 
be economically attractive only when it involved supplier which were rela- 
tively close to the Netherlands. For distant supplier of natural gas, such 
as Nigeria or Middle Eastern countries, transport via pipeline was con- 
sidered too expensive by the Dutch government, to be an appropriate 
option (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.5). 
The analysis of the Dutch government was based on the difference in 
cost structure between gas transport via pipeline and by LNG carriers. 
The cost of transport via pipeline would increase more rapidly with larger 
distances, compared to transport by LNG tanker. The difference in cost 
structures-as represented by the Dutch Government--are illustrated 
below (see Figure 4.10), indicating that at a certain large transport dis- 
tance, transport via LNG tanker becomes more economical than tran- 
sport via pipeline (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr. 9, p.5). 
In the specific case of transport of natural gas from Algeria to the 
Netherlands, the Dutch government indicated that the investment cost 
for transport via pipeline would be about 50% higher, than for transport 
via tanker in the form of LNG. The investment costs figures presented by 
the Cabinet are given below in Table 4.32 (Tweede Kamer, 14626, nr.9, 
p.6). 
The option of "exchanging" contracts for natural gas supply with 
Italy, which receives Dutch natural gas via pipeline (and which could in 
principle be supplied with the Algerian gas, contracted by the Nether- 
lands), was rejected as a viable option by the Dutch Cabinet. Apart from 
the difference in delivery time scales involved and other practical con- 
siderations, the Cabinet concluded that financial savings of t h s  option 
would be very limited because: 
c o s t  gas r i z  ? i ? e L i ~ e  
Figure 4.10. Natural gas transport cost structure. 
(as presented by both ICONA and the Cabinet) 
(a) the Netherlands-Italy pipeline would have to be kept available; 
(b) the cost of transporting Algerian gas by LNG carrier to the Neth- 
erlands would differ little from the cost of transporting natural 
gas by pipeline to Italy (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.9). 
On the basis of the above economic and other factors the Cabinet decided 
that transport of the Algerian gas was preferred in liquefied form as LNG, 
rather than via pipeline (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.7). 
As regards the policy question of a Dutch versus a foreign LNG termi- 
nal, cost considerations do not seem to have played a significant role, if 
any. The cost dimension did play an  important role, however, in relation 
to  the policy question of the exact location of a LNG terminal in the Neth- 
erlands. Firstly, mainly based upon figures calculated by ICONA, the 
Dutch Cabinet concluded that an island terminal for LNG was consider- 
ably more expensive than land-based terminals being considered. In this 
respect, the Cabinet followed the advice of ICONA (from October 1977) 
that the option of an island terminal would lead to excessive costs 
(Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.3, p.8). 
The governmental decision process in the Netherlands about the sit- 
ing of a LNG terminal followed a path characterized by elimination. A 
large number of potential land sites were judged to be unfeasible, on the 
grounds of nautical and technical considerations. The main site being 
considered in 1977 was in the Maasvlakte area--the island option 
effectively being considered too expensive. Following the re-introduction 
of Eemshaven as potentially viable LNG site, the cost dimension came 
again to the fore, as the government considered the selection of sites 
which by 1978 had narrowed down to the choice between a land-site at  
Maasvlakte or Eemshaven. The Voornedam alternative and the OTTS ter- 
minal were also taken into consideration by the Cabinet; the &st was 
Table 4.32. Investment cost gas Algeria to the Netherlands 
(12 x 10 'm~/~ea r )  Millions of Dollars (1 977). 
pipeline to Algerian coast 
liquefaction plant 
Pipeline 
I six LNG carriers 125,000 m3 I 750 I 
LNG I 
2500 km pipeline: Algerian 
gas field to N-Italy (via 
Tunesia, Sicily) 
*Three quarters of this cost would be accounted for by the Algerian government in the case 
of pipeline transport only 1/6 to  1 /7  of the costs would be paid by Algeria. (Source: Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr. 13, p.3) 
3000 
pipeline N-Italy to the 
Netherlands (1000km) 
introduced as a serious option at a later stage of discussions, a t  the 
requests of Zuid-Holland provincial counsellors (Tweede Kamer 14626, 
nr.9., p.34). 
800 
As regards cost, the Dutch Cabinet stated that the cost of c o n s t r u c -  
tion for a LNG terminal at Eemshaven and Maasvlakte would be identical, 
with both Voornedam and OTTS options considerably higher (Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.21). Taking into account the infrastructural 
requirements needed for the different options a clear cost difference was 
noted, however. The total cost for a LNG terminal at the different sites, 
including infrastructure (harbor modifications, etc.) transport cost were 
cited by the Dutch government as follows in Table 4.33 (assuming 12 x 
10'm3 LNG transported per year). 
The cost difference between Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites were, 
however, less pronounced in the case of a LNG transport amounting to 4 x 
10'm3 LNG per year. By mid-1978 the Cabinet had narrowed down the 
choice of a LNG site to Eemshaven versus Maasvlakte. In its fmal analysis 
it concluded that the Eemshaven option would be considerably cheaper. 
The following Table 4.34 summarizes the Cabinet's cost comparison 
(Tweede Karner 1978, Bijlage 2). The government figures thus clearly indi- 
cated that in terms of e c o n o m i c s / c o s t  alone, the Maasvlakte site was the 
most attractive option. 
Table 4.33. Total cost siting LNG terminal 
Site 
Maasvlakte A and B 
Eemshaven 
Voornedam 
OTTS 
Total Cost* 
520-530 
1170-1 260 
1575-1 675 
approx. 1580 
*in rnillions of guilders 
(Source: Tweede  Ka rne r  14626, nr.9, p.22) 
4.7.5. Safety /Risk 
The dimension of safety does not seem to have played a major role in the 
resolution of the first policy question, concerning the desirability of 
importing LNG into the Netherlands, nor did it affect the governmental 
view that the Netherlands should give preference to its national LNG ter- 
minal. In relation to the acceptability of a LNG terminal on Dutch soil, 
and thereby in respect of the third policy question, that of the selection 
of a LNG site, the safety dimension did play a significant role. 
As a contextual factor it must be mentioned here that governmental 
concern about safety of a LNG terminal was a major factor influencing the 
national government to get itself involved in a major way in the decision 
making on LNG (Approval procedures on the licensing and siting permis- 
sions could in principle have been handled by the relevant local authori- 
ties). Governmental involvement lead (among other things) to the com- 
missioning of safetylrisk studies by TNO and others and official advisory 
bodies. 
On the basis of the advice of ICONA and using various risk studies 
(notably TNO 1976) the Cabinet first informed parliament in March 1978 
about its position vis-a-vis the safety at the various potential LNG sites. 
The Cabinet concluded that the research had indicated that "the minimal 
probability of calamities involved in the location of a LNG terminal at an 
artificial island does not differ essentially from that involved in location at 
Maasvlakte sites A and B"; furthermore the Cabinet stated that with 
respect to Maamlakte site C and the Voornedam terminal site, the same 
conclusion applied (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.6., p.2). 
Table 4.34. Cost comparison siting LNG terminal Eemshaven/Maasvlakte* 
Aspect Maasvlakte B site Eernshaven site 
Sea transport: 
Gas distribu- 
tion within the 
Netherlands 
additional cost compared to 
Maasvlakte: 144 million guilders (4 
x lo9m3 LNG/year) 431 million (12 
x 10' LNG / ye ar) 
additional cost compared to 
Maasvlakte: 45 million (4 x 10'm3 
LNG/year) 135 million (12 x 1 0 ~ m ~  
LNG /year) 
1 Infrastructure 29.1 million 56-1 1 1 million guilders** I 
NOTES: 
* The cost of construction of a LNG terminal was estimated as being approximately 
equal at all sites, totaling approximately 560 million guilders, for a capacity of 12 
9 3 x 10 m LNG per year (Tweede Kamer 1878, Bijlage 2). 
** This figure is calculated on the basis of 125,000m3 capacity LNG carriers; the 
exact level depends to what extent modification of the harbor for ships up to 
70,000m3 is counted as separate harbor investment, independent of LNG termi- 
nal facilities. 
As regards the safety aspect, the government argued that it was 
practically impossible to use general criteria for assessing the acceptabil- 
ity of a LNG terminal site, since for the selection all relevant aspects of a 
proposed location should be taken into consideration (Tweede Kamer 
14626 nr.9, p.5). The Dutch government therefore took an approach of 
assessing and comparing the risk involved a t  the proposed sites rather 
than judging its acceptability on the grounds of a p r i o r i  criteria. Towards 
the end of the decision-making period, the discussion on safety largely 
centered around a comparison between the prime sites, at  Maasvlakte 
and Eemshaven, once the other sites were eliminated from the &scus- 
sion. 
The approach taken by the government, (albeit never explicitly 
stated) suggests that the elimination of the other potential sites (exclud- 
ing Maasvlakte and Eemshaven) took place largely on the basis of techni- 
cal and economic factors, rather than the concept of acceptable r isk .  It 
also implied that the risk involved in a LNG terminal was acceptable a t  
either of the two Anal alternative sites (M.aasvlakte and Eemshaven). 
The Dutch Cabinet seems to have concluded that its h a 1  position on 
safety be in agreement with the conclusions of ICONA (where representa- 
tives of 15 ministerial departments were represented): that the risk 
involved in LNG operations were acceptable. The acceptance by the 
Cabinet of the risk involved in a land-based LNG terminal, was almost cer- 
tainly a political compromise, given the initial objectives by the Ministry 
for Public Health and Environment, to the acceptance of a Maasvlakte site 
in 1977. (Within ICONA, the representative of the Ministry for Public 
Health and Environment had stated that location of a LNG terminal at 
Maasvlakte was not acceptable, mainly on the grounds of safety; see sec- 
tion 4.2.5.6.). 
The risk involved in a LNG terminal located at  Eemshaven were con- 
sidered to be safer (in terms of risk to the population) by a factor of 10, 
in comparison to Maasvlakte, but it is not obvious to what extent this sin- 
gle factor has played a major role with respect to the seemingly limited 
degree of official opposition to the selection of the Eemshaven site, on 
safety grounds by the Ministry for Public Health and Environment. What- 
ever the potential internal governmental disagreement between different 
ministerial departments, the final Cabinet view apparently accepted the 
risks involved in a LNG terminal, and focused its attention upon a com- 
parison, in terms of safety, of the Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites. The 
Cabinet seems to have been somewhat reluctant to emphasize the safety 
dimension of the later stages of the decision processes, since the risk 
issues involved had not been given much prominence as a s e l ec t i on  cri- 
t e r i o n  in earlier stages of decision making. 
In the comparison between the safety aspects of a LNG terminal at 
Eemshaven and Maasvlakte respectively differences were concluded, 
firstly with respect to the transport of the LNG to the terminal. Taking 
into account the longer shipping route to Eemshaven, in comparison to a 
Rotterdam site, the government stated that the number of encounters 
with other shps ,  and thereby the probability of collisions was not lower in 
relation to Eemshaven, despite the fact that the sea traffic density on 
route to Eernshaven was considerably lower (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, 
p.19). As regards the risk of LNG shps  stranding on route to the terminal 
the government concluded that an Eemshaven terminal would be more 
dangerous. In this respect the government noted the nearby islands of 
the Waddenzee on route to Eemshaven. Approach to an Eemshaven har- 
bor was also considered more risky than the route to the Maasvlakte. 
Reference was made in this context by the government to studies carried 
out by ICONA. With respect, to the risk to the population, in the area of a 
proposed LNG terminal, the Cabinet clearly acknowledged (on the basis of 
TNO and other data sources) that the maximum consequences of 
accidents with LNG are a factor 10 lower in the case of an Eemshaven ter- 
minal, in comparison with Maasvlakte); the individual death probability is 
approximately an order of magnitude lower at Eemshaven, the Cabinet 
concluded (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.11). 
The safety assessment of the different potential LNG sites presented 
by the Cabinet in its final policy position is summerized in Table 4.35. 

As regards the t o t a l  r i sk  levels used by the Cabinet in its final assess- 
ment of the safety of transporting, handling and storage of LNG, the 
Cabinet concluded that  (given the difficulty of quantification) it supported 
the view of the CPR Committee for the Prevention of Disasters and stated: 
"on the grounds of risk considerations n o  c l e a r  p r e f e r e n c e  can be given in 
favor of one or the other harbor sites" (emphasis added) (Tweede Kamer 
1978, p.1). This conclusion referred to the comparison between 
Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites only, particularly taking into account 
the longer shpping route to the latter site. 
4.7.6. Socio-economics/Regional Policy 
With respect to the first policy question, the desirabihty of importing 
LNG into the Netherlands, the dimensions of socio-economics did not play 
direct role of any significance. No explicit mention' was made by the 
national government whether it agreed or disagreed with the conclusion 
of the interdepartmental coordination committee, ICONA, that the impor- 
tation of LNG would have a positive effect upon Dutch industry, especially 
the shpbuilding sector (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.3, p.3). 
Once the Dutch government had taken the decision to  import LNG, 
the question of the desirability of a Dutch terminal was considered, and 
here the aspect of employment was mentioned by the government of 
being a significant factor. The national government adopted the view that 
the use of a foreign LNG terminal for the reception of Dutch bought LNG 
(e.g., Wilhelmshaven) would be "less appropriate" since the positive 
employment effects should be acheved within the Netherlands if a t  all 
possible (Tweede Kamer 14626 nr.5, p.7). The Cabinet concl.uded that a 
LNG terminal in the Netherlands would play a positive role with respect to 
employment, also in relation to other economic activities and the acquisi- 
tion and development of expertise in the Netherlands i.n the area of LNG 
(Tweede Kamer 1978, p.9). 
In relation to the l o c a t i o n  of a LNG terminal wit.hin the Netherlands, 
the government's position with respect to the dimension of socio- 
economics centered on two main aspects: 
(1) employment generation; and 
(2) promotion of (new) economic activities in the region around the 
terminal. 
As regards the employment effects of a LNG terminal, the national 
government basically used the figures calculated by ICONA. The following 
figures were quoted by the Cabinet in respect of direct and indirect tem- 
p o r a r y  employment generated by the construction of a LNG terminal and 
the necessary infrastructure, indicating that the employment effect of a 
LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven would be higher than at  a Maasvlakte site 
(Table 4.36) (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.3-4). In addition, the govern- 
ment discussed the permanent employment stemming from the exploita- 
tion of the LNG terminal and the maintenance of the infrastructure: 
Maasvlakte: 50 permanent jobs 
Eemshaven: 120 permanent jobs; 
Table 4.36. Direct and indirect employment effects 
(no. of man-years). 
Maasvlakte A 
Maasvlakte B 
Eemshaven 
the main area of difference concerns the dredging operations required at 
Eemshaven to maintain access to the harbor for LNG carriers (Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.3-4). 
In relation the generation of permanent employment the Cabinet 
stated, in June 1978, that the expected permanent employment at both 
main locations (Maasvlakte and Eemshaven) was considered to be small in 
absolute terms; the re la t ive  employment consequences, however, would 
be greater a t  Eemshaven--considering the higher unemployment rate in 
the province of Groningen, in comparison to the Rotterdam area (Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.26). In terms of employment generation the Cabinet 
therefore concluded that against the background of the relatively weak 
regional economic situation in the North of the Netherlands, t h s  factor 
was more significant when a LNG terminal was sited at Eemshaven 
(Tweede Kamer 1978, p.2). 
As far as secondary socio-economic affects of a LNG terminal are 
concerned, the national government mentioned the possibilities for 
further industrial activities related to LNG, such as cryogenics industries. 
It is important to emphasize that whilst such "external" socio-economic 
effects played a significant role in the Cabinet's final policy view, earlier 
governmental statements (e.g., Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.36-June 
1978) seem to have played down this factor. As far as the industrial use 
of cold energy from LNG activities is concerned, the government noted 
that the opportunities for cryogenic development could possibly be 
grater at a Maasvlakte site, than at Eemshaven. The opportunities for 
follow-on activities a t  Eemshaven were not considered large by the 
Cabinet in the short term (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr. 13, p.7 and p.18). 
A major socio-economic factor mentioned by the government in favor 
of an Eemshaven LNG site was, however, the so-called "psychological 
effect" of the actual use of Eemshaven, which was thought to help improve 
the economic climate in the region and stimulate economic activities 
(Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.9, p.36; Tweede Kamer 1978, p.12). In its final 
position the Cabinet stated that the selection of Eemshaven was based in 
particular upon considerations of regional economic policy and made in 
relation to the "necessary impulse" to the region in terms of employment 
(Tweede Kamer 1978, p.1.) The national government repeatedly under- 
lined the importance of regional industrial policy and the promotion of 
economic activities in regions such as Groningen, whch have traditionally 
seen slower industrial development compared to other parts of the Neth- 
erlands (e.g., Western regions). The Cabinet stated that the decision on 
the siting of a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven was made in that particular 
context; it also played a role in giving credibility to the government's 
regional industrial policy, aimed at attracting economic activities to less 
developed regions (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.12; 1978a, p.862). In relation to 
the Eemshaven site it is important to mention that LNG would be the first 
major use of the newly-constructed harbor (Tweede Kamer 1978a, p.862). 
The employment involved in the construction of the LNG ships, was 
considered by the national government not to affect the selection of a 
LNG terminal location, since the building of the LNG carriers was planned 
in the Rotterdam region--where Dutch shipbuilding industry is 
concentrated--regardless of the location of the LNG terminal (Tweede 
Kamer 1978, p.12). The following Table 4.37 summerizes the socio- 
economic aspects of the comparison between Various alternative LNG 
sites, as stated by the Dutch Cabinet (Tweede Kamer 1978, Bijlage 2). 
4.7.7. Environmental Impact 
The dimension of environmental impact played a minor role in rela- 
tion to the policy perspective of thenational government. As regards th.e 
desirability of importing LNG, from the viewpoint of environmental con- 
siderations, the national government acknowledged the act that natural 
gas, compared to other energy sources, is relatively "clean" and is there- 
fore preferred (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.5, p.8). Because of the limited 
perceived environmental problems of LNG (excluding safety) the dimen- 
sion of environmental impact seems to have played no significant role in 
the national government's position with respect to the policy choice 
between a Dutch versus a foreign LNG terminal. As regards the dimension 
of environmental impact in relation to the selection of a Dutch LNG termi- 
nal site, the national government based its position predominantly upon 
advice from ICONA (see section 4.2.5.5.) and ICMH (Tweede Kamer 14626, 
nr.9, p.21). The natural government concluded that there were no fun.da- 
mental objections attached to a LNG terminal sited at either of the two 
prominent land-based sites (Maasvlakte and Eemshaven) (Tweede Kamer 
14626, nr.6., p.2). 
A major area of environmental impact concerned the effect of a LNG 
terminal upon the Waddenzee environment, in case an Eemshaven termi- 
nal site was selected. In this respect the Dutch government ack- 
nowledged that LNG would have environmental consequences, but -it 
judged that compared to other industrial activities, a LNG terminal is 
relatively "clean" (Tweed Kamer 14626, nr.13, p.20). According to th.e 
Cabinet, studies had indicated that with "adequate provisions" a LNG ter- 
minal would not in itself create unacceptable environmental conse- 
quences (Tweede Kamer 1978a, p.866). 
Table 4.37. National government policy perspective socioeconomic aspects 
Notes: if multiveasel lanker proves Ieaaible 
** employment 125.O0Om3 LNG tanker oonstruction to Rijnrnond 
region-in all circumstances 
I !hcio-economic Aspects 
Alternative Sites 
Maasvlate B 
Eemshaven 
Maasvlate A 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam 
Island 
4 
Temporary 
employment 
(man years): 
LNG terminal 
+ lnlrastruc- 
t u r e  construc- 
tion 
5300-5900 
5600-6200 
4500-5050 
11280-13560 
15600-1 7400 
15000-15600 
Permanent 
employment 
(man years): 
exploitation 
termlnal 
50 
50 
40 
50 
50 
60 
Permanent 
employment 
(man years): 
maintenance 
infrastructure 
(dre&i%) 
-- 
70 
-- 
- 
- 
-- 
Regional Policy 
IrnplicaLions 
compensation 
possible of poten- 
tial negative 
eflects upon 
oil/petrochemical 
activities 
stimulus North 
Netherlands; 
prefer w.r.t, dis- 
tribution 
economic activi- 
ties. strong 
psychological 
eflec t 
as  Maasvlakte H 
Employment in 
shipbuilding** 
interesting pros- 
pects multivessel 
tanker* ** 
llmited prospects 
rnultivessel 
tanker*. 
interesting pros- 
pects multivessel 
tanker ** 
Attraclion follow- 
on activities 
limited 
very limited 
limited 
limited 
limited 
very limited 
As far as the comparison between Eemshaven and Maasvlakte LNG 
sites is concerned the Cabinet concluded in terms of the environment 
aspects (excluding safety), that the siting of a LNG terminal at 
Eemshaven would have greater negative environmental consequences, 
due to the required dredging, and taking into account the "special char- 
acter" of theMWaddenzee environment" (Tweede Kamer 1978, p.11). From 
the viewpoint of environmental impact, the national government there- 
fore concluded that a Maasvlakte LNG site should be preferred (Tweede 
Kamer 1978, p. 14). 
The following Table 4.38 summerizes the Cabinet's policy view with 
respect to the environmental impact of a LNG terminal at the various 
alternative sites (Tweede Kamer 1978, Bijlage 2). 
4.7.8. Cabinet/National Government Policy Perspective 
The h a 1  policy perspective of the national government indicated a 
perceived need for LNG importation via a Dutch LNG terminal, with 
Eemshaven as the preferred LNG terminal site. The dominant dimension 
mentioned by the national government underlying its final siting decision 
concerned socio-economics, in particular the positive effect siting at 
Eemshaven could have upon regional development and employment. A 
Land- based terminal was favored by the Dutch government mainly on the 
basis of cost considerations. Table 4.39 summerizes the policy position of 
the national government in terms of the implications of its dimensional 
views, as it was stated in of i c ia l  governmental publications. Table 4.40 
attempts to interpret the national government's position in terms of the 
relative weight attached to different dimensional aspects. 
4.8. Party Perspectives: Risk 
Table 4.41 summarizes the various party positions with respect to 
the acceptability of the risk and safety dimensions of LNG terminal siting. 
For further discussion of the risk aspects of Dutch LNG decision making 
that is not featured, reference is made to the Dutch Chapter in the IIASA 
final report on LEG siting (IIASA 1982). 
Table 4.38. National goverment site comparison - environmental impact. 
Notes: effecLs of terminal only 
** the positive eflects in case of restricted drninage from LNG and 
power station, through closed-circuit using heated cooling water 
, 
Source: Tweede Kamer 1978. Bijlage 2 
Environmental 
Impact 
Site 
Maasvlate B 
Eemshaven 
Maasvlakte A 
Maasvlakte C 
Voornedam 
Island 
OTTS 
Terminal water 
pollution through 
drainage chlori- 
dated. cold water 
some damage to 
organisms a t  sea- 
bed 
large damage to 
sea-bed organ- 
isms 
-------------- as  
some damage to 
sea-bed organ- 
isms 
limited damage to 
sea-bed organ- 
isms 
some damage 
sea-bed organ- 
isms 
Water pollution 
terminal in case 
of combination 
with electricity 
power station 
positive eflects 
through decreas- 
ing temperature 
and cNorine 
drainage 
large positive 
eflects through 
decreasing tem- 
perature and 
chlorine drainage 
Maasvlakte 
supposed not 
relevant 
not relevant 
not relevant 
Water pollution dredg- 
ing operations 
limited disruption sea- 
bed 
large disruption sea- 
bed; decreased primary 
production; chemical 
pollution 
site B 
incidental disruption 
limited; permanent 
distruption unknown 
incidental disruption 
limited; permanent disr- 
uption unknown 
sea-bed disruption 
absent? 
Noise and light eDacts; 
potential efTects 
disturbances for birds 
and seals 
- - -- - -. - - - . - -. 
- 118 - 
Table 4.39 Policy questions and dimensional impact 
KEY: + favorable 
o no preference 
I:] not consideredlnot relevant 
NOTES: * greater opportunities for larger LNG carriers, if required; 
** by implication from cost data; policy preference never explicitly stated 
stated in final governmental view; this dimension was dominant with 
respect to preference of land-based LNG terminal. 
Location LNG 
Terminal: Eemshaven 
or Maasvlakte? 
Maasvlakte* 
Maasvlakte**(?) 
o 
Eernshaven 
Maasvlakte 
Table 4.40. National government policy perspective. 
Dutch terminal 
desirable? 
+ 
o 
OIL] 
+ 
o/[l 
Policy 
Question 
Dimensions 
1, energy policy 
2. economics /cost 
3. health and safety 
4. socio-economics 
5. environmental 
impact 
Policy question Dominant dimensionfsr Outcome 
LNG importation 
desirable? 
+ 
+ 
01 [ I  
o/H 
o/[l 
I LNG import desirable? 1. energy policy yes  I 
I Dutch terminal desirable? 1. energy policy yes  1 
Land-based or off-shore 1. economics/cost Land-based 
te rrninal? 2. energy policy 
Location LNG terminal? 1. socioeconomics Eemshaven 
(Eemshaven or Maasvlakte?) 
Table  4.41. Risk P o s i t i o n s  o f  I n t e r e s t e d  P a r t i e s  Regarding t h e  
Nether lands '  LNG Decis ion.  
Additional Risk 
To Population 
Acceptable Too Uncertain Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Cabinet Zuid-Holland Zuid-Holland (North Sea) 
ICONA 
Parliament 
(majority 
Rotterdam 
Harbour 
Rotterdam 
Municipal 
Authorities 
Groningen 
Provincial 
and 
Municipal 
Authorities 
Provinci a1 Provincial Environmental 
Council Governors Group 
(Eemsmond) Rijnmond 
Environmental Local 
Group Authority 
Noordzee Minister fo r  
Environment a1 Health and 
Group Environmental 
Protection 
(minority view) 
Electr ici ty 
Corporation 
Groningen 
Key to risk positions: 
Group 1-Acceptable: Risks are negligibly small or acceptable in 
relation to the advantages of LNG; 
Group 2-Too uncertain: The risk analyses are too uncertain; too 
many underlying assumptions and contradictions; it is unacceptable 
to draw conclusions (at  this stage) further investigation of risk and 
alternative options should be pursued; 
Group 3-Additional risk-of LNG unacceptable for population: psycho- 
logical factor /percep tions of risk; at  least handling/ reception of LNG 
should not take place at Maasvlakte (parties in t h s  group did not 
express views on the acceptability of the risk at other locations, or 
absolute levels of acceptable risk) 
Group 4-Unacceptable: possible consequences of an accident are 
too large; reception/handling as well as storage of LNG on-shore is 
unacceptable. 

SECTION Ill: 
ANALYSIS OF DECISION PROCESS 
C W E R  5: 
DECISION STRUCTURE AND PARTY CONNECTIONS 
5.1. DECISION STRUCTURE 
Siting decisions and planing approval for large developments in the 
Netherlands would normally involve the (national) Ministry for Economic 
Affairs, and, at  the local level, the municipal and provincial authorities 
responsible for the area where siting is proposed. 
The most striking aspect of the LNG decision-making process was 
that these normal procedures only partially applied. The decision struc- 
ture and procedures with respect to LNG siting in comparison with "nor- 
mal" large-scale siting decisions different in two major respects: 
1. The early involvement of the national government at  a prelim- 
inary stage (i.e. before a formal application for a LNG terminal 
had been made by the eventual applicant, Gasunie), which 
related to 
(a) the role of the national government in activities of Gasunie 
as regards energy policy, and 
(b) concern about feasibility and acceptability of alternative 
LNG sites, (especially with respect to safety); and 
2. A special decision procedure which was designed by the national 
government in order to obtain "in principle" positions from 
relevant local authorities on acceptability of a LNG terminal, 
prior to the formal customary siting approval procedure at the 
local level. 
The result was an unusual combination between decision-making at  the 
national and the local level, with the national government taking the lead- 
ing role in relation to LNG planning and decisions. 
At the level of the national government, the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs in particular was involved a t  an early stage in the plans being con- 
sidered by Gasunie for the importation of LNG, as part of Dutch national 
gas supply policy. Gasunie is partly state-owned (see also section 4.5.2.), 
with formal connection with the Dutch government, and in particular with 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs' energy department. The minister for 
economic affairs generally approved and supported the Gasunie's plans 
for the importation of foreign natural gas (2e Kamer zitting 1978-79; Han- 
delingen 5, p.855, 26 October 1978). The ministry of economic affairs was 
directly involved in planning the corporate strategies of the Gasunie, 
within the context of Dutch energy policy and was therefore consulted on 
the desirability and feasibility of LNG terminal in the Netherlands. 
In addition to the involvement of the Ministry for Economic Affairs in 
relation to energy policy, the national government became involved in 
LNG siting, through the concern about feasibility and acceptability of a 
potential LNG terminal site in the Netherlands. Although no formal 
request had been made by Gasunie for a LNG terminal site in the early 
seventies, the national government was aware of discussions in 1972/73 
between Gasunie and LNG suppliers and the intention of Gasunie to 
import LNG. This awareness and concern on the part of the government 
triggered the national government to become involved more fully. In par- 
ticular, this led to the request (in 1974) by the Ministry for Social Affairs 
(with formal responsibility for safety, etc.) for research into the safety 
aspects of LNG by a special committee (Commissie Buschmann) and later 
TNO. The Netherlands Maritime Institute was asked by the national 
government to evaluate the nautical aspects of potential Dutch LNG sites. 
The decision process on LNG siting at the governmental level was 
subsequently moved into a new phase, when in 1975, Gasunie requested a 
formal view from the national government with respect to its plans of sit- 
ing a LNG terminal at  Maasvlakte, and more specifically (in relation to 
alternative sites) the possibility of a LNG terminal off-shore. When in 
governmental circles t h s  request was linked to stated interest (by indus- 
try) in an artificial industrial island in the North Sea (off the Dutch coast) 
developments led to the setting up of an interdepartmental steering 
group, STUNET, in 1975. With STUNET's first task to investigate the 
desirability and modalities involved in a possible LNG terminal in the 
North Sea, the role of the national government in LNG decision-making 
grew. 
Although matters relating to LNG within the government had up to 
then been concentrated within the Ministry of Economic Affairs (energy 
policy) and to some extent Social Affairs (safety), it was becoming 
increasingly clear that a LNG terminal was not solely a matter of respond- 
ing to Dutch energy policy (whch was the responsibility of the Ministry 
for Economic Affairs), but that it was a matter of broader concern, involv- 
ing issues such as health and safety, environmental planning, interna- 
tional shpping arrangements, etc. With the setting up of STUNET under 
the coordination of the Ministry for Traffic and Public Works, LNG moved 
to the interdepartmental level, involving a large number of ministerial 
departments, whch  recognized their respective responsibilities for dif- 
ferent aspects of LNG importation and handling. It was a first recognition 
that the ultimate decisions on LNG would eventually involve the level of 
the Cabinet--notwithstanding the responsibilities of local authorities with 
respect to site approval. 
STUNET was made responsible to ICONA, the inter-departmental 
coordination committee for  North Sea, taking the decision-making on LNG 
siting into an  inter-departmental structure. Such a structure was 
required in order to prepare Cabinet decisions concerning LNG, involving 
a considerable number of different ministries with departmental respon- 
sibilities. ICONA became the foremost interdepartmental group at  the 
level of the national government, concerning LNG. Involvement by the 
national government was further enhanced by introducing additional 
governmental "advisors" into the decision-making process, such as  the 
Interdepartmental Committee for Environmental Hygiene (ICMH) and the 
State Land Use Planning Commission (RPC)--reflecting governmental con- 
cern about environmental and land use planning, as well as safety. I t  was 
significant that ICONA incorporated representatives of practically all min- 
isterial departments. ICONA was to advise MICONA, a sub-committee to 
the Cabinet, which together with the Ministerial Council for land use plan- 
ing (RRO--Radvoor de Ruimtelijke Ordening), formed the final link to the 
Cabinet on decisions concerning LNG. 
The complicated governmental structure built around LNG decision- 
making (see Figure 5.1) ensured an  unusually h g h  degree of involvement 
1 Cabinet 1 
Minis ter ia l  
l eve l  
I Highest l eve l  o f f i c i a l  government 
----- 
advice 
Figure 5.1. Governmental structure of advisory and decisionmaking 
bodies on LNG. 
on the part of the national government in decision-making on LNG siting. 
In principle, the involvement in LNG decision-making by the national 
government could have been limited by involvement of the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs with respect to (i) approval of a contract for LNG impor- 
tation and (ii) approval of a selected LNG terminal site, withn the "selec- 
tive investment" legislation (SIR). If the national government had so 
decided, all other aspects of the decision-making as regards LNG siting 
could have been handled by the relevant local authorities, responding to 
requests for siting by Gasunie. 
At the local level of authorities contacts had been made between 
Gasunie and local authorities in the Rotterdam region, as well as the Har- 
bour Authorities, about a possible use of Maasvlakte for a LNG terminal. 
The Maasvlakte site had been Gasunie's preferred LNG-site from the start; 
a preference whch was later strengthened by the fact that the study by 
the Netherlands Maritime Institute concluded that it was the only feasible 
land-based LNG site in the Netherlands. This conclusion was later 
adopted by STUNET in its advice to ICONA (this was before the Eemshaven 
site was re-introduced in late 1977). 
A fundamental change in the decision-making process as regards the 
involvement of local authorities occurred in mid-1977 when Gasunie 
signed a LNG contract with Algeria, and the Ministry for Economic Affairs 
gave its approval. As a result of the limited time-scales specified in the 
side-letter to the contract as regards the location where the Algerian LNG 
would be imported, the national government decided to "interfere" in the 
normal decision procedure of local authorities. A special decision pro- 
cedure was designed by the national government, specifying the relation- 
s h p  between the national and local authorities and the timescales withn 
which the various decision steps were to take place (see Section 5.2). 
5.2. LNG DECISION PROCEDURE AND HlERARCHY 
In October 1977 it was decided by the Cabinet that a special decision 
procedure for LNG was required to take account of the various issues and 
parties involved. The design of a special procedure was preceded by two 
factors whch can be said to have set the context for subsequent decision 
events on LNG: 
1. Gasunie had signed a contract for the importation of LNG with 
Sonatrach with full approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
2. The deadline of 31st October 1978 for approval of a site for LNG 
terminal had introduced a critical time factor in the decision 
process. 
Withn these constraints, and in the interest of Dutch energy policy* 
it was imperative that the national ministerial departments and th.e 
Cabinet play a determining role in controlling of the decision procedures 
on LNG in order to attempt to  find a LNG terminal for the contracted LNG. 
The national government hereby began to play a more dominant role in 
defining the decision problem, setting its context and assigning responsi- 
bilities. 
*By this time Gasunie had also been given the official mandate by the national government to 
pursue contracts for the importation of LNG according to the official energy policy of 1974 
(Ehergienota-Tweede Ksmer 1974). 
The decision procedures designed by the national government for the 
LNG siting decision involved two levels. First, the preliminary selection of 
a candidate LNG site by the Cabinet based on advice from ICONA, STUNET, 
and others. Secondly, local authorities at  the provincial and municipal 
levels (in the area where LNG terminal was proposed) who were to 
respond officially to the government's proposals thereby indicated 
whether they would, in principle, approve a LNG terminal withn the con- 
text of environmental and other planning laws. It is of interest to note 
that at  the time this decision procedure for LNG was being drafted, the 
government was working with the assumption that the only group of local 
authorities they had to deal with, would be those responsible for the 
Maasvlakte sites (i.e.. Province of Zuid-Holland, Public Authority of Rijn- 
mond, and the City of Rotterdam), since governmental advisors (NMI, 
STUNET) had concluded Maasvlakte to be the only viable land-based LNG 
site.+ 
The major elements of the LNG decision procedures are depicted in 
Figure 5.2. The role of public participation or involvement of environmen- 
tal groups, unions, and other non-governmental organizations did not 
receive special attention in the national government's decision pro- 
cedure. By implication, however, public hearings and other channels for 
airing respective objections to regional developments would be included 
through customary decision procedures at the provincial and municipal 
levels. 
CAB INE T 
(council of ministers) 
MICONA 
s A 
noti f icat ion 
advance position ICONA advance position 
w 
Ministries 
( c i v i l  servants level) 
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Figure 5.2. Major elements of LNG governmental decision procedures. 
*At the time the decision procedure was being designed the national government had not yet 
officially rejected an island-terminal for LNG as a suitable option; in particular with respect 
to  the high cost and long lead-times of such an alternative, however, a land-based site seems 
t o  have been the government's first preference. 
The decision procedure was designed to receive an early position on 
LNG by the local authorities on the acceptability of a LNG terminal in its 
area of responsibility. Formal approval--at a later date--was still required 
by the local authorities withn their legal responsibilities concerning 
legislation on environmental planning, land use, construction, and 
environmental pollution. 
The decision procedure was designed by the national government 
against the background of the time-factor whch had been introduced by 
the agreement between Gasunie and the Algerian company Sonatrach. In 
particular, the Ministry for Economic Affairs was concerned about the 
implications of delay--withn its responsibility for Dutch energy policy. In 
this respect the position of energy department of the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs was in line with the interests of Gasunie, which, of 
course, was anxious to complete the required arrangements with respect 
to a LNG terminal and to finalize the LNG supply contract. 
An implication of the national concern with respect to energy policy 
was a relatively dominant role for the national government in setting the 
context for decision-making events, leading to the selection of a site for 
the LNG terminal. The result was the unusual situation that on the one 
hand the Cabinet was assigned the task of selecting a LNG terminal site 
and notifying the Algerian suppliers about its seemingly final decision, 
whilst on the other hand, final approval in the formal sense would still 
rest with the relevant local authorities at  a later date. Within the context 
of t h s  analysis, however, the final Cabinet decision (and subsequent 
approval by Parliament) is taken as the final step in the decision-making 
process on LNG in the Netherlands. 
Withn the Dutch decision-making procedure the national govern- 
ment was a t  the center of decision-power, with other parties providing 
official or unofficial advice and input. The list below (Table 5.1) provides a 
picture of the decision herarchy with respect to LNG policy-making, 
according to the decision powers of the various parties and the extent to 
which they were consulted by decision-makers, at more influential posi- 
tions. The different parties involved in making and influencing decisions 
concerning LNG fell broadly in three categories. 
Although the actual decision events did not necessarily reflect the 
relative positions in the decision hierarchy, as represented above, in the 
initial configuration of interested parties the national government did 
play a dominant role in setting the context for the final round of 
decision-making, in terms of problem definition, time-scales and the 
selection of interested parties which were assigned a place in the 
decision-making structure. 
Table 5.1. Decision Hierarchy LNG Policy-Making Parties 
I. Cabinet 
(ICONA) /Ministerial Departments (Civil Service level) 
Parliament 
11. Local Authorities 
Officially appointed advisory bodies/organizations 
Gasunie 
Parliamentary Committees 
111. Public Interest Groups 
Trade Unions 
Environmental Organizations 
Individuals 
5.3. PROBLEM EMPHASIS BY THE NATIONAL GOYERNMENT 
The national government was not merely the final decision-making 
authority on LNG siting, but was also the main party responsible for 
designing the decision procedure, formulating the problem and setting 
the contextual background for the LNG decision process, and t h s  had 
implications for the extent of involvement of different interested parties 
in the decision process. 
The national government designed the special decision procedure in 
late 1977 against the background of a set of contextual factors, whch 
included the following: 
-- Gasunie was anxious to find a LNG terminal in order to finalize 
the LNG contract with Algeria, withn Dutch energy policy objec- 
tives; 
-- Gasunie was in favor of siting a LNG terminal at  Maasvlakte, but 
also showed interest in possible use of Wilhelmshaven; 
- ICONA had advised the Cabinet that an island-terminal could not 
be completed in time to meet the first delivery date of the con- 
tracted LNG supplied by Algeria (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr.3, 
p.9). 
Within the government, the Ministry for Economic Affairs had furthermore 
indicated that use of a foreign LNG terminal was less appropriate to con- 
sider, since a Dutch terminal was preferred from the viewpoint of employ- 
ment (Tweede Kamer 14626, nr. 5, p.7). I t  is important to note that the 
Ministry for Economic Affairs was the main government department in 
charge of industrial/employment policy, in addition to its responsibility 
for energy policy. Other government statements following the approval of 
the Algerian LNG deal, in October 1977, indicated that  of the land-based 
LNG alternatives, Maasvlakte was considered to be the preferred site, 
because of its proximity to major Dutch gas users and the nautical and 
practical objections to alternative LNG sites (e.g., Eemshaven) (Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr.5, p.7/8). 
By October 1977, when the Cabinet was first involved in the siting 
decision on LNG, the national government was far from announcing an 
agreed policy position with respect to the siting of a LNG terminal. 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned factors reveal some sort of "impera- 
tive" in favor of a land-based LNG site at  Maasvlakte. This can perhaps be 
understood, given the dominant role of energy policy withn whch the 
LNG siting issue (in relation to  the Algerian contract) had first been intro- 
duced; in the early stage of governmental decision-making on LNG (1977) 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs played an important role. The Ministry 
for Economic Affairs' energy department seems to  have been the main 
government department which had direct interest in meeting the October 
31, 1978, deadline for the selection of a LNG terminal, in order to secure 
the delivery of Algerian LNG. The Economic Affairs Ministry was aware of 
the formal contacts which had already taken place between Gasunie and 
Rotterdam local authorities about Maasvlakte and given the limited 
timescales available, a Maasvlakte site provided the best prospects for 
completing the designed decision procedure in time (in addition to the 
apparent cost-advantages of Maasvlakte). 
At the time the special decision procedure was formulated by the 
national government--in late 1977--the "problem definition" used, 
included all possible LNG sites, land-based, off-shore and foreign. The 
"imperative" towards a Maasvlakte LNG site was, however, reflected n the 
attention the national government seems to have paid to consultation 
with the relevant local authorities (City of Rotterdam, Public Authority 
Rijnmond, and Province Zuid-Holland) in comparison to investigation of 
other potential alternative options. The decision procedure followed by 
the national government (based on advice from RPC) indicated the impor- 
tance of continual assessment of the option of a foreign LNG terminal, but 
i t  is clearly suggested that the feasi.bility of a Dutch LNG terminal should 
be preferred (RPC 1977). 
Whilst ICONA and other governmental bodies (ICMH, RPC) were 
requested in the period October/November 1977 by the national govern- 
ment to further investigate the various options for a LNG terminal, the 
special decision procedure seemed to emphasize the various arrange- 
ments involved in approval of a Dutch land- based terminal, in particular, 
a t  Maasvlakte. Thls emphasis was reflected in the institutional contacts 
between the national government and other major interested parties as it 
developed in the  course of the decision-making process. The following 
section attempts to identify the role of the national government amidst 
the network of interested parties and to discuss their inter-relationshp. 
5.4. INTERACTION BEXWEXN INTEHESI'ED PAHTlES 
Up to the end of 1977 four main interested parties had been involved 
in the preparation for LNG decision-making: 
-- national government /cabinet 
-- STUNET/ICONA 
-- Gasunie 
-- Local Authorities Rotterdam 
When assessing the changing inter-relationships between these parties it 
is important to take account of the dynamics of the LNG events and to 
compare the different institutional arrangements a t  some of the crucial 
decision points, as formulated in Section 2.3. * 
Gasunie initiated plans for a possible LNG terminal and had contacts 
in t h s  context with the national government (Ministry for Economic 
Affairs--Energy Dept.), and the City of Rotterdam Harbour authorities (see 
Figure 5.3). 
N a t i o n a l  
G o v e r n m e n t  
L o c a l  A u t h o r i t i e s :  
R o t t e r d a m  H a r b o u r  
Figure 5.3. 
Also in 1975 STUNET is set up (later made responsible to ICONA) with 
representatives of various government departments. Gasunie provided 
some technical in-put to STUNET. Gasunie also had observer-status in 
LNG Terminal Working Group. the basic institutional network remained 
unchanged in the period 1975 to June 1977. the contact between Gasunie 
and the Harbour Authorities of Rotterdam intensified and feasibility for a 
LNG terminal at Maasvlakte are started by the Harbour Authorities follow- 
ing the application for a construction permit by Gasunie in February 
*Developments prior to  1875, such as the involvement of the Ministry for Social Affairs and 
the safety and nautical studies carried out by TNO and NMI bear relevance to the LNG issue, 
but they did not play a direct role in terms of initiating and approving decision on the siting 
of the LNG terminal. Similarly, the important contextual event of the adoption of a Dutch 
governmental gas importing policy in 1874, is not discussed in the context of this particular 
section. 
June 1977 
Gasunie signed a contract with Algeria for the importation of LNG, 
starting in 1984, a terminal had to be found by November, 1978. Follow- 
ing this contract, the Ministry of Economic Affairs had to decide upon 
approval of the agreement made by Gasunie, and the national government 
becomes more deeply involved. In preparation of its decision, the Minis- 
try of Economic Affairs held preliminary &scussions with the three local 
authorities responsible for an approval of a LNG site a t  the Maasvlakte: 
the City of Rotterdam, Rijnmond Public Authority, and the Province of 
Zuid-Holland. Contacts between the Gasunie and the local authorities 
similarly intensified (see Figure 5.4). 
Nat iona l  
Government 
Local ~ u t h o r i t i e s :  
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Figure 5.4. 
October 1977 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs approved the Gasunie-Sonatrach 
LNG contract; the national government (via RPC) started with the design 
of a local and national government procedure for the approval of a LNG 
terminal site. In the period October and November 1977, various formal 
and informal discussions took place involving the major parties. In this 
period the respective interests and policy positions with regard to LNG 
importation and siting started to "crystalize." Table 5.2 summarizes the 
various views at  this point. 
December 1977 
Concerned about the perceived "delays" in the decision-making pro- 
cess by the local authorities responsible for the Maasvlakte site, Gasunie 
approached Delfzijl Harbour authorities (Delfzijl 1978, p.1). The purpose 
of the contact was to open discussions on the possibility for an alternative 
LNG site (other than Maasvlakte) for the Gasunie, in case the approval of 
a Maasvlakte LNG site would endanger the deadline for the decision (of 31 
October 1978) to  be made. From the respective positions on the accepta- 
bility of a LNG terminal at the Maasvlakte, it is clear that among the main 
parties, the view of Rijnmond Public Authority, constituted the strongest 
objections to Gasunie's initial plans of siting a terminal at Maasvlakte 
Table 5.2 
Dutch LNG ter- I== 
rninal re- 
quire d,  
Maasvlate site 
preferred 
A new interested party was thus introduced in the decision process 
through dealings initiated by the Gasunie. Following initial feasibility stu- 
dies, including a risk analysis by TNO--focusing upon the Eemshaven site- 
-the Groningen local authorities established formal contact with the 
national government to argue in favor of a LNG site at Eemshaven (see 
Figure 5.5). 
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Figure 5.5. 
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The position taken by the local authorities of Qroningen was clear 
from the start: because of the perceived socio-economic benefits of a 
LNG terminal, they strongly favored a LNG terminal at Eemshaven. In the 
first quarter of 1978 Groningen provincial governors established extensive 
contacts with the national government, to press for the inclusion of 
Eemshaven in the formal decision procedure for LNG, which had until that 
point only considered the Maasvlakte as viable site for a LNG terminal. 
The government's response came in March 1978 when the Cabinet 
announced its preliminary policy position, which stated that in addition to 
the Maasvlakte sites A and B, the Eemshaven site was not "ruled out" 
(Tweede Kamer 14626, nr. 6, p.2). Following this preliminary policy 
not yet for- 
ICONA 
LNG terminal 
terminal at  
Maasvlakte 
about safety 
to local pw 
pulation 
LNG terminal 
at  
Maasvlakte 
mulated a t  
Maasvlakte 
or off-shore 
announcement, the local authorities concerned with the Maasvlakte and 
Eemshaven, were incorporated in the special decision procedure and 
were given until July ls t ,  1978, to prepare their respective cases for con- 
sideration by the Cabinet. 
In the period July to 25th August 1978, when the Cabinet took its final 
decision on the siting of the LNG terminal, the basic institutional network 
of interested parties did not change. However, contacts between the 
national government on the one hand and local authorities around Rotter- 
dam and in Groningen intensified in this period after the local authorities 
had decided upon their policy positions, which were made known to the 
Cabinet by early July 1978. 
In the period leading up to the final Cabinet decision on LNG siting. 
discussions took place at the formal level between Cabinet ministers (i.e., 
representatives of ministerial departments) and delegations from the 
local authorities responsible for Maasvlakte and Eemshaven sites, and 
with representatives of Gasunie. Additionally, the three main non- 
governmental parties (the two relevant local authorities and Gasunie) 
took the opportunity to establish contacts with the national government 
and Cabinet, using various formal and informal channels to influence the 
outcome of the decision process. The personal contacts between the pro- 
vincial Governor of Groningen (Commissaris van de Koningin) and some 
key Cabinet ministers provide a significant illustrative example of the for- 
mal and informal contacts which were exploited by various parties, in the 
period of discussions by the national government leading up to the 
Cabinet decision. 
After the Cabinet decision was announced, in preparation of the par- 
liamentary debate on LNG, parliamentary committees became more 
directly involved in the decision process.* 
A special parliamentary committee on LNG (Committee 14626) was 
set up in 1078 and had a series of meetings with representatives of the 
leading parties (national government, Gasunie, local authorities 
Groningen, City of Rotterdam, Public Authority Rijnmond, Province of 
Zuid-Holland) as well as with nautical experts (from NMI, KNRV, and other 
organizations) and representatives of environmental groups (included in 
Werkgroep Noordzee collaborative--see Section 4.6.3) (Tweede Kamer 
14626, nr.12, p.1). The implications for the institutional set-up of 
interested parties is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
Prior to the Cabinet decision on LNG, several ("minor") interested 
parties, such as environmental groups (including those heard by parlia- 
mentary committees, included in the dotted box in Figure 5.6) were only 
part of the institutionalized decision structure, via public hearings held at 
the local level. Additionally, these parties communicated with the 
national and local government, the Cabinet and parliamentary represen- 
tatives through correspondence and other consulted or unconsulted con- 
tacts, as a means of influencing the outcome of the LNG decision process. 
'Parliament and parliamentary committees had been informed about various developments 
concerning LNG all through the decision-making period, but it was not until after the 
Cabinet's decision that Parliament was institutionalized in actual decision-making, and was 
given the opportunity t o  exercise its power. 
In the context of t h s  analysis the LNG decision-making process ended in 
the configuration of parties as represented in Fgure 5.6, when Parlia- 
ment effectively approved the Cabinet decision to site a Dutch LEG termi- 
nal at  Eemshaven (31 October 1978). 
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CHAPTER 6: 
PARTY INTERESTS: STRATEGIES AND CONFLlCTS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous sections have discussed how the interested parties 
involved in the LNG debate in the Netherlands took up different positions 
with respect to the question of LNG terminal siting and the place they 
were "assigned" in the decision structure. The respective party positions 
ultimately relate to the different responsibilities and perceived interests 
of the parties. This chapter attempts to assess the different strategies 
used by the major interested parties to support their respective positions 
and to identify what arguments and channels of communications were 
used to influence the final decision on LNG--keeping in mind the decision 
structures, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
In addition to the formal and informal relationships between the vari- 
ous interested parties, they can be mapped according to their positions 
with respect to the LNG siting questions--both in terms of problem defini- 
tion and in terms of dimensional preferences. An attempt is made to 
identify the areas of conflict between (groups of) interested parties and 
to map what alliances developed around common areas of interest. The 
different party interests crystallized distinctly in 1978, when the discus- 
sion on LNG siting narrowed down to a "political battle" between pro- 
ponents of a LNG terminal at Maasvlakte and Eemshaven respectively; a 
major part of the following analysis therefore focuses upon the events of 
this final period of 10 months in 1978. 
The period before 1978, however, also contained some key events, 
involving important alliances and conflicts between some of the 
interested parties. 
6.2. ALLIANCES AND CONFLICTS 
As discussed in Section 2.3., an important event took place in 
October 1977, when the Ministry for Economic Affairs approved the con- 
tract between Gasunie and Sonatrach for the importation of LNG (as 
signed 4 months previously). This ministerial approval set the scene for 
the subsequent decision process, among other thngs because it effec- 
tively endorsed the time restrictions of the LNG contract, whch specified 
that a decision on the location of a LNG terminal had to be taken by 31st 
October 1978. This approval was the result of close contact between the 
(Department for Energy of the) Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Gasunie. The Ministry for Economic Affairs (Energy Department) and 
Gasunie were in agreement on two important policy issues: (1) the need 
for LNG imports to secure Dutch energy supply, and (2) the need to find a 
LNG terminal within the specified period which initially suggested prefer- 
ence for Rotterdam Harbor area, as the site for the LNG terminal. 
It was clear that both Gasunie and the energy department of the Min- 
istry of Economic Affairs favored a Maasvlakte site, because, in addition 
to dimensional arguments in favor of Maasvlakte, this option seemed to 
provide the best prospects for ensuring that the deadline for the Sona- 
trach contract could be met. In 1977, however, no agreement was yet 
reached between the different ministerial departments as to the final 
position of the national government with respect to the preferred LNG 
site and several options and aspects were still being investigated. The 
lack of consensus at his stage also related to the different responsibilities 
of national ministries with respect to the policy discussion on LNG. Table 
6.1 shows the respective areas of responsibility of various relevant minis- 
tries. 
The lack of (initial) consensus between ministries, in 1977, was illus- 
trated by the minority view attached to the October 1977 ICONA policy 
advice (ICONA 1977) by the representative of the Minister for Health and 
E&ronmental Protection, indicating doubts about the desirability of LNG 
importation and objections on grounds of safety considerations to LNG 
siting at Maasvlakte. Despite these reservations, the advice given by 
ICONA, i.e., the col lec t ive  view of the relevant ministries, indicated a 
preference for Maasvlakte as far as a land- based  terminal was con- 
cerned. A t  this stage a decision in favor of a Maasvlakte site would thus 
have been in agreement with the interests of Gasunie and Rotterdam Har- 
bour Authority and consistent with advice from ICONA. 
In the second half of 1977, however, a potential area of conflict began 
to surface with respect to Gasunie's plans for siting a LNG terminal in the 
Rotterdam area. This involved the local authorities responsible for this 
area, who as early as the summer of 1977 (before the approval for the 
LNG contract was granted) had met with the ministries for economic 
affairs and social affairs respectively, to  discuss the acceptability of 
Table 6.3 
Economic Affairs I Energy supply and regional industrial policy* I 
Ministry 
Transport and 
Public Works 
Areas of Responsibility 
Waterways, Shipping, North Sea activities 
Social Affairs I Safety*, I 
Health and Environ- 
mental Protection 
Housing and 
Planning 
Environmental impact and safetye* 
*In 1977 the main department withh the Ministry for Economic Affairs dealing with LNG was 
the energy department. 
**At the time of LNG decision-making there existed a potential conflict between the minis 
tries for social affairs and public health/environrnent about the demarcation of responsibili- 
ties, in relation to safety. 
Gasunie's plans to site the LNG terminal in the Rotterdam area. Through 
these meetings as well as via press and other statements by officials of 
Public Authority Rijnmond and some critical Rotterdam City Councillors, 
the less than enthusiastic positions of some factions of the local authori- 
ties (esp. Rijnrnond Public Authority) began to surface. Gasunie and the 
(energy department of the) ministry for economic affairs became con- 
cerned about the possible delays caused by lengthy discussions at  the 
local authorities level about LNG and potential time-consuming public 
debates on the subject. 
Mostly as a result of the surfacing opposition and possible delays with 
respect to approval of Rotterdam LNG site, the Gasunie took the initiative 
to approach Delfzijl Harbor authorities to open discussions on the feasibil- 
ity of Eemshaven for the siting of a LNG terminal. The positive response 
by the Groningen local authorities is well known and has been reported on 
earlier. Contacts between Gasunie and Groningen Province were facilitied 
by the fact that Gasunie's headquarters are located here, and the fact 
that the Royal Commissioner for Groningen is, through its statutory right, 
also the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Gasunie. It is important to 
note that despite the close contacts between Gasunie and the province of 
Groningen, Gasunie, followed the strategy of proclaiming itself strongly in 
favor of a Rotterdam LNG terminal (see section 6.2.4) while keeping the 
option open to shift to  Eemshaven at a later date, but strictly as a second 
choice. 
In March 1978, the national government announced its preliminary 
policy position with respect to LNG siting, indicating that it definitely 
included in its final selection Maasvlakte sites A and B, whlst, "for the 
moment, the Delfzijl-Eemshaven location was not excluded" (Tweede 
Kamer 14626, nr .  6, p.2). The policy position clearly emphasized that the 
national government gave preference to a Dutch, Land- based LNG termi- 
nal. The preliminary policy announcement signaled the s tar t  of the spe- 
cial decision procedure of consultation with the relevant local authorities. 
As the selection process had now largely been reduced to a choice 
between two alternative LNG sites, the conflicts and alliances between dif- 
ferent interested parties were becoming increasingly pronounced. 
As indicated in section 2.2, the policy process on LNG was concen- 
trated in two interrelated questions: that of siting of a LNG terminal in 
the Netherlands and that of the exact location of such a terminal. As 
local authorities began to  debate their respective .positions on LNG siting 
in early 1978, general consensus on the first policy question had been 
reached by ICONA and the national government. The national government 
in particular had already made it clear that  its official policy was in favor 
of LNG importation and preferred the use of a Dutch LNG terminal. This 
position, of course, formed the basis of the procedure whereby the local 
authorities were to restrict their discussions to the policy question of 
acceptance of a LNG terminal in their area. At the local level, the ques- 
tion of the need for LNG importation or for a Dutch terminal was largely 
kept out of the debate within local authorities; it was only raised by some 
environmental opposition groups and some parliamentary parties. The 
conflicting parties on the first policy question may thus be pictured as 
below (excluding local authorities). (See Table 6.2). (It must be noted 
Table 6.2. Policy question 1: LNG importation in the Netherlands? 
that as the question of LNG importation was being debated, some parties 
restricted the discussion to the need to import the contracted gas from 
A.lgeria in liquefied form; on the subject of the need for LNG importation 
in general, the Cabinet and parliament had in fact already agreed to this 
in 19?4/?5 within the context of the Dutch policy paper on energy 
(Ene~~ienota--Tweede Kamer 1974) .) 
Desirable 
ICONA 
Gasunie 
Cabinet 
AER - Energy Council 
Undesirable 
Environmental groups 
(some) parliamentary opposition parties 
As regards the second policy question of siting of the Dutch LNG ter- 
minal two alternative areas were being debated in 1978: Maasvlakte vs. 
Eemshaven. Among the major interested parties the divisional prefer- 
ences could be noted as shown in Table 6.3. The implication of policy 
question 1 is that some interested parties were against both Eemshaven 
and Maasvlakte as a LNG terminal site (for details of party positions refer- 
ence is made to Chapter 4). 
Table 6.3. Policy Question 2: Site for LNG Terminal? 
Maasdakte Eemshaven 
Province of Zuid-Holland 
Not all of the above-mentioned interested parties involved them- 
selves in equal degree in attempting to influence the outcome of the deci- 
sion process, e.g. by applying pressure upon (some) ministerial depart- 
ments and the cabinet, in order "to force" a decision in their favor. In 
some cases institutional links with the national government already 
existed such as the contacts between Gasunie and the Energy department 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the direct link between ICONA and 
the Cabinet, to whom the former was responsible. It is of significance 
here to  emphasize the policy advice to  the Cabinet given by ICONA in June 
1978, in favor of a Maasvlakte site; ICONA was, after all the "closest" advi- 
sor to  the Cabinet, the main policy advisory body which incorporated a 
co-ordinated view from all relevant ministerial departments. 
As the discussion on LNG siting narrowed to a choice between a 
Maasvlakte site or a site a t  Eemshaven, two major (groups of) interested 
parties involved themselves actively in trying to influence the cabinet's 
policy decision on LNG to their advantage: the collective local authorities 
in the province of Groningen, and the City of Rotterdam. These (groups 
of) interested parties put forward specific arguments and used tactical 
approaches, in  order to emphasize the advantage of the Eemshaven area 
and the Maasvlakte respectively. 
Groningen local authorities (collectively) 
Rijnmond Public Authority 
(only in favor of 
storage of LNG) 
City of Rotterdam 
ICONA 
Trade union movement 
6.2.1. Local Authorities Groningen 
The local authorities of Groningen were very successful in mobilizing 
a common front of local interested parties in favor of a LNG terminal in 
Eemshaven. Ths included, in addition to the governors and council of the 
province of Groningen, the city councils of towns in the Eemshaven area 
(Uithuizermeeden and Delfzijl), the provincial Chamber of Commerce, and 
trade unions organizations. Additionally, the Royal Commissioner of 
Groningen played an important role in leading the proponents of an 
Eemshaven LNG terminal. 
Major channels of communication be tween Groningen local authori- 
ties and the national decision-makers were threefold: 
(1) to respective ministerial departments (letters and other con- 
tacts) 
(2) to members of parliament (letters and other contacts) 
(3) to party political allies. 
With respect to the political party alliances it must be noted that the 
Royal Commissioner of Groningen belonged to the same political party 
(VVD) as the ministers responsible in the cabinet for economic affairs, 
public health/environment, and Traffic and Public Works--three key min- 
isterial departments in the LNG debate. The fact that the commissioner 
had been a cabinet minister in previous governments, illustrates the 
extent of close contact with national governmental circles. 
It is significant that between June and October 1978 the Province of 
Groningen published no less than four official publications outlining its 
position on the LNG terminal at Maasvlakte, whch were subsequently sent 
to ministers and members of parliament. 
The major arguments put forward in favor of an Eemshaven LNG ter- 
minal can be summarized as follows (based on publications and state- 
ments by Groningen local authorities): 
1. LNG terminal will provide social-economic stimulus for Province 
of Groningen, through employment benefits and the attraction 
for further industrial activities; 
2. National regional economic policy has stressed importance of 
stimulating industrial activities in the province of Groningen 
(where unemployment rate is more than 50% higher than 
national average); 
3. Eemshaven is cornerstone of regional industrial policy in 
Groningen and LNG project will provide opportunity for the 
national government to show it is serious about promoting 
industrial activities in this area; 
4. LNG activity is essential for the future of Eemshaven, whereas at 
Maasvlakte it would represent no more than 3% of goods activi- 
ties in Rotterdam harbor area; 
5. Eemshaven LNG terminal will result in less interference with 
other shpping activities, compared to the Rotterdam area; 
6. Lower risk to neighboring population, compared to Maasvlakte 
site. 
As the above list illustrates, the brunt of the arguments put forward 
by the Groningen local authorities relate to the socio-economic advan- 
tages of a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven. Partly these arguments had a pol- 
itical dimension, i.e ., to convince the national government/Cabinet that it 
should show its political will to actively support a regional (industrial) pol- 
icy in favor of the less developed (northern) areas of the country. Addi- 
tionally, an attempt was made to discredit the arguments which were 
being put forward by the proponents of a LNG terminal at Maasvlakte (see 
below). 
6.2.2. City of Rotterdam 
The City of Rotterdam was the main interested party involved in put- 
ting pressure upon the national government to select Maasvlakte as the 
LNG terminal site, especially during the final months leading up to the 
cabinet decision in August 1978. The position of the proponents of a 
Maasvlakte terminal was made considerably more difficult by the fact 
that it was unable to present a common line of arguments, shared also by 
the other two main local authorities, Public Authority Rijnmond and the 
Province of Zuid-Holland. 
Whlst the province of Zuid-Holland seems to have kept itself out of 
further discussion after July 1978, following subnlission of its official posi- 
tion vis-a-vis LNG to the Cabinet, Public Authority Rijnmond was unable to 
engage in a pro-Maasvlakte "campaign" since it had pronounced itself 
against importation of LNG at  Maasvlakte (distinct from LNG storage). As 
the pressure upon the national government intensified from the 
Groningen local authorities in favor of the Eemshaven site, the City of 
Rotterdam was thus the only interested party which was in a position to 
wholeheartedly put its weight behind a Maasvlakte site for LNG. Spurred 
by the interest of the Rotterdam Harbor authorities, the mayor and ald- 
ermen of Rotterdam became the main interested party whch continued 
to argue in favor of the Maasvlakte site. The arguments put forward by 
the City of Rotterdam in a document on LNG published three weeks prior 
to the final cabinet meeting decision on the siting of LNG can be summar- 
ized as follows: 
1. LNG can bring increased employment to Rotterdam area at a 
time of decreased economic activity (especially with respect to 
oil operations) which endangers Rotterdam harbor as energy 
distribution centre of Europe; 
2. Rotterdam harbor is safest place to import LNG; risk of colli- 
sions is smaller than at Eemshaven; 
3 ,  Rotterdam harbor can accommodate all sizes of LNG tankers 
foreseen, has large number of m.oders navigational aids, is used 
to handle large ships and has no restrictions resulting from lim- 
ited depth of shipping waters; 
4. Cost of LNG terminal a t  Rotterdam is 700 million guilders lower 
than Eemshaven site (assuming 12 x 10'm3 LNG/year imports) 
whilst required infrastructure is already available at  Maasvlakte; 
5. Major users of natural gas are in the western part of the Nether- 
lands around Rotterdam; 
6. There is no prospect for large-scale industrial development 
around any newly-developed sea harbor and the bad industrial 
infrastructure in Groningen limit chances for LNG related indus- 
trial activities in that region. 
Several of the positive aspects of a LNG terminal at Maasvlakte had 
also been stressed by lCONA and Gasunie. The critical comments by the 
Dutch ship-owners' association with respect to the nautical feasibility of 
an Eemshaven LNG site (see Section 4.6.7), also contributed to the pres- 
sures in favor of a LNG terminal at  Maasvlakte. 
6.2.3. Further conflicts 
The conflicts between proponents of Eemshaven and Rotterdam 
respectively did not limit themselves to the various parties mentioned 
above, but also extended to governmental circles. It is known that an 
internal conflict existed within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the 
one hand there was the department responsible for energy policy, which 
continued to be in favor of a Maasvlakte site, whilst the department for 
regional economic policy had chosen to side with the local authorities of 
Groningen, arguing in favor of the Eemshaven site. 
As regards further disagreement involving ministerial departments 
the major dissenting view--to the coordinated advice in favor of 
Maasvlakte--had come from the ministry for public health and the 
environment, who a t  the time of the first two ICONA report (October 1977 
and February 1978) had been critical about the acceptability of a LNG 
terminal at Maasvlakte from the point of view of risk and safety. It was 
not announced by ICONA to what extent the Eemshaven site was deemed 
more acceptable in this respect. 
6.2.4. Gasunie 
The position of Gasunie is characterized by the fact that  by and large 
it did not involve itself in the process of shifting attention to the 
Eemshaven site. Gasunie continued to stress the economic, and energy 
policy advantages of a Maasvlakte site. Gasunie, however, seemed to have 
turned away from the direct policy discussion as regards Eemshaven  
v e m w  Maasulakte as the debate continued in 1978. Gasunie considered 
the siting decision to be one which could only be taken at  the level of 
national government. It is important in this respect to note that Gasunie 
had made it clear that any decision in favor of the more expensive 
Eemshaven site, should not involve hgher  costs for Gasunie, but should 
be carried by the government. 
The strategy followed by the Gasunie, during the course of the deci- 
sion process in late 1977 and in 1978 involved a great deal of confidence 
about the expected position taken by the ministry for economic affairs 
and ultimately the cabinet. The general consensus was that the 
discussion on LNG siting was taking place against the background of 
Dutch energy policy, which would almost certainly ensure that the import 
of Algerian (and other foreign) LNG would be endorsed by the Cabinet. 
Backed by the imperative of security of Dutch energy supply, as  outlined 
in the governmental policy, Gasunie was confident that the Dutch cabinet 
would operate within a "boundary condition," whereby the importation of 
the contracted LNG would go ahead. Within such a context the Cabinet 
would not see it in its interest to stall the arrangements l e a d w  to 
delivery of LNG by Algeria in 1983, and beyond. Consequently Gasunie was 
able to continue its strong support in favor of Rotterdam, thereby relying 
on either one of the following two actions by the Cabinet: 
(1) selection of Maasvlakte, after local objections to LNG had been 
effectively overcome; or 
(2) selection of Eemshaven, if a LNG site a t  Maasvlakte seemed 
impossible to  acheve within the required timescales as a result 
of (political) opposition. 
As long as the Cabinet would take the position that a positive deci- 
sion on either Maasvlakte or Eemshaven had to be taken, the Gasunie had 
little interest in involving itself in finding a politically acceptable site for a 
LNG terminal, leaving this task entirely to preparatory activities of min- 
isterial departments and Cabinet ministers. This explains why the 
Gasunie involved itself only to a very limited degree in the discussion on 
LNG in the months leading up to the final decision. 
6.3. PARLIAMENTAKY DEBATE 
The role of parliament increased in the period following the Cabinet's 
decision to site the LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven, and leading up to the 
parliamentary debate (25, 26 and 31 October 1978). Despite the attempts 
by proponents of both Maasvlakte and Eemshaven to involve members of 
parliament in such a way as to see their respective interests represented, 
Parliament debated LNG in a wider context, without creating signiFicant 
alliances with major interested parties as regards the exact  location of a 
LNG terminal. It may be significant in this respect that  a full parliamen- 
tary debate took place only once, a t  the very end of the  decision-making 
process. Despite the fact that parliamentary committees had been given 
the opportunity to question Cabinet ministers during the preceding 
year(s), the parliamentary debate on LNG involved a discussion on a 
broad set  of issues including the need for natural gas imports, the condi- 
tions under which the Sonatrach LNG contract was signed, as well as more 
specific issues relating to siting 
The parliamentary debate on LNG focused upon .the following majw 
aspects (Tweede Kamer 1978a): 
- the need for importing l iquefied n a t u r a l  gas; 
- the lack of attention to the option of importing (Algerian) gas via 
pipeline to the Netherlands; 
the role of the factor time in the decision-making process and 
the late involvement of Parliament; 
the safety aspects; the acceptability of risk involved in LNG; 
the "questionable" positive effect which may be expected in 
terms of employments and additional economic activities from 
the location of a LNG terminal at  Eemshaven; 
the extent to which a decision on the siting of a Dutch LNG ter- 
minal could be postponed. 
Several motions were debated calling for the national government to 
reconsider its decision and/or to  postpone a final decision on LNG siting, 
to  enable further investigation of alternative options. These motions did 
receive some support mainly from those who either (i) preferred alterna- 
tives involving natural gas via pipeline rather than LNG, or (ii) objected to 
the Cabinet's selection of Eemshaven. A majority of Parliament, however, 
voted against these motions, and thereby effectively endorsed the 
Cabinet's decision to site a LNG terminal a t  Eemshaven. 
Delfzijl 1977 "LNG naar de Eemshaven," letter Havenschap Delfzijl 
to Raad van Bestuur, Havenschap Delfzijl, 28 Febru- 
ary 1978. 
Eemsmond 1978a Kommentaar  op eventuele ves t ig ing van L N G  
t e rmina l  in Eemshaven,  werkgroep Eemsmond, 27 
April 1978, 9p. 
Eemsmond 1978b Kommentaar  op de  voorgenomen ves t ig ing van een 
LNG t e rmina l  in Nederland,  Werkgroep Eemsmond, 
19 October 1978, lop. 
EGD 1978 "LNG Terminal Eemshaven," letter to Provincial 
Authority of Groningen (Gedeputeerde Staten), Elec- 
triciteitsbedrijf voor Groningen en Drenthe, 2 May 
1978, lp. 
Letter ministry for economic affairs to  STUNET; in 
Tweede Kamer 14626, nr. 3,  bijlage 1. 
FNV 1978 Eemshaven  . .. energiehaven- - Het L.N. G.- projekt ,  
e e n  werkeli jke s tar t! ,  FNV distrikt Noord, 28 Febru- 
ary 1978, 1 lp.  
Gasunie 1978a Jaanlers lag  1977, NV Nederlandse Gasunie, 1978. 
Gasunie 1978b 
Gasunie 1978c 
Gasunie 1978d 
Groningen 1978a 
Groningen 1978b 
Groningen 1978c 
Groningen 1978d 
Groningen 1978e 
Groningen 1978f 
Groningen 1978g 
"How LNG fits in Dutch gas planning" paper 
presented by Ir. G. Kardaun, Managing Director, NV 
Nederlandse Gasunie, not dated (1978), l l p .  
Memorandum NV Nederlandse Gasunie aan de bijzon- 
dere commissie voor het stuk 14626, "Aanvoer van 
vloeibaar aardgas (LNG) in Nederland; de keuze van 
de aanlandingsplaats; het Gasunie-standpunt," 4 
October 1978, 4p. 
Jaaruer s lag  1978, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, 1979. 
S t u d i e  n a a r  d e  v e i l i g h e i d s a s p e k t e n  van e e n  L N G  
t e r m i n a l  aan d e  E e m s h a v e n  e n  a d v i e s  o m t r e n t  a a n -  
v a a r d b a a r h e i d ,  Provinciale Waterstaat van 
Groningen, Februar 1978,. 31p. 
Letter 2 March 1978 (61 14/4.K) Provinciaal Bestuur 
van Groningen to provincial committees, "aanland- 
ing vloeibaar aardgas in Groningen," 9p. 
NOTA v a n  gedepu teerde  s t a t e n  a a n  prov inc ia l e  s t a -  
t e n  i n z a k e  de  a a n l a n d i n g  van vloeib a a r  a a r d g a s  in 
d e  E e m s h a v e n ,  Nummer 56 / 1978, Provincie 
Groningen, 8 May 1978, 12p. 
NADERE NOTA van g e d e p u t e e r d e  s t a t e n  a a n  prov in -  
c ia l e  s t a t e n  i n z a k e  a a n l a n d i n g  van v loe ibaar  a a d -  
g a s  in de E e m h a v e n ,  nummer 56aI1978, Provincie 
Groningen, 16 May 1978, 9p. 
Kort ve r s lag  van d e  gezarnenl i jke  ve rgader ing  van 
d e  s t  a t  encomrniss ies  voor  economische  
a a n g e l e g e n h e d e n  e n  werkge l egenhe id ,  w e l z i j n ,  
w a t e r -  e n  wegbeheer  e n  m i r n t e l i j k e  o rden ing  e n  
a l g e m e n e  z a k e n  o p  v r i j d a g  19 rne i  in h e t  Prov in-  
c i e h u i s ,  Provincie Groningen, May (?) 1978, I l p .  
(mime 0). 
"Aanlanding vloeibaar aardgas in de Eemshaven," 
Provinciale Staten vergadering van 25 mei 1978, Pro- 
vincie Groningen, May/June (?) 1978, 13p. 
m o e i b a a ~  a a r d g a s  naar de E e m s h a v e n  - Visie  van 
h e t  prrruinciaal b e s t u u r  van  Oroningen ,  Provincie 
Groningen, 5 june 1978, I l p .  
Groningen 1978h Vloeibaar a a r d g a s  n a a r  d e  E e m s h a v e n  - Nadere  
o p m e r k i n g e n  v a n  het  college v a n  Gedeputeerde  S t a -  
t e n  v a n  Groningen,  Provincie Groningen, 27 June 
1978, 
Groningen 1978i Het v loe ibaar  a a r d g a s  e n  d e  E e m s h a v e n  - N i e u w  
c o m m e n t a a r  v a n  de  provzncie  Oroningen e n  h e t  
Havenschap  Delfz i j l ,  17 August 1978, 16p. 
Groningen 1978k "Kort verslag van de openbare hoorzitting te Uithuiz- 
errneeden betreffende de aanlanding van vloeibaar 
aardgas in de Eemshaven," (24 April 1978) mimeo. 
ICONA 1977 (report ICONA t g  Cabinet) "Beleidsadvies bij het 
ICONA, nr. 84, 12 Octoker 1977. 
ICONA 1978a (report ICONA to Cabinet) "Nader advie van de ICONA 
inzake de aanvoer van vloeibaar aardgas (LNG) in 
Nederland," ICONA, nr. 49, 21 February 1977. 
ICONA 1978b (report ICONA to Cabinet) "Aanvullend advies van de 
ICONA inzake de mogelijkheid van aanlandin van 
vloeibaar aardgas (LNG) in het Ems-gebied," ICONA, 
nr. 145, 1 June 1978. 
ICONA 1978c 
ICONA 1979 
IIASA 1982 
Kamer 1978 
(annual report 1977-78) Jaarver s lag  ICONA 1978-  
1 9 7 9 ,  ICONA, 1979. 
Jaarver s lag  ICONA 1 9 7 9 ,  ICONA, 1 980. 
Risk Ana ly s i s  a n d  Decision Processes:  The S i t ing  of 
LEG Faci l i t i es  in Four Countr ies ,  H .  Kunreuther, J.  
Linnerooth, e t  a l .  Preliminary Draft, Laxenburg, 
Austria, March 1982. Forthcoming as a Springer Ver- 
lag publication. 
"Aanlanding L.N.G.", letter to council of Ministers 
(Cabinet) Karner van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
de Veenkolonien en Oostelijk Groningen, Veendam, 
28 March 1978,3p. 
Koekkoek 1980 "Risico-analyse en de aanlandmg van LNG in Neder- 
land: een case study," Henk Koekkoek, Rijksuniver- 
steit Utrecht, concept (draft) June 1980, mimeo. 
KNRV 1978 M e m o r a n d u m  van d e  KNRV be t r e f f ende  de  a a n l a n -  
d i n g s p l a a t s  voor  LNG, Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Redersvereniging, 8 August 1978, 6p. 
Noordzee 1978a 
Noordzee 1978b 
NSP 1978 
Rijnmond 1977a 
Rijnmond 1977b 
Rijnrnond 1977c 
Rijnmond 1978a 
Rijnmond 1978b 
Rijnmond 1978c 
Rijnmond 1978d 
Rijnmond 1978e 
Rotterdam 1977a 
Rotterdam 197Ba 
Rotterdam 1978b 
Ouer d e  i n v o e r  v a n  v l o e i b a a r  a a r d g a s ,  uitgave werk- 
groep Noordzee, Harlingen, May 1978, 32p. 
N o t a  m e t  be t rekk ing  t o t  d e  i n v o e r  van a a r d g a s  in 
N e d e r l a n d ,  Werkgroep Noordzee, Harlingen, 4 
October 1978, 12p. 
Aanloop E e m s h a v e n  - r i s i c o  a n a l y s e  v o o r  d e  vaart 
m e t  e e n  LNG c a r r i e r ,  Nederlands Scheepsbouwkun- 
dig Proefstation, nr. 02625-1-MS, February 1978. 
T/loeibaar Aardgus  (collection of papers on LNG) 
Afdeling Voorlichting Openbaar Lichaam Rijnmond, 
1977. 
LNG e n  R i j n m n d ,  Openbaar Lichaam Rijnmond, 
October 1977. 
"Notitie inzake diverse aspecten verbonden aan de 
inspraakprocedure m.b.t. de eventuele aanlanding 
van LNG op de Maasvlakte," Openbaar Lichaam Rijn- 
mond, (afd. milieubeheer) 7 December 1977, mimeo. 
"Nota inzake de aanlanding van LNG" (policy state- 
ment), Openbaar Lichaam Rijnrnond 1978/613, litt. 
b&c, 7 June 1978, mimeo. 
(Rijnmond council) "Rijnmondraad, 26 June 1978, 
(120e vergadering) p. 1202-1243. 
(Rijnmond council) "Rijnmondraad", 6 July 1978 
(121e vergadering), pp. 1245-1258. 
letter DB Rijnrnond to Minister for Traffic and Public 
Works (22454 RdB/LV), 26 July 1978. 
Statement Rijnmond Public Authority to Parliamen- 
tary Committee 14626, 3 October 1978. 
LNG Aanvoer  v i e  R o t t e r d a m ,  Havenbedrijf der 
Gemeente Rotterdam, October 1977. 
notitie "Aanlanding LNG," Commissie voor de Haven 
en Economische Ontwikkeling , aan de Gemeen- 
teraad, June 1978, H.B. 75/47. 
LNG? Rotterdam! Nota van Burgemeester en 
Wethouders van Rotterdam, inzake de aanlanding 
van vloeibaar aardgas op de Maasvlakte, 1 Augur. 
1978. 
Rotterdam 1978c 
Rotterdam 1978d 
RPC 1977 
Schwarz 1980a 
Schwarz, M. 1980 
STUNET 1977a 
STUNET 1977b 
STUNET 1979 
TNO 1976 
TNO 1978 
TNO 1980 
Tweede Kamer 13122 
Tweede Kamer 14626 
"Aanlanding LNG," V e r z a m e l i n g  gedrukte stukken 
1978, volgnummer 174 H.B. nr. 75/47 (p.1019- 
1062), B&W Rotterdam. 16 juni 1978. 
NotuLen R a a d s v e r g a d e r i n g ,  donderdag 29 juni 1978, 
Gemeenteraad van Rotterdam, 29 juni 1978 (p.215- 
243). 
"Inventarisatie Besluitvormingsprocedure LNG- 
terminal," bijlage bij advies RPC 15-12-77, 
Rijksplanologische Commissie, 15 December 1977; 
bijlage 2, ICONA 1978a. 
"The ~ n e r ~ ~  Policy Situation and LEG Siting in the 
Netherlands," paper presented to IIASA Task Force 
Meeting LEG Facility Siting, Sept. 23-26, 1980, Laxen- 
burg, Austria, mimeo, J.J. Schwarz. 
"Information Paper: LNG-Siting in the Netherlands," 
paper submitted to IIASA Task Force Meeting, Lique- 
fied Energy Gases Facility Siting, September 23;26, 
1980, Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA. 
LNG T e r m i n a l  in d e  Noordzee ,  STUNET Projectgroep 
LNG Terminal, maart 1977. 
appendicies to STUNET 1977a (1 to XI) 
Wensel i jkheid I ndus t r i e -  e i l a n d ,  STUNET, 1979. 
E v a l u a t i e  van d e  g e v a r e n  v e r b o n d e n t  aan aanw e r ,  
ove r s lag  e n  ops lag  van v l o e i b a a r  a a r d g a s ,  TNO 
bureau explosieveiligheid, Decemer 1976. 
E v a l u a t i e  van d e  g e v a r e n  v e r b o n d e n  aan a a n v o e r ,  
ove r s lag  e n  ops lag  van v l o e i b a a r  a a r d g a s  met 
be t r ekk ing  to t  e m  Eems haven-  t e r m i n a l ,  bureau 
industriele veiligheid TNO, February 1978. 
De besLui tvorming  r o n d  d e  a a n l a n d i n g  van LNG in 
N e d e r l a n d ,  ir. H .  van Amerongen, TNO Werkgroep 
lndustriele Veiligheid, 1980, 76p., mimeo 
Ener g i eno ta ,  Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
zittin 1974-1975, 13122, 1974 (also referred to as 
Tweede Kamer 1974). 
R a p p o r t  Onderzoek  aanvoeT v l o e i b a a ~  a a r d g a s  (LNG) 
in N e d e r l a n d ,  Tweede Karner der Staten-Generaal, 
14626 (1977, 1978, 1979). nrs. 1-33. 
Tweede Kamer 15802 
Tweede Kamer 1974 
Tweede Kamer 1978a 
Tweede Kamer 1978b 
Zuid-Holland 197Ba 
Zuid-Holland 197Bb 
Zuid-Holland 1978c 
Zuid-Holland 197Bd 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, zitting 1979-80, 
15802, 1980 Energiebe le id .  
Energ ienota ,  2e Kamer zitting 1974-1975, 13 122, 
nrs. 1-2, Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Sep- 
tember. 
H a n d e l i n g e n  Zi t t ing  1978-  1 9 7 9 ,  Tweede Karner der 
Staten-Generaal, 1978 (numbers 5 and 6; October 
1978). 
R a p p o r t  Onderzoek a a n v o e r  v l o e i b a a r  a a r d g a s  (LNG) 
in N eder land ,  Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 
Zitting 1977-1978, 14626, nr. 11 (letter and policy 
memorandum "Nota met betrekking tot de aanland- 
ing van vloeibaar aardgas in Nederland met 2 
bijlagen"), 15 September 1978 (included in Tweede 
Kamer 14626). 
LNG Aanvoer o p  d e  M aas v lak t e :  j a  of n e e ? ,  provine 
Zuid-Holland, openbaar lichaam Rijnrnond gerneente 
Rotterdam, April 1978. 
Aanland ing  Vloeibaar A a r d g a s ,  (policy paper), 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid Holland (aan provinci- 
ale staten) vergadering June 1978. 
N o t u l e n  Frov inc ia le  S t a t e n  van Zuid-  Ho l land -  - 
Vergader ing  1 5  j u n i  1 9 7 8 ,  Provincie Zuid-Holland 15 
juni 1978 (~4349-437 1). 
"Standpunten van G.S. van Zuid-Holland en het 
gemeentebestuur van Rotterdam inzake de aanvoer, 
overslag en opslag van vloeibaar aardgas (LNG)", 
Statement to Parliamentary Committee 14626, 3 
October 1978. 
The following Dutch organizations and individuals were consulted by 
the author during the course of the research: 
Delfzijl Harbour Authority 
Groningen Provincial Authorities 
dr.ir. J.L.A. Jansen 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Ministry of Education and Science (Science Policy Directorate) 
Ministry of Health and Environmental Protection 
Ministry of Home Affairs 
Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works (ICONA) 
Natuur en Milieu Foundation 
N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie 
Noordzee Working Group 
drs. A.P.J. Planken 
mr. A.A. van Rhijn 
Rijnmond Public Authority 
Rotterdam Harbour Authority 
TNO Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research 
Zuid-Holland Provincial Authorities 
